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ABSTRACT 
Who controls the nomination in gubernatorial elections? This dissertation seeks to answer this 
s j i~~ple  question. Parties have classically been the organizations held responsible for throwing 
their collective effort behind a candidate and controlling the nominations. Yet, in recent years, 
scliolai-s have noted a steady weakening of American political parties through a succession of 
major alterations in the political landscape: the loss of patronage-based organizations 
traditionally used to uphold party organizations; competition from interest groups; and the 
ascendant y of media-based campaigns and political consultants which buoy candidates' personal 
organizations. Not only that, recent work suggests that national party organizations have 
displaced their state-level counterparts. The combined result of these strains on the party system, 
sc:holars conclude, is the rise of a candidate-centered politics and of an electoral politics that can 
110 longer count parties as critical factors in the political system. 
My dissertation tests whether parties have been dealt out of the nominations process in 
gubernatorial primary elections in six states: Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, New 
Mexico, and Texas. My principal evidence is elite public endorsements of candidates. I find that 
the tempo, quantity, and quality of endorsement activity varies from election to election 
according to many factors. My research finds that endorsement activity fluctuates within four 
principal domains - across election type (general or primary), across the level of competition in a 
given election, across party, and across states. Contrary to many recent studies, I do not find 
evidence of an "extended party" - of a broad set of actors (interest groups and highly-partisan 
iilfluential elites) that help in the nominee selection process in four of my six case studies. 
Instead, I find many states with strong parties that expressly do not have large numbers of 
important groups and individuals involved. Moreover, in states in which major groups and 
influential individuals are involved to a high degree, I find evidence of weak, factionalized 
pa.rties. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND PUZZLE 
Who controls the nominations process in gubernatorial elections? This dissertation seeks 
to answer this simple question. Parties have classically been the organizations held responsible 
for  throwing their collective effort behind a candidate and controlling the nominations. Yet, in 
recent years, scholars have noted a steady weakening of American political parties tlvough a 
succession of major alterations in the political landscape: the loss of patronage-based 
organizations traditionally used to uphold party organizations; competition from interest groups; 
and the asce~ldancy of media-based campaigns and political consultants which buoy candidates' 
personal organizations. Not only that, recent work suggests that national party organizations have 
displaced their state-level counterparts. The combined result of these strains on the party systein, 
scholars conclude, is the rise of a candidate-centered politics and of an electoral politics that can 
no longer count parties as critical factors in the political system. 
Although there is no question that these trends have had a profound impact on the 
American party system and have altered the behavior of parties, it is imperative to ask how 
uniforn are these effects both nationally and across the fifty states. The focus of this dissertation 
is state-level political parties. The immense variety of regulations governing state parties and 
elections, should, prima facie, suggest wide variation in how state party systems have responded 
to the trends noted above. First, I assess in what ways party systems vary across the states. I shed 
light on three issues: Why the Democratic party in New Mexico, differs from the Democratic 
party in Massachusetts which differs from the Democratic party in Texas in terrns of who is 
involved in party politics, in terms of how primary elections are contested, and in terms of what 
coalitions develop within parties. 
The second issue revolves around the data that I use to address the question of how the 
vanation across party systems can be explained. I have collected all publicly declared 
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endorsements of gubematorial candidates in primary and general elections from interest groups, 
from individuals, from parties, and from many other political actors. For my purposes, 
endorsements serve as "signals" from elites regarding which candidate is most acceptable and 
ultimately most winnable. Hence, my questions vis-a-vis endorsements include: How important 
are endorsements in gubernatorial elections, and what is their purpose? Do some types of 
endorse~nents matter more than others? Do endorsements from officeholders, for example, trump 
endorsements from groups? What kinds of political players involve themselves in elections from 
one year to the next and what kinds of players engage intermittently? The dissertation ai~alyzes 
what types group coalitions and what types of individuals emerge from election cycle to election 
cycle, and how these coalitions change over time. My investigation points to the social iletworks 
involved in gubematorial elections and asks who is immersed in these networks. In addition, this 
dissertation sheds light on how campaigns think strategically about garnering endorsements and 
how individuals and groups deliberate on their decisions to grant or withhold endorsements. 
Finally, I wish to emphasize that the data collected for this dissertation serves as a 
contribution to political science. My dataset is entirely original. Results emerging froin it explain 
differences that appear from state to state, from election to election and from primaries to general 
elections. Such information is not only useful for the study of endorsements themselves, it is also 
worthwhile simply because the issues have received little attention from scholars. 
This dissertation sheds light on these and related issues. I have mapped out the universe 
of publicly declared endorsements of gubematorial primary- and general-election candidates in 
six states - Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, and Texas. Massachusetts 
served as my in-depth case-study, in which I have examined the thirteen elections between 1978 
and 2002; in all other states, I examined a shorter time-period, between 1994 and 2002. The 
chosen states represent different types with regard to party strength, levels of partisan 
competition, and endorsement activity. 
The Argument in Brief 
Next to presidential elections and many senate elections, gubernatorial elections draw 
attention. In almost every election, endorsement activity occurs. Yet the tempo, the quantity, and 
the quality of endorsement activity varies from election to election according to many factors. 
My research finds that endorsement activity fluctuates within four principal domains - across 
election type (general or primary), across the level of competition in a given election, across 
paity, and across states. Finally, I investigate who or what is doing the endorsing. Given such 
oscillations, what accounts for the variation? 
My key findings are as follows: 
Parties: I do not find evidence of an "extended party" - of a broad set of actors (interest 
groups and highly-partisan influential elites) that help in the nominee selection process in four of 
my six case studies. Instead, I find many states with strong parties that expressly do not have 
large numbers of important groups and individuals involved. Moreover, in states in which major 
groups and influential individuals are involved to a high degree, I find evidence of weak, 
factionalized parties. In addition, in the Massachusetts Democratic party I found that candidates 
often do not compete for the same endorsements. Rather, they look for endorsements that 
represent their contrasting ideological positions. 
Incumbents, challengers, and endorsements: In general, in primary elections, incumbents 
typically do not collect many (if any) endorsements, unless they are "running scared." When 
incumbents do not face any high-quality challengers they tend not to ask for endorsements and 
groups tend to reserve their endorsements for the general election. This often means, therefore, 
that when incumbents are running, elections become low-information events; opposition-party 
high-quality or low-quality challengers in primary or general elections simply do not generate as 
Inany endorsements and therefore the informational value of endorsements din~inishes 
significantly. 
Contested versus uncontested primaries and endorsements: In general, contested primary 
elections draw greater endorsement activity than non-contested primaries. When there is an 
uncontested primary, the general election is typically where the endorsement activity is. 
The next part of this introductory chapter proceeds by taking a step back to define some 
of the concepts dealt with in this dissertation. In the next section, I define the key concepts and 
variables employed in my study. I first define the term "party," after which I discuss what 
constitutes a "party system." Defining these terms up front avoids confusion, motivates and 
grounds the dissertation, and firmly establishes the fact that very real differences exist between 
parties of the same name across time and across space. 
What is a Party? 
For all of the changes that have taken place in the development of parties in the twentieth 
century, from the "old" party to the "new" party (Schlesinger 1985), the essential definition of 
what a party is remains unchanged: a party is an election mechanism; a political party is "a teain 
seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election" 
(Downs 1957). Two points about this definition immediately strike one: first, the definition 
focuses on office seekers, not on voters; second, the definition excludes policy commitment. Yet 
both points focus on office seekers and the exclusion of policy commitment and leaves neither 
out of the process, for Downs' entire theory of parties is predicated on the idea that parties seek 
to maximize the votes cast for them, and that parties rely on voter preferences to accomplish this 
task. Voters, after all, must choose among competing parties. Downs' definition of party is both 
precise in that the focus is on electoral victory, and broad in that it allows considerable flexibility 
in determining what constitutes the "team." 
Schlesinger (1985) argues that a theory of parties must not only define the term party, but 
inust also define the term "party organization", because it is in the "organization" that the actual 
work of parties takes place. Schlesinger's characterization of party organization includes "all . . 
cooperative, deliberate activities among two or more people aimed at capturing elective office in 
the ilame of the party" (Schlesinger 1985). In historical terms, Schlesinger asserts, the 
development of party organizations came about because of the ongoing effort of each party to 
guarantee that a single candidate would stand in the general election and, moreover, that all 
elements of the party unite behind that candidate. 
Parties do more than seek office, they do inore than recruit and put forth a winnable 
candidate, and they do more than unite behind that candidate. Parties do more than organize 
elections. They also organize political life within legislatures and within the electorate. Iil the 
legislature, parties are institutions designed to advance the achievement of collective choices - 
choic:es that can only be accomplished through majority rule. Parties solve the problem of how to 
broadly coalesce around a set of values, interests, and concerns - they are the mechanism that 
allows politicians to achieve and maintain policy majorities. 
In the electorate, parties serve a similar function. In order to win elective office, 
politicians must mobilize resources, workers, and ultimately voters. Politicians must persuade 
voters and must position themselves in relation to their opposition. To do so effectively, 
politicians turn to parties, for it is only in through the backing of an organized team or some very 
potent organizational assistance that candidates can hope to get elected. Parties, therefore, help 
politicians resolve the problem of how to coerce rational and self-interested individuals into 
sublimating some of their personal interests to certain group interests (Olson 1965)' 
Parties are vital to democratic health: they foster political participation through voter 
illobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993); they provide information to voters; they create 
policy coalitions; they organize the activities of government to facilitate collective action. Parties 
articulate and aggregate interests, and they ultimately hold elected officials accountable. We 
might expect, therefore, that parties behave similarly across time and across space. No. Varying 
institutional arrangements, electoral conditions, and degree of factionalization all contribute to 
the diversity of party behavior. Why then, do we speak of state "party systems" beyond the 
national two-party system and how do we understand variation across these systems? 
What is a Party System? 
A party "system" may be defined in any of several ways. On the one hand, some scholars 
draw a comparison between the American winner-take-all two-party system and the multi-party 
proportional representation systems of Europe, describing a party system in terms of the way 
electoral rules shape competition. On the other hand, scholars of American history describe a 
sequence of five (or possibly six) historical party systems and focus on the characteristics of the 
distinct coalitions that distinguished each. Finally, a third group of scholars, endeavoring to 
compare parties within states, have categorized states along dimensions which include the 
' Mancur Olson lays out The Logic of Collective Action succinctly: "But it is not in fact true that the idea 
that groups will act in their self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested behavior. It 
does 170t follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they 
would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested. Indeed unless the number of 
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act 
in their conlmon interest, rational, self-i~zterested individuals will not act to achieve their colnnzolz or group 
interests " (Olson 1965: 2) 
characteristics of party organizations and activities, the influence of these organizations upon 
voting behavior, party structure and recruitment patterns, inter-party competitiveness, and the 
ideological leanings of states and their parties. 
Why is there such variation across the one hundred state Democratic and Republican 
parties? Why is the Massachusetts Democratic Party different from the Texas Democratic Party, 
and why do both of these differ from the national Democratic Party? To explain why variation 
exists between the two parties across the fifty states, we need to reflect on the historical 
development of political parties in the United States. The founders did not create a party system, 
nor did they encourage one to develop at the country's inception. They were, in fact, more 
interested in blocking party formation. George Washington, in his farewell address, "warn[ed] . . . 
ill the most solemn manner against the baneful effect of the Spirit of Party, generally" 
(Cunningham 1965). James Madison most famously and eloquently argued against parties, for, 
he said, they would only serve as a channel for factional  choice^.^ Madison deemed factions 
odious because they were "adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community" (Wills 1982). Organized interests, he insisted, would 
"invade the rights of other citizens" (Wills 1982); hence, he argued vigorously for a large, 
expansive national government which would make it difficult for majorities to form, let alone act 
in concert. A large national government was, he advised, the best check on majority power. 
I11 spite of Madison's warnings and those of others, parties were created anyway. Some 
said they needed to exist for only a short period of time in order to serve a specific function, and 
then American life could move ahead without them. Nevertheless, the very fact that early 
architects quickly recognized the functionality of parties points clearly to their necessity. Parties 
It is certainly ironic that Madison himself formed what became the basis for the first organized national 
polj tical party, the Democratic Republicans, organized in oppositioil to the policies of president John Adams. 
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solve many problems, including perhaps the most basic of all political problems - the collective 
action problem. In a diverse, large republic - the very diverse and large republic that Madisoil 
urged - how do you patch together a majority? The answer: with political parties. Parties 
aggregate interests so that politicians can appeal to enough voters to form majority coalitions 
(Eldersveld 1966; Key 1964; Sorauf 1963). Parties exist because they solve multiple problems of 
governance. 
If parties simply help facilitate governance through the aggregation of interests, then why 
do we find variation in party strength over time and space? It certainly cannot be the case that 
some states simply do not have as many collective action problems as others and therefore do not 
need as strong parties as others do. Returning to the original premise, I noted that the founders 
did not write parties into the Constitution nor did they even work to create a legal entity that 
resembled a party. Instead, both national and state politicians had to develop parties themselves. 
Parties at both the state and national level were not created from above, but emerged from 
within to develop as separate, distinct entities (Huckshom 1976). They did not start out as 
hierarchical organizations. Early state political parties were loose organizations of every shape 
and manner, lacking centralized authority, party discipline, and sustained membership. U. S . 
parties in general, until well after the Civil War, existed as private organizations outside the 
purview of the Constitution and of state laws. The early American state party system was 
uneven, incoherent and wildly diverse. Some states had, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
developed strong, effective parties performing all the classic functions of political parties. Other 
states produced immature party organizations that rarely performed any functions at all. 
Although state party organizations certainly matured as the country grew, the idea that some 
state parties were moribund and useless did not escape V.O. Key, who observed as late as 1956, 
The most apparent, and perhaps the fundamental, incapacity of state parties lies in 
the frequency with which the leadership corps is fractionalized and lacking in 
both capacity and organization for action. Some state party organizations, to be 
sure, have an evident vitality as well as a fairly high degree of coherence. Yet, a 
more common situation is the almost complete absence of a functioning statewide 
organization" (Key 1956). 
The historical development of each state - its demographic trends, evolving legal 
regu.lations, and other events in both the private and public sectors - greatly influences the 
structure and development of each state's political parties. Much has been written about variation 
in state political systems, and scholars have attributed the variation to variables such as political 
culture, patterns of two-party competition, differences in state economies, constitutional and 
legal provisions, including the structure of the legislature, the organization and history of the 
parties, and the ways in which primary and general elections are carried out. I will discuss each 
of these variables in turn. 
Pokitical Culture 
An extensive literature links variation between states to the unique history and traditions 
of each state - i.e. the state'spolitical culture. The general argument asserted by proponents of 
the political culture argument is that "differences in the habits, concerns, and attitudes that exist" 
between states, "influence political life in the various states" (Elazar 1972, 85). These differences 
encompass aspects of state development such as population - the distinct racial, ethnic, and 
re:l:igious groups that historically dominated a state's political life, e.g. the Irish Catholics in 
Massachusetts. Political culture scholars also examine the economic and social developments of 
a state and its critical political movements, such as the Progressive movement during the early 
twentieth century in Wisconsin, Minnesota and the Dakotas. 
Elazar's (1 972) distinction between states in which the "individualistic", "moralistic", 
and "traditionalistic" subcultures prevail, offers a widely cited framework within which to assess 
political culture. The "moralistic" political subculture identified by Elazar in the states of upper 
New England, the upper Middle West and portions of the West (a subculture which emphasized 
a positive view of government, bureaucracy and public participation) developed programmatic, 
issue-oriented groupings that ultimately resulted in ideologically distinct parties. His 
"individualistic" political culture states of the middle-Atlantic through Illinois (which value 
limited government) developed pragmatic, j ob-oriented parties that ultimately resulted in less 
ideologically distinct parties. Finally, his "traditionalistic" culture states of the South (which de- 
emphasize political participation and focus more on the maintenance of the existing social order) 
"tend to have loose one-party systems if they have political cultures at all" (Elazar 1972: 99). 
Historical Legacy of Local Party Organization Strength 
Mayhew (1986) endeavored to classify states on the historical presence or absence of 
local "traditional party organizations" (TPOs) during the 1960s and 1970s. Mayhew's five-point 
scale of "TPO-ness" measures the presence in states of local party organizations that (1) had 
substantial autonomy (i.e. were not dominated by corporate or labor power); (2) lasted a long 
time; (3) had a hierarchical internal structure; (4) regularly tried to nominate candidates for many 
offices up and down the ballot; and (5) relied on material incentives rather than purpose 
iilcentives to "engage . . . people to do organization work or to supply organization support" 
(Mayhew 1986: 19-20). Mayhew scores all fifty states using his own judgment based on reading 
academic and journalistic literature on local parties in each state. Mayhew gives high TPO scores 
(4-5) to those states that were historically dominated by his "traditional" organizations (e.g. 
Tammany Hall in New York or the Pendergast Organization in Missouri). States with low TPO 
scores (1 -2) historically have never been dominated by such a party. Although TPOs have 
disappeared from the American party landscape, Mayhew contends that their historical presence 
can still be felt and can be associated with differences between states on a number of variables 
relating to public policy. He shows a link, for example, between the relative size of a state's 
public economy and the presence of a TPO - states with a history of traditional parties, he 
contends, tend to have slnaller public economies than do states without such parties. Other 
scholars have used Mayhew's scoring to discern larger trends in American politics. Nagel's 1996 
study examining voter turnout in gubernatorial and senatorial races since 1928 concluded that the 
collapse of TPOs accounted for "an important part of the decline in U.S. turnout since the 
1960s," since, he argued, traditional, patronage-based party machines had historically mobilized 
lower socio-economic populations populations (Nagel 1996: 792). 
State Party Ideologies 
Recent work has shown wide ideological variation across states and has demonstrated the 
implications of such ideological distinctiveness on public policy outcomes. Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver's work (1993) established wide inter-party ideological variation across states based on 
attitudes exhibited by the elite (elected officials and party activists) and the mass (party 
identifiers in the electorate). Erikson et al. showed that state party ideologies are, in part, a 
reflectioil of state opinion, which itself is a reflection of the state's political culture - "the 
expectations and values that citizens (but mainly elites) share as they conduct the business of 
governing" (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993: 150). State public opinion drives the policy 
tendency of the states, they argue. "Over time, state electorates choose a mix of Democratic and 
Republican policy-makers that reflects the degree to which the parties represent the electorate's 
ideological  interest^."^ 
Party Con~petition and Party Strength 
Other scholars have attempted to show an association between the level of party 
competition and party strength. Strong party states (such as Northern and Midwestern states) 
tend to be those with historical legacies of strong machines. In these same states we find state 
legislative parties that are relatively cohesive on important issues and state parties that have wide 
influence over the choice of nominees (Jewel1 and Whicker 1994). Weak party states, especially 
Southein states, by contrast tend to be those states in which one party dominates and where 
political competition (where exigent) is much more prevalent within parties than it is between 
parties. Precisely because of this dominance neither party needs to be particularly well-financed 
or organized to win. The dominant party simply always wins, and the minority party neither has 
nor can collect the resources necessary to become competitive. Hence, the collective action 
problem is largely solved by default rather than by skillful coalition-building. Western states, 
however, which historically were home to the Populist tradition and,to several anti-party 
organization and anti-boss movements, tend also to be relatively weak-party states with low 
levels of legislative party cohesiveness and low levels of party competition. 
Intra-Party Competition 
I11 a related set of scholarly endeavors, political scientists have examined the factors that 
determine the nature of intra-party competition in the states - what happens when one party 
dominates, as in the South? Key (1 949), for example, examined variation in factionalism in the 
Confederate South in order to explain electoral divisiveness. Riker (1962) gave fonnal 
d.evelopment to Key's explanation, hypothesizing that when a single party dominates in a state, 
all electoral competition is channeled through the state's primary. The dominant party's primary, 
therefore, is the sole route to winning office, and as a result several candidates contest the 
nomination. By contrast, in states with high levels of inter-party competition, fewer candidates 
vie for office. This is because (1): the likelihood of actually winning higher office is lesselled by 
the presence of a strong opposition party in the general election; and (2): candidates and party 
leaders alike try hard to keep competition and intra-party fragmentation to a i~linimum so as not 
to cause defeat in the general election. Berry and Canon (1993) call this conclusion the 
"opposition hypothesis." 
An alternative hypothesis, which is not mutually exclusive with the previous one, 
suggests that electoral structure shapes electoral competition. Duverger (1 954), in a cross- 
niiitional comparison, asserted that first-past-the-post systems induce pre-election coalescence 
leading to two-party competition. He concluded that under proportional representation systems 
and other systems that reward more than one candidate, benefits are more spread out, making 
pre-election unity less imperative and less necessary, and multiparty systems tend to be the 
result. A similar logic applies to the American case and to the primary structure. Ten states in the 
Anierican South offer runoff elections for cases in which no candidate receives a vote-majority 
in the first primary. Both Key (1949) and Canon (1 978) argue that this double primary system 
encourages greater numbers of candidates to participate because, "even losers can secure rewards 
by bargaining and coalescing with the candidates competing in the runoff' (Berry 1 993 : 45 5). 
Berry and Canon's 1993 study, using a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of data fro111 
states going back as far as 1919, offers support for both hypotheses, but a nuanced support: 
"[d]ouble primaries can be expected to produce the greatest increase in competitiveness over 
single primaries when the opposition party is very weak. . ." (Berry 1993 : 470). 
Reconceptualizing Parties' Electoral Role 
The explanations presented thus far infonn us about the variety of political culture, party 
strength, party activity, and party structure across the fifty states. Yet these explanations leave 
unanswered questions. The first category of questions poses a critique of existing literature: 
While Mayhew's analysis of TPOs may shed light on public policy questions and even on 
political participation generally, it does not tell us whether the historical presence or absence of 
TPOs sheds light on the current condition of state political parties. TPOs vanished at the end of 
the 1 960s. Then what? Do the remaining vestiges of TPOs tell us anything about the 
Massachusetts Democratic party or the Texas Republican party? Again, Elazar's political 
subcultures may conjure a familiar ring, yet the very notion that we could easily divide the 
hundred state parties into those that are programmatic and issue-oriented versus and those that 
discourage participation and maintain the overriding social order seems nearly impossible, given 
the nationalization of the parties and the fluidity of the concepts themselves. Further, Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver's research on public opinion, though extremely useful, cannot, in and of 
itself, tell us much about who controls nominations procedures in states and how powerful are 
the parties. Work on partisan competition in states does not shed light on who or what drives the 
competition or on what implications the level of competition has for the level of participation by 
certain interest groups, individuals, and other participants. Does the number of candidates in a 
given election, for example, drive levels of participation of interest groups and other actors? 
Scholars of congressional, presidential, and gubernatorial nominations have tended to 
focus their attention on candidates - on their specific qualifications, qualities, and ambitions - 
not on the party insiders, the interest groups, not the activists that make up the increasingly wider 
riii~llge of nomination participants. Political science has produced solid research informing us of 
the ambitions, motivations, and qualities that make candidates successful. But it has, thus far, 
failed to explain how parties, especially at the nomination stage, affect candidates' personal 
a1111bition and the nomination process itself. By focusing attention on candidates and on party 
organization and on broadly based analyses of state party strengths and weaknesses, political 
science has failed to consider additional or alternative sources of party strength and weakness. 
A literature now emerging is reconceptualizing the role of parties in elections by 
expanding the very definition of the word to encompass party elites who are not necessarily its 
"official" representatives and who neither hold elective office nor have any official link to the 
party. Recent scholarship has demonstrated, for example, that staff (campaign professionals and 
those who work in political offices in government) are party loyalists whose decisions about 
which candidate or member to work for often signal party insider support (Monroe 2001 ; 
Beinstein 2000; Bemstein and Dominguez 2003). Cohen et a1 (2001) have shown that candidates 
at the presidential level who receive the kind of broad-based support from party elites that is 
signaled through endorsements, are more likely to win their party's nomination. Developing a 
lnore thorough understanding of party coalitions adds several new sets of actors to the mix - 
loyal donors, activists who staff candidate campaigns, hired guns, interest groups, and other key 
players - and can help us better to understand their overall influence on the electoral process. 
Cohen and his colleagues at UCLA employ the broader definition of party elites for the 
simple reason, they argue, that parties have experienced a resurgence since the 1970s because 
they have adapted to a changed environment. In adapting (Cohen et a1 argue), parties have 
abandoned traditional hierarchies and have developed more loosely structured networks - 
networks that incorporate people and groups who work regularly for the party and who control 
resources beyond simply their own votes. This definition of party includes groups that are allied 
to it over the long-term and who participate in its councils, such as unions and pro-choice groups 
on the left, and the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the Chstian Coalition on the right. 
Cohen et a1 argue, quite simply, that "[lleaders of such interest groups have loyalties both to their 
party and to their group . . . [I]f they regularly involve themselves in party councils and in 
electoral politics on behalf of the parties, they are . . . part of the party's leadership" and an "arm 
of the contemporary political party" (Cohen et al. 2001). This new organizational form allows 
parties to continue to engage in their essential and classical functions - as organizations that put 
foi-th a winnable candidate and coalesce behind that choice. 
Cohen et al's broad definition of party raises important questions: do parties themselves 
really control nominations (presidential or gubernatorial), or is the power of interest groups such 
that they now can dictate which candidate will be nominated, or is what appears to be party 
stability actually a series of candidates with strong ad hoc followings? 
Analyzing Endorsements in 'Elections 
The literature on participation in electoral politics is wide and varied. Over the last fifty 
years or so of political science research, scholars have unpacked the individual's calculus of 
decision-making and voting, the group's motivation and ability to participate, and the politiciai~'~ 
d.ecision to run for and maintain political office. In attempting to understand the endorsement 
prjocess, we must deal with the following lines of research unpacked by scholars: 
Do endorsements provide information to individual voters and, if so, how? This question 
is especially important since so many of the endorsements we examine occur in primary 
elections absent the party cue; 
how do groups make decisions to endorse and what strings come attached; 
and how and why do politicians give endorsements and also how do they secure them for 
tkieinselves. 
The current state of research on endorsements, however, deals with only one narrow band 
of the topic, and even there the evidence is scant. There are two main ways of analyzing the role 
of ei~dorsements in the political process: empirical studies that examine the impact of specific 
eildorsers in specific elections; and formal models that endeavor to determine what impact 
e~ldorsements have on imperfectly informed voters. I shall deal with each of these in turn. 
Einlpirical Examinations of Endorsements 
Most enzpirical examinations of endorsements suffer from a short time-line and a limited 
number. Almost all (though not all) empirical studies, for example, restrict their examinations to 
one or two election cycles, meaning that they need to account for the idiosyncrasies in the 
election years chosen. Most scholars examining endorsements focus their inquiry on a particular 
type of endorsement (e.g. labor or newspapers), on a specific endorser (e.g the National Rifle 
Association or the Christian Coalition), or on a group of endorsements for or against specific 
ba~llot initiatives. The formal literature, by contrast, focuses almost exclusively on endorsements 
from interest groups. 
The role of labor unions presents an interesting case in point, being one of the most active 
groups in electoral politics. They endorse; they rally their members; they launch massive get-out- 
the-vote drives, and much more. Yet we do not have a clear picture of how much labor union 
inembers buy in to the recommendations of the leadership when they enter the voting booth. For 
example, studies such as Converse and Campbell's (Converse and Campbell 1968; Kornhauser 
1956; Sousa 1993) indicate that labor union endorsements affect the voting behavior of its 
members. Komhauser et a1 W'en Labor Votes (1956), examines the voting behavior of Detroit 
UAW-CIO members in the 1952 presidential election, finding that, "On the whole, auto workers 
in the Detroit area were found to vote in agreement with union recommendations." However, a 
growing body of more recent studies suggest that labor's ability to successfully mobilize their 
membership depends on the group's organizational strength in a given locale (Radcliff 2001), on 
the degree to which members of the group have competing loyalties, on how well the group 
manages these (Clark and Masters 2001), and finally on how politicized the group members are 
in the first place (Gimpel 1998). 
Newspaper endorsements, as a set of specific endorsements, differ dramatically from 
group endorsements. Newspapers simply take a side and declare that stance at a strategically 
opportune moment. They need not to mobilize members, nor do they need to pour resources into 
member education. Literature examining newspaper endorsements has found that endorsed 
candidates' vote share increases by about 1 to 5 percentage points as a result of an endorsement 
(Ansolabehere, Lessem, and James M. Snyder 2004). 
Some investigations focus on specific groups during specific elections. A recent study by 
Kenny et a1 (2004) looks at the influence of the NRA in contested congressional elections in 
1994 and 1996. They find that NRA endorsements had a statistically discemable effect 011 
Republican candidates but not on Democrats in 1994, while they find no discemable effect of 
eitl~er in the 1996 elections. 
Another study which examines a specific election centers on the effect of group 
endorsements in a presidential nomination contest. Rapoport et al. (1991) surveyed delegates to 
the 1984 National Democratic Party convention to discern whether group endorsements affected 
candidate support or pre-nomination activity. They found that unions and teachers' groups had a 
significant effect, while women's groups had no effect. They conjecture that the difference arises 
fi-om each group's "history of partisan political involvement, their base in the workplace, and 
their inore hierarchical structure" (Rapaport, Stone, and Abramowitz 199 1). 
Schlozman and Tiemey (1986), who analyze interest group activity, find no systematic 
evidence that scorecards or endorsements make any notable difference in electoral outcomes. 
Providing volunteers, they point out, requires local branches and large memberships - both 
assets that most interest groups and voluntary associations do not have. Maisel and Wayne 
(1 993), suggest that interest groups have an occasional impact when they rate candidates, but that 
it is sporadic at best. 
Based on the most recent literature, we conclude that in general terms single-issue 
g~-cups, groups with money, groups with a large membership and those with a history of political 
participation are the ones best placed to persuade and mobilize members to participate. 
Formal Examinations of Endorsements 
The fonnal literature on endorsements began with a series of articles by econoinists 
Mc:I<elvey and Ordeshook in the mid- 1980s. McKelvey and Ordeshook sought to resolve a 
se:eming contradiction: on the one hand, study after study had demonstrated that voters relied on 
and possessed extremely low levels of information to make decisions in the voting booth. On the 
other hand, the rational choice literature had developed lofty assumptions about the level of voter 
lu~owledge. Scholars sought to bring the infonnational assumptions of rational choice models 
into line with the empirical evidence which indicated low levels of voter information. When 
voters do not possess perfect infonnation and when infonnation is costly to obtain relative to its 
expected benefit, voters will, McKelvey and Ordeshook suggested, take their cues from other 
voters, from interest groups, from the historical behavior of candidates, and from poll results, 
with the result that voters behave as if fully informed. Thus endorsements serve as an 
infonnational shortcut. (Gregg 1970; Lupia 199 1 ; Magleby 1984). 
Uhlaner (1989) followed in McKelvey and Ordeshook's footsteps and made a case that 
individuals make their vote choice within a social structure. Individual affiliations to groups 
make a difference when and if group leaders choose to increase the consumption benefits of 
action to their members. 
I seek to improve on the literature in two ways: 1) Because my examination of 
endorsements does not center on any single type of endorsement from a single group or type of 
group, but examines the universe of endorsements, I trace not only the impact of certain specific 
endorsements, but also the overall level of endorsement activity from election to election. 2) My 
research looks at a series of elections across both time and space, giving me greater purchase on 
how electoral activity differs across states and across elections. 
(IH,4PTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN 
In the first chapter I outlined the driving question behind my research: who controls 
gubeillatorial nominations? I then asserted that though parties have classically been the vehicles 
L 
in charge of nominations, several major trends may have diminished the importance of parties 
and therefore their importance in the control of nominations. The task of this dissertation, I 
suggested, is to discern whether we find different constellations of "control" of nominations 
procedures in different states and why that might be. 
Before attempting to discern who controls nominations in a given state's gubernatorial 
contest, we must investigate what we mean by "control." Further, we need to indicate how we 
measure "control." However, even before we deal with either of these issues, we must develop 
familiarity with key aspects of state party nominations processes and procedures. The section 
that follows contains a very brief overview of the history of primary elections and how they 
came to be instituted. Next, there is an examination of the ins and outs of what are called 
preprima~y party endorsements, one means by which parties fought the establishment of direct 
pirimaries. Preprimary party endorsements are one substantial difference found in the states under 
investigation. Finally, I continue my previous examination of nominations procedures and 
discuss what control means. At that point, I can specify some hypotheses. 
Overview: Purposes and Functions of Primaries and Party Endorsements 
PI-imaries 
During the early 1900s, most states passed legislation establishing state-run primaries as 
the principal method of selecting party nominees for elected office. Leon Epstein writes, "the 
direct primary quickly became as American as apple pie . . . by 191 7, all but four states had 
direct-primary laws for at least some state offices" (Epstein 1986). Malcolm Jewel1 agrees that 
"the adoption of the direct primary must have been one of the most rapidly adopted state reforms 
not mandated or encouraged by the federal government" (Jewell 1984). While there are 
variations among states in terms of which offices employ the primary, no state is without a 
primary syste~n for at least some offices. The main reason driving the adoption of the primary, 
argues V.O. Key, was the dual desire to "make feasible popular participation in nominations" 
and the move, especially by the Progressive movement, "to limit or destroy the power of party 
organizations" (Key 1964: 37 1). Progressives argued that party organizations were corrupt to the 
point of "political robbery," and, said Wisconsin's Robert La Follette, "If bad men control the 
nominations, we cannot have good government" (Torrelle 1920, cited by Jewell, 1984: 7). 
Party organizations did not close shop, however. Instead, they adapted. They developed 
"coping mechanisms" which both maintained their power and asserted it in new ways (Walcott 
1980: 37). The "power" that parties wanted to maintain, it should be noted, was the power to 
screen potential candidates - the power to present voters with a "slate" - the power to put forth a 
team of winnable candidates for general election. One coping mechanism that parties used to 
retain their power was the closedprimary - a primary election that allows only those voters who 
register in advance of the election to vote. Eleven states have closed primaries. In half of the 
states, voters must establish their party registration nearly a year in advance of the election 
(Jewell and Morehouse, 2001). Fifteen additional states have a closed primary system that allows 
voters to switch party registration right up to election day. Jewell and Morehouse (2001) note 
that "little practical difference" exists between some of the more flexible closed primaries and 
some f o i ~ l ~ s  of open primaries, "except that a record is usually kept of each voter's party 
registration" (Jewell and Morehouse 200 1 : 1 04). 
Party Endorsement 
Another mechanism party organizations adopted to ensure their survival was the party 
enclo~*senzent. Jewell notes that "If primary legislation was a weapon used by those challengii~g 
party leadership, the endorsement process may be considered a weapon used by party leadership 
to maintain a share of power. It was a reaction to the institution of the primary" (Jewell 1984: 
40). 
Party endorsement - also called preprimary party endorsement - is an official expression 
of preference for a candidate or a set of candidates by a political party. An official political party, 
however, can be conceived of in one of three ways: first, it can be the party as in the party 
convel~tion; second, it can be the party as in an oficial standingparty colnlnittee such as the state 
party central cormnittee; or third, it can be the party as in an ad hocparty body. An official party 
ei~dorsement is not an endorsement fiom a single party official, nor is it an endorsement fro111 an 
unofficial party faction, nor even from a group of key members of a party. What distinguishes a 
pi-eprimary party endorsement from other kinds of endorsements is that it truly is official: many 
states' party rules and regulations and even some state laws require preprimary party 
endorsements and have specific dates upon which these endorsements must be made. 
Scholars examining state political parties often divide preprimary party endorsements 
into two categories - those that are specifically sanctioned by state law, and tl~ose that are not. 
Eindorsements sanctioned by state law are often referred to as "formal," whereas endorsements 
without such sanction are called "informal." Formal endorsements carry potential benefits for the 
endorsee, such as a notation on the ballot indicating party endorsement, a specific position 011 the 
ballot, or automatic inclusion on the ballot without needing to file petitions or pay fees. Infonnal 
endorsements are usually made by state party leaders or by party committees behind closed 
doors. A third category of endorsement lies somewhere between these two - it is a party 
endorsement not written into state law, but required by party rule. This last type of endorsement 
does not carry any "official" advantages, but it may carry other advantages, some of which will 
be explored later in this dissertation. In Massachusetts, both parties require candidates to receive 
at least fifteen percent of their party's convention vote to qualify for the primary ballot. 
How effective are party endorsements of all kinds in helping the endorsee to win 
nomination? Jewell and Morehouse (2001) conducted an analysis of the rates of success by 
foimal versus infonnal (party rule) endorsees in gubernatorial primaries over the period 1960- 
1980 and 1980-1 988. Under both arrangements - legal and party rule - they found that "[t]he 
illost significant finding is that when there was a contested primary the endorsee won over 80 
percent of the time in the 1960- 1980 period and only half the time in the 1 982- 1988 period. . . 
The overall success of endorsees, including both primaries that were uncontested and tllose they 
won, dropped from 91 percent to 74 percent" (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 110). 
Preprimary party endorsements have diminished in efficacy since 1960 - they are no 
longer a sure-fire ticket to nomination for endorsees, nor are they an iron-clad control 
mechanism for parties. Yet Jewell and Morehouse (2001) assert that, in spite of their decline as 
effective instruments, preprimary endorsements occur only in states with strong or nzoderately 
strongparties (Jewell and Morehouse 2001 : 96). They make this claim based on matching a 
state's party coalition strength (measured by the magnitude of the governor's vote in the 
primaries 1978- 1998) against the presence or absence of a preprimary endorsement (see Jewell 
and Morehouse 200 1 : 92-8). 
Nomillations Procedures 
"Boss" Tweed is supposed to have said, "I don't care who does the electing, as long as I 
do the nominating." E.E. Schattshneider contends that nominations are the "most important 
activity of the party," for it is through this act that the party's united front is "expressed." 
Nominations, he says, are the "distinguishing mark of modem political parties; if a party camlot 
~llake noininations, it ceases to be a party" (Schattschneider 1942: 64). 
The broad history of the twentieth century American political parties is indeed the story 
of how the circle of participants engaged in making nominations decisions has expanded. Party 
~llachines and parties in general lost some of their nominating power to primary elections and to 
open caucuses, the most well-known recent example being the banning of closed caucuses fioin 
the presidential nominatioil process in both parties following the 1968 election. 
Though parties have lost nominating power, whether or not this loss caused or resulted in 
a loss of party power overall remains a subject for heated debate. Until recently, scholars were 
divided into two broad schools of thought on the subject: the decline-of-parties scholars and the 
parties-as-resurgent scholars. These two schools of thought focused on very different aspects of 
parties. The parties-in-decline group focused its energy largely on the variety of ways in which 
parties have been supplanted by alternative avenues of nomination, mobilization, and funding. 
The parties-in-decline group argued that parties lost control of nominations because the parties 
were displaced by technological innovations such as polling, direct mail, professional public 
relations finns and the internet, all of which enabled candidates to develop independent 
organizations that could reach voters themselves and which did not need party help to win. As a 
result:, "candidate-centered" campaigns became popular in the literature and many political 
scientists provided evidence of the shift in behavior - (see Jacobson, 1983; Agranoff 1972; 
Sa1bat.o 198 1; Sorauf, 1980 Crotty and Jaconsob 1980; Orren 1982 (see JOP 1986)). In addition, 
parties-in-decline scholars argued that parties have been displaced by the growing influence of 
mass media. Television, some scholars contend, came to so dominate campaigns that parties lost 
out to television as critical information-providers for voters (Patterson 1993; Sabato 198 1). 
The parties-as-resurgent school of thought put the spotlight on organizations themselves, 
demonstrating the growth of party coffers, the expansion of party office space, and the 
professionalization of party staff. In general, scholars found increased activity at all levels - 
national, state, and local. Activity was measured in terms of the degree of bureaucratization of 
party organizations, the range and level of campaign activities and the amount of campaign 
money that was raised and distributed (Hemson 1993; Dwyre 1993). 
A team of researchers at UCLA have put themselves squarely in the revitalization camp, 
arguing that presidential parties are "back" after having briefly lost control for a few years 
following the McGovem-Fraser Commission reforms of the 1970s. Cohen et al. (200 1) contend 
that, since 1980, major political parties have effectively controlled the presidential nominations 
process and have coordinated their actions in selecting nominees. Cohen et al. clash directly with 
the parties-in-decline scholars, asserting that the "reports of the death of parties are.. .frequently 
exaggerated by scholars and others," because analysts are confused by the significance of 
organizational form. "[O]rganizational form," they write, "is not what makes a party. It is, rather, 
the will and the ability of party members to bridge their differences in a united front for the sake 
of contesting elections." (Cohen et al. 2001: 75) The "new" party organizational form is a 
loosely structured network of elites rather than the traditional hierarchy that dominated party 
politics in the first half of the twentieth century. The fact that the parties control non~inations is 
shown by the fact that they control the resources presidential candidates need to compete 
effectively in state primaries and caucuses - resources which include funding, expertise, and 
"credible cues" fiom major players signaling both the support and the worthiness of a given 
candidate. 
Cohel~ et al. have developed an innovative way to measure control of resources in 
presidential nominations contest. They collected all publicly declared endorsements of every 
presidential candidate that appeared in print news. This method allowed them to gather many 
factors into their data: U.S. senators, basketball players, party leaders, interest groups. Cohei~ et 
al. then weighted each endorsement and measured the impact of all endorsements on the 
~l~olllinations contest. 
I have collected a similar list of endorsements for another executive office - governors. I 
examined all pub1 icl y declared endorsements of gubernatorial candidates in both primary and 
general elections in six states over a certain period of time. By examining a state-wide office in 
several states that differ across several axes, I can investigate the question of nomination col~trol 
with great precision. 
About the Data: Endorsements 
Primary elections clearly differ from general elections in that they are one-party affairs. 
The simple voting cue of party is absent. What other sources of information are available? 
Pol.itica1 scientists have theorized that voters use advice or statements of opinions by leaders 
(Berelson 1954), partisan identification (Campbell et al. 1960), particular events that take place 
during a campaign (Popkin 1991), and "the past" (Fiorina 1981) to help cue their vote. It would 
seem obvious, though, that endorsements from public officials and from interest groups provide 
a powerful, efficient, and low-cost information cue in the absence of party. The question is: To 
what extent does an interest group endorsement, or any endorsement for that matter, persuade a 
voter. Recent research by Lupia (2002), and by Lupia and McCubbins (1998), has found that 
endorselnents can indeed persuade, but only when the voter perceives that the endorser is 
knowledgeable and when the voter perceives that the endorser and the voter share common 
interests. Endorsements from individuals and groups, therefore, whom voters perceive as 
lu~owledgeable and who have clearly identifiable interests, significantly affect voter choice. 
I collected publicly reported endorsements for gubernatorial candidates so that I could 
map the range of endorsements over time, and trace both how they operate from election to 
election and from candidate to candidate. Some elections have many endorsements fro111 inany 
different groups - others have very few. This fact raises a number of questions: Why? Does the 
candidate with the most endorsements always win? Where do endorsements come from? Is there 
a coalition that forms around a candidate that is consistent from election to election, or does the 
tenor of each election vary so significantly that coalitions develop anew for each election? Is 
there a tipping point in highly-contested elections? These are the sorts of questions my data 
throws up. 
What does an endorsement mean? An endorsement can mean different tl~ings, depending 
on who is doing the endorsing. When a major group, such as the AFL-CIO or the NRA endorses 
a candidate, that endorsement brings with it not only major commitments of resources but also 
troops on the ground, office-space for campaigns, additional sources of advertising, fund-raising 
lists, phone-banks, and networks of activists. When a newspaper endorses, that endorsement 
comes at a critical moment in a campaign and can have a modest effect on highly-informed, 
politically attentive  reader^.^ However, when a minor celebrity or a small group endorses, that 
endorsement may represent llothing more than permission to use the endorser's name. 
' Ansolabehere, Stephen, Rebecca Lessern, and Jr. James M. Snyder. 2004. Newspaper Endorsements in 
U.S. Elections, 1940-2002. Unpublisl?ed. 
Endorsements can come with strings attached. Those already holding office can use 
endorsements as political favors - a thank you for support in the last election, or a quidpro quo 
for supporting the candidate on a specific issue. Interest groups often demand commitments froin 
candidates when an endorsement is up for grabs. Before endorsing, the NRA requires a public 
sta.tement of support from the candidate, along with the requirement that the candidate fill out a 
questionnaire in a way that is favorable to the NRA's positions on firearms and related issues 
(Grossman and Helpman 1999). Under the same circumstances, the National Organization for 
Woinen requires the candidate to support unrestricted abortion rights and to make a commitment 
to fight for the Equal Rights Amendment. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue that politically 
active groups serve as critical intermediaries between political leaders and citizens. Such groups 
spend most of their resources educating and mobilizing their membership on important political 
matters. Public endorsements from them can be seen, therefore, as a means of comm~~nication 
between informed group leaders - the elite - and less informed rank-and-file members. 
Endorsements, then, serve as informational short-cuts which encourage group members to 
behave in accordance with the wishes of the elite. In addition, the endorsement may have an 
efkct beyond the group's membership and may have an impact on both group sympathizers and 
group opponents. Clark (2001) writes that ". . .perceived group membership, in fact, may 
sigd ticantly extend electoral reach beyond fom~al ties.. ." (105). 
Selection of the States 
I chose six states for this study: Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, 
and Texas. My choice was based on four criteria: 1) the level of party competition in the state 
over the time period being examined, 2) consistency in the "type" of primary in state elections 
(i.e. whether the state has an open or closed primary system; explained below), 3) the 
consistency of the primary election type across the study's time period, and 4) the electronic 
availability of multiple newspapers. 
Level of party competition is one indicator of party strength. The more competitioil 
between parties, the less likely it is that a single party dominates, and the more likely it is that the 
two parties are equal contenders in elections. V.O. Key notes that where two-party competition is 
absent or weak, the result is multifactional parties that are unable to control nominations and 
cannot enact legislative programs (Key 1949; Key 1956). Weak parties appear, Key argues, 
because no force drives the majority party toward internal cohesion and discipline. Without an 
opposition party to serve as a countervailing force, a majority party fragments under its own 
power. Gray and Lowery (1996) suggest that high levels of two-party competition in a state 
mobilize group involvement in state politics and elections. High levels of party competition, they 
argue, raise uncertainty, because the potential for change in administration and policy becomes a 
real possibility, encouraging more groups mobilize in protection of their cause (Gray and Lowery 
I chose states which maintained a high degree of party competition over the time period 
of this study (1994-2002), measured using the Ranney Index (see Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1: Index of State Party Balance 
Party Control (1980- Party Control (1999- Party Competition (1980- Party Competition (1999- 
1998) 2003) 1998) 2003) 
CO 0.4 1 2 0.41 7 0.912 0.91 7 
OH 0.455 0.289 0.955 0.789 
IL 0.488 0.5 19 0.988 0.98 1 
TX 0.623 0.378 0.877 0.878 
NM 0.624 0.617 0.876 0.883 
MA 0.740 0.694 0.760 0.806 
Source: Jewel1 and Morehouse (2001) pgs. 30-32; Bibby and Holbrook in Gray and Hanson (2002) pg. 88. 
Another reason I selected these specific states is because of consistency in the type of 
priinary they employ. Parties have wide room to maneuver when regulating their noininating 
processes. Not only can they determine when a primary may be used, they can also specify its 
type. In every state indicated on Table 2, the type of primary has remained consistent over the 
study's time period. The states I chose employ three of the six types of primaries, and I excluded 
those states with open, nonpartisan, and blanket primaries because I wanted to limit the study to 
states in which differences between parties are apparent to voters. 
A handful of scholars have undertaken research which examines the effects of primary 
type on nominations. Tobin and Keynes (1 975), for example, found that nonpartisan groups are 
inore likely to influence the gubernatorial nomination in states with open primaries than in states 
with closed primaries. In closed primary states, control over nominations tends to be held by a 
sing1.e leadership coalition, and candidates are likely to ask party leaders for assistance because 
pa~ty  leaders serve as gatekeepers. However, much of Tobin and Keynes' research was 
cond.ucted in the 1 970s. Gerber and Morton (1 994) found more recently that, because open 
prinlaries encourage crossover voting, the candidate with policy positions closest to the median 
votel- is likely to be the nominee. This conclusion holds only for open primaries, however. It 
rema,ins to be seen whether either of the conclusions above apply for the time frame of this study. 
Table 2-2: Primary Type 
time period. Semiclosed: unaffiliated voters permitted to vote in a party primary. Semiopen: voters must publicly 
declared their choice or party ballot at polling place on election day. Open: voter decides which party primary to 
vote in privacy or voting booth. Nolzpartisan: Top two primary votegetters, regardless of party, are nominated for 
general election. Blanket: voter may vote in more than one party's primary, but one candidate per office. 
--- 
Colorado 
-- 
Illinois 
-- 
Massachusetts 
--- 
Ohio 
New Mexico 
--- 
Texas 
--- 
Finally, my states were selected on the basis of data availability. I selected states for 
which I could find electronic coverage during 1994-2002. Table 2-3 presents a summary of the 
Closed 
Source: Federal Election Commission, 2001. Closed: party registration required; changes permitted within a fixed 
X 
Semiclosed 
X 
X 
Serniopen 
X 
X 
X 
I 
Open Nonpartisan B lailke t 
newspapers I used, including the date the newspaper coverage became available on LexisNexis, 
the circulation statistics of the newspaper and the population of the state. 
Table 2-3: Newspapers Used by State 
Paper Year LexisNexis Coverage Circulation State 
Commenced Population 
Denver Westword 1994 108,000 
Colorado Rocky Mountain News 1994 
Denver Post 1994 
Pantagraph 1996 
State Journal-Register 1994 
Illinois Chicago Daily Herald 1997 
Chicago Sun Times 1992 
Crains Chicago Business 1986 
Patriot Ledger 1995 
Worcester Telegram and 
Massachusetts Gazette 1996 
Boston Herald 1994 
Boston Globe 1988 
-- - -  - 
Albuquerque Tribune 1995 14,373 
Santa Fe New Mexican 1994 New Mexico Albuquerque Journal 1995 
AP 1998 NA 
Crains Cleveland Business 1994 19,566 
Cleveland Scene 1999 95,423 
Ohio Dayton Daily 1994 126,642 11,505,705 
Columbus Dispatch 1992 252,564 
Plain Dealer 1992 365,288 
Corpus Christi Caller 
Times 1999 60,858 
Dallas Observer 1993 109,242 
Texas Austin-American 
Statesman 1994 
San Antonio Express-News 1996 222,536 
Houstan Chronicle 1991 553,018 
In addition, I gathered endorsement data going back to 1978 for Massachusetts elections, 
enabling me to explore one state in depth. For the years 1978 through 1990, I used the Bostoll 
I11 half the cases (OH, IL, and MA), I excluded the Associated Press State & Local Wire because the 
source tended to return far more additional articles to sort through while not adding more quality to the data. I kept 
the AP sources for NM, TX, and CO since my endorsement count was so low and I wanted to ensure endorsements 
were not missed. In nearly all instances, when the AP reported an endorsement, the major newspapers also reported 
the endorsement and the timing of each report was almost exactly the same. 
Globe's electronic archive located in the library of the Boston Globe. Although it is far better to 
use inore than one source when creating event counts (Woolley 2000), no other newspaper in 
Massachusetts currently has as extensive and as well designed an electronic archive as the 
Bostol? Globe. 
I should briefly mention a methodology I did not use. I did not take the name of an 
endorser, combine it with the name of a candidate and go looking in additional sources, such as 
magazine articles, Google searches and the like. Unlike Cohen et al. (2001), who often took the 
l l i ~ ~ ~ e  of an endorser and then searched on that name, I seldom did it, both because the ~lletllod 
illt:roduces inconsistency when some endorsers are chosen but not others, and also because it is 
laborious. In other studies, researchers using endorsements as data have contacted the campaigns 
directly and have obtained endorsement lists fiom them (Dominguez, 2002). This is possible 
when examining a current campaign, but it is impossible once the campaign is over. Therefore, 
in the end, I chose a consistent and accessible methodology. 
Years Selected 
My study focuses on elections fiom 1994 to 2002 in Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, New 
Mexico, and Texas, but in Massachusetts the timeframe extends back to 1978. Ideally, a longer 
time horizon would serve us well, for it would enable us to examine change (or lack of it) over 
time in terms of party strength in the states, in terms of the competitiveness in primaries and 
general elections, in terms of the ebb and flow of group participation, and in terms of the 
changing dynamics of party power. Because of limitations in available data and time, however, 
such a broad-ranging study was not feasible. Nevertheless, since one of the central goals of this 
project is to test recent claims made in the literature regarding what endorsements measure and 
how strong parties are, this goal can still be accomplished without a long time frame. 
Office Selected 
The data for this study comes fiom media accounts, so it was necessary to study an office 
that has a high profile to be certain of press coverage. Also, it is far easier to find infomation 
about a state-wide race than about an office with a lower profile. Though I might have examined 
races for the United States Senate, I finally decided not to because congressional elections, in 
general, have received a good deal of attention in the literature during the past forty years, while 
guben~atorial elections remain an understudied area of American politics. Peverill Squire writes: 
That state governors are important actors in the American political process is an 
obvious but underappreciated fact. Scholars of American government all but 
ignore the office and its holders in favor of studying national politics. In 
particular, relatively little is known about gubernatorial elections, compared to 
presidential or congressional campaigns, despite the fact that far more people 
know who their governor is than who represents them in the U.S. Senate or House 
(Squire, 1992: 125). 
In addition, gubernatorial elections are thought to provide more fertile ground than do 
congressioilal elections for the study of contested primaries. John Bibby, for example, notes that 
"it is well documented that incumbent governors are more vulnerable to electoral defeat [in 
general elections] than are U.S. senators and representatives" (Bibby 1 987: 72). 
Method of Data Collection 
I employed Boolean searches on LexisNexis. I simply typed a list containing each 
candidate's name for a specific election and used the search terms "endors!" or "favor!" or 
"support!", requiring the candidate's name and the search term to appear in the same paragraph. 
For primary elections, I covered the time period fiom exactly one year prior to the date of the 
primary through the date of the primary election itself. For general elections, I covered the time 
period fi-on1 the day after the primary through the date of the general election.-or each 
endorsenlent I noted the date of the article, the source of the article, and the date of the 
endorsement, if a~a i l ab le .~  In all, 2,132 names of people and organizations for the thirteen 
e1le:ction cycles were gathered by examining over 20,000 newspaper articles. 
Next, I coded the endorsements along several axes, including type. I identified nine 
endorser types: 1) self-proclaimed activists, 2) interest group leaders or representatives, 3) 
interest groups themselves, 4) media, 5) individual officeholders, 6) political party groups or 
i~~dividuals (e.g. Democratic City Committees, or "a member of the committee"), 7) 11011-office- 
hol!ding political people (e.g. an aide to a politician or a former nominee), 8) prominent 
individuals, and 9 )  a miscellaneous category. I also coded sub-types where possible and 
expanded the types. Interest groups, for example, I divided into 37 different sub-types, including 
suc:h categories as civil rights, conseivative, environmental, gayllesbian, housing, human 
services, industry, labor, liberal, minority, pro-choice, pro-gun, pro-life, taxpayers, and women's. 
A full listing of types and sub-types is available in Appendix A. 
The endorsement data that I collected has several peculiarities worth noting. First, the 
timing of endorsements is not always clear. Most newspaper accounts are clear about the exact 
date on which the endorsement occurred, though some accounts simply tell the reader the 
candidate was endorsed by X or Y, leaving the date of the endorsement out entirely. How this 
issue is handled depends on which question we want answered. On the one hand, if we are 
interested in knowing when the public at large becomes aware of an endorsement, the absence of 
a date is of no consequence since it is the timing of the story - the point of public knowledge - 
Each search yielded many extraneous articles that usually related to the normal business of government. 
In cases in which the article stated that a group or individual had endorsed the candidate "yesterday" or 
ever1 "last week", the approximate date of the endorsement was clear-cut. In some instances, however, the clarity of 
the. tiate was not so clear. I rely, therefore, on the date of the article as the approximate date of the endorsement. 
that matters. 011 the other hand, if we are interested in how an endorsement from group or 
individual X acts as a cue or as a signal to group or individual Y, then the timing of the 
endorsement itself, not just the date it is reported in the press, matters. We are interested in both, 
of course, but our primary interest is in how an endorsement serves as a cue. Hence, the exact 
tiining of its occurrence counts. When collecting endorsements, I entered both the date of 
publication and the date the newspaper reported that the endorsement occurred. When a 
newspaper account failed to report the actual date of the endorsement, I entered "not available." 
Because most reports were clear about when the endorsement was made, I used the article's 
publication date as the best proxy I had for the date of the endorsement in all cases. 
Another inadequacy of the data is that it is incomplete. Because I relied almost 
exclusively on newspaper  account^,^ I did not collect the entire universe of endorsements for any 
given election cycle. Moreover, my sample is not random. It is much more likely for a 
newspaper to report the endorsement from a prominent group or individual (and much more 
likely for a politician to tout such an endorsement) than it is for a newspaper to report the 
endorsement from an unknown. This certainly skews the data. However, since I assume that the 
more prominent an endorser the more important the endorsement, the bias is slight. 
I conducted in-person in-depth interviews with 18 people involved in Massachusetts 
politics, including former governors, forrner gubernatorial candidates, party leaders, political 
analysts, and journalists. In addition, I spoke with a variety of political observers in other states, 
party archivists and the like, either over the phone or through email. A complete list of 
To check the veracity of my data early on in my data-gathering process, 1 consulted several large interest 
groups in Massachusetts to find out whom they had supported in each election and compared this with newspaper 
accounts. The newspapers failed to report the withholding of endorsements in two election cycles, but always 
reported the granting of endorsements. 
interviews is available in Appendix B. Finally, I collected vote totals for every candidate in both 
primary and general elections. For the latter data, I used state-level returns reported in 
Congr.essional Quarterly's Guide to US.  Elections for all states except Massachusetts. For 
Massachusetts, I used the city and town-level returns reported in the Secretary of State's 
publication, Massachusetts EZectiolz Statistics. 
Specifying Hypotheses: 
Incu~nbency: 
The incumbency advantage enjoyed by governors has been well documented. Incun~bei~t 
governors in all fifty states nearly always win re-nomination when they run in primary elections, 
a fact which scholars attribute to their ability to ward off serious competition from quality 
challengers (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002; Cox and Katz 1996). Between 1980 and 2000,46 
percent9 of incumbent governors were unopposed in their party's nomination (Bardwell 2002). 
When incumbents do face opposition, they rarely lose. Between 1980 and 2000, in 88 contested 
primaries, only five incumbents lost their party's nomination (Bardwell 2003). High job approval 
ratings, strong financial advantages, party endorsements, and success in prior elections all serve 
to deter potential challengers. 
While incumbents enjoy strong name recognition, the perks of office, and usually a well- 
greased fundraising machine, challengers by contrast face an up-hill battle. They must spend 
large amounts on campaign advertising, travel, and staff. Bardwell (2002) finds that incumbent 
governors 011 average outspend their primary challengers five to one. 
This excludes nominees in Virginia and Utah who were selected by state party convention rather than by 
dir'ect primary. 
Given the rewards of incumbency, it seems logical to expect popular incumbents to 
benefit from an "endorsement advantage" as well. We expect popular incumbents to receive 
high-quality endorsements - from major interest groups, from key players in state politics, fioln 
well-connected individuals, and from newspapers. By contrast, we expect vulnerable incumbents 
to face an endorsement disadvantage. Vulnerable incumbents not only suffer from low popularity 
ratings, they often attract high-quality challengers. Under those circumstances, the endorsement 
pie has more takers. Moreover, high-quality endorsers are wary of squandering their political 
capital on vulnerable incumbents and withhold endorsements accordingly. 
Candidate Quality 
Congressional literature has examined "challenger quality" in some depth (Cox and Katz 
1996; Green and Krasno 1988; Mann and Wolfinger 1980). The general findings of these studies 
is that quality challengers - politically experienced, well-funded candidates - emerge when they 
are likely to win either because a seat is open or because an incumbent looks vulnerable. This 
finding holds for gubernatorial elections as well (Squire 1992). Candidate quality can be 
ineasured using a variety of factors. Here, I use Jewell's (1 984) measure of political experience, 
easily observed and easily assessed. His 4-point scale ranges from (4) = incumbent to (0) = 
political novice (see Chapter 3). 
Just as we expect incumbents to have an endorsement advantage, we also expect quality 
challengers to benefit from high-profile endorsements. Because my measure of "quality" is 
Jewell's measure of political experience, it assumes that those with wide political experience also 
have a large, well-connected network of hends  and associates who can both assist with securing 
endorselnents and offer endorsements themselves. 
H:igh Quality Endorsers 
Just as there are high-quality challengers in electoral politics, so there are also high- 
quality endorsers. Within the universe of potential endorsers in any given state, there are certain 
endorsements that campaigns covet because these endorsements endow the campaign with 
legitimacy -- with resources, mome~~tum, and, ultimately, with votes. Certain features 
cl~aracterize high-quality endorsers: (1) They appear regularly from one election to the next 
because they are players in state politics and are actively engage in elections in an ongoing basis. 
(2) They represent and command key constituencies. Labor groups, for example, both represent 
ltey constituencies and command respect from their leaders, while following the group's chosen 
candidate. Elected officials, whether state legislators or mayors, represent key geographic 
constituencies, are well connected within political networks, and can direct campaigns to the 
right point-people within their geographic unit to mobilize voters. (3) High-quality endorsers, 
such as newspapers are, well-known entities across a wide spectrum of voters. Even people who 
are not regular readers know the state newspapers and may respond positively to a campaign 
colnlnercial touting a newspaper's endorsement. (4) High-quality endorsers grant their 
endorsement at a strategic moment in the campaign, an idea that will be developed further later. 
A high-quality endorser may wait until a critical point in the campaign season to bestow their 
enclorsen~ent because they are cautious, they wish to protect their reputation, or they wish to 
maintain their political capital. 
Winning Coalitions 
While attracting a few key, high-quality endorsements is certain to demonstrate strength 
in any candidate, what a candidate really wants is a winning coalition of endorsers around him or 
her. Within the universe of endorsers, there is a sub-set, a group or groups that are notable not 
only for size, but also for composition. These band together (informally and perhaps without 
knowledge of the other) from election cycle to election cycle and produce the winning nominee. 
We expect that where there are strong parties, there are strong, winning coalitions. And, of these 
winning coalitions, we expect them to be stable - to have the same general membership froill 
election to election. 
Parties 
What does a "strong" party look like, particularly during the nomination process? A party 
can certainly not influence, let alone control, the nomination process if its members are 
substantially divided on which candidate to support. Consequently, one criterion for a party is 
unity aillong elites. In addition, following the primary, the party should band together and 
should, at least some of the time, be successful in having its candidate win the general election. 
Strong parties unite to influence the nomination; weak parties do not unify at all. We should 
expect, therefore, to see parties that are unified during the nominations process, that demonstrate 
a united front, and select and support their nominee relatively early in the process. 
CIl3riPTER 3: EMPIRICAL RESULTS IN FIVE STATES 
In this chapter, I systematically present the data gathered about endorsements o f  
gubernatorial candidates in five of the six states in this study (excluding Massachusetts), 
focusing on timing, key actors, networks, and in~plications. 
The main question under scrutiny is who controls the nomination in gubernatorial 
elect ions. Do parties ultimately command the nominations process, or must each candidate 
individually build their own candidate-centered organization in order to win the nomination? 
I engage two theses regarding party control of nominations: the Jewell and Morehouse 
(2001) argument that party control of nominations flows from the presence or absence of 
PI-epriinary endorsements; and the Cohen et al. argument that the hallmark of party control of 
no~ninations is the extent to which "the extended party" participates in electoral politics, cueing 
elites to select the most broadly acceptable candidate. 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, Jewell and Morehouse (2001) argue that state 
parties are likely to control the nominations process, given certain institutional conditions, 
namely the presence or absence of party preprimary endorsements either by law or by custom. 
Sta.tes with preprirnary endorsements are cohesive and strong in their nominating processes, they 
argue. States without such systems tend toward party disarray. For Jewell and Morehouse, the 
storyline associated with preprimary endorsements is this: local party leaders are unified under a 
state chair. They control the nominations for governor by sending local delegations to the state 
corlvention and can count on them backing the chosen individual. A coalition around the 
candidate builds to the point that it can both sustain a challenge and carry over into the general 
election campaign. The stronger the party, they contend, the more likely it is that the party can 
successfully perform its three main functions - choosing a nominee, assisting the nominee in 
geitting elected, and finally providing the organizational strength, once in office, to govern. 
Cohen et al. (2001) identify partisan elites in presidential nominations contests and 
\ 
measure their behavior during the preprimary period. Cohen et al. contend that this approach 
allows them to capture the pool of important partisans involved in presidential campaigns and to 
assess how much institutional backing a given candidate has, as well as the impact of this 
support 011 the nomination process. They find that institutional backing matters - successful 
candidates have the full weight of the party, of partisan-aligned interest groups and of important 
individuals behind them. They find that the "party" is more than party chairs, governors, 
senators, and other members of the regular party apparatus. They find that the party also includes 
groups that regularly work for the party and who choose (endorse) the candidate that is not 
necessarily an ideological clone of the group, but is rather the candidate they deem most likely to 
win in the general election. Cohen et al. show that in order to compete successfully for the 
presidency, candidates really do need a broad set of inside interests on their side. 
In this chapter, I employ several measures to discern partisan control of nominations. For 
every state, I use three tests designed by Cohen et al. (2001), I examine the quality of candidates 
ruilning in each election, and I look at the presence or absence of prepriniary endorsements and 
other institutioilal designs. 
Methods of Discerning Partisan Control 
Small World Test: 
Do political players and campaign backers encompass a "small world" - small enough 
that all candidates must compete within this limited group? In order to determine the answer, 
Cohen et al. examine to what degree the same people and the same groups endorse from one 
election to the next. A considerable portion of repeat endorsers indicates to them that the size of 
the pool is relatively small and stable." 
United Front Test: 
Do party leaders form a united fi-ont, focusing on the candidate most capable of uniting 
the party and of winning in the general? In order to determine the answer, Cohen et al. look at 
the pacing of endorsements throughout the primary and at how interest groups and other 
fac:tional interests behave. A broadly acceptable candidate encourages party members to make 
endorsements at a faster rate tllan a candidate with narrow appeal. Interest groups and factional 
interests sometimes pass over the candidate most in line with their interests in favor of a 
calldidate with broader appeal and greater ability to unite the party. 
Decisive Intluence Test: 
Is the influence of the small world of party elites decisive? Cohen et al. develop a variety 
of measures for this final test, including the simplest - does the winner of the endorsement derby 
also win the nomination? 
If the answers to all three questions are positive, then the party is strong, healthy, and in 
control of the nominations process. 
Candidate Quality: 
We would expect parties to endorse candidates who have significant office-holding 
experience. Parties, generally, tend to discourage "outsider" candidates; instead, they seek 
candidates with established records of success at the state-level or, at the very least, candidates 
with long-term service to the party organization. The congressional literature has examined 
"c~hallenger quality" in some depth (Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Green and Krasno 1988; Cox 
10 Cohen et al. weight their endorsers and hence are able to pluck from their data only those repeaters who 
they deem powerhl in order to arrive at their "small world" conclusions. I do not weight my endorsers for reasons 
described in chapter 2. 
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and Katz 1996). The general findings of these studies is that quality challengers - politically 
experienced, well-funded candidates - emerge when their probability of winning increases 
because of either an open seat or because an incumbent looks particularly vulnerable. 
I use Jewell's (1 984), four-point scale method of scoring individual gubernatorial 
candidates, based on their political experience. Unlike the Jacobson and Kernell, Jewell assigns 
different values for different types of political experience. 
Table 3-1: Multipoint measure of gubernatorial candidate quality 
Points Type of Experience 
4 Incunlbent governor 
3 Former governor 
2 Elected state officeholder, member of Congress, state House Speaker, state Senate President, mayor of 
major city 
1 Any person who formerly held any of the offices listed under measure 2, current state legislator or nlayor of 
a sillall city, former candidate for governor or U.S. Senator 
0 None of the above 
Incumbents have an endorsement advantage, and quality candidates receive high profile 
endorsements. Because I measure of "quality" according to political experience, it follows that 
those with wide political experience also have a large, well-connected network of friends and 
associates who can both assist with securing endorsements and also offer endorsements 
themselves. 
Before proceeding to the next section, I present a table summarizing the legal 
requirements surrounding primaries, the month in which the primary is held, and Jewell and 
Morehouse's strength rating. In addition, full results of every election and timelines documenting 
endorsements granted election are available in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
Table 3-2: Summary of Primary Laws and Customs and General Information about the State Primaries 
I I Party Gubernatorial I State Requirements for I % Contested Primary I 
Texas does not .have preprimary endorsements. 
CO1,ORADO 
Overview of Colorado Politics 
Colorado is generally known as a Republican state, and it is the most Republican state in 
i ~ l y  dataset according to the Ranney (1 976) measure of party control. The GOP has doininated 
both houses of the Colorado Assembly for almost all of the period 1960-2002, save four years. 
The Democrats, however, have dominated every single gubernatorial election between 1974 and 
1994. Only in the last two election cycles have the Republicans made headway with the top 
office. At the federal level, however, Colorado has split between the two parties. Between 1978 
ar~d 1994, Colorado had one senator from each political party. This situation came to ail end 
when Ben Nighthorse Campbell switched from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party in 
1995. In the House of Representatives, Colorado has had a four-to-two split, with Republica~~s 
taking the edge. 
Colorado mandates a pre-primary endorsement. Every registered member of each 
political party may participate in their neighborhood precinct caucuses in April to elect delegates 
to the county convention that is held in May. At the May county conventions, candidates must 
win 30% (a sizable threshold) of the delegate vote to move to the state party convention. The 
1 1  
"There is little practical difference," Jewel1 and Morehouse (2001 : 104) write, "between some closed 
primaries that allow some voters change their status on primary election day and some open primaries that ask 
voiters to publicly select their party preference on election day." 
state party convention operates under the same procedures as the county convention. Candidates 
must again win 30% of the delegate vote to qualify for the August primary ballot (Appleton and 
Ward 1997). 
The two major parties in Colorado are highly polarized. Erikson, Wright, and McIver 
(1993) list Colorado as one of the most polarized states in the nation. This division falls largely 
along city-suburb lines, with Democrats drawing strength from cities such as Denver, Pueblo, 
and Boulder, while Republican gains are drawn from the suburban-style city of Colorado Springs 
and the rural expanses along the western edge of the state. 
According to Mayhew (1 986) and Appleton and Ward (1997), party bosses and patronage 
politics are virtually non-existent in Colorado party politics, and, to some degree, it has ever been 
thus. The rank-and-file play the key role in nominations, these researchers argue. Mayhew 
reported these findings when he published research into the Colorado of the 1950s and 1960s, 
giving it a TPO score of 1 (Mayhew, 1986). Appleton and Ward investigated the parties of the 
1980s and 1990s and reported the same finding. Volunteer party workers have as "their only 
reward . . . whatever satisfaction they get out of their activity and whatever sense of 
accomplishment and prestige they may feel" (Martin 1960; Mayhew 1986). Yet the quantity and 
the type of endorsements candidates receive tell a different story. Party-affiliated insiders 
dominate the endorsements. For the three election cycles under investigation, I found only a 
small number of endorsements for candidates, but those endorsements were from major interest 
party-affiliated groups (Christian Coalition and the NRA 011 the right, and Colorado NARAL and 
the Sierra Club on the left), and from key party leaders in Colorado politics including U.S. 
senators, the mayor of Denver, and party chairs. 
Overview of Colorado Elections 
1994 
The 1994 Democratic primary was uncontested as popular three-tern governor Roy 
Ronier ran unopposed (he was first elected in 1986). Romer won the general election by nearly 
18 percentage points, beating his Republican opponent Bruce Benson. Romer received 
e~ndorsements in the Deniocratic primary just before the May endorsing convention. Most of his 
er~dorsements came from individuals - from former cabinet members, two former state senators 
and from prominent individuals, including land-owners in the Colorado Rockies and 
philanthropist Merle Chambers (see Table 3-3). These low numbers are not surprising, given that 
he was an incumbent (see Massachusetts chapter for more detail on this). 
The Republicans ran three candidates in the 1994 primary, two of whom were low quality 
ci~~~didates who each earned under a quarter of the total vote share. The third candidate, oilman 
and former Republican Party chairman Bruce Benson won the primary handily with 61.4 percent 
of the vote. Benson garnered only two endorsements, both from business owners and both in 
Nlarch 1 994. 
The general election produced little more endorsement activity for either party, though 
the incumbent Romer earned more than Benson. Benson received four endorsements - support 
from the traditionally Republican-affiliated group, the NRA, and from the CEO of a natural gas 
company. Benson's two additional endorsements came from two dispersed "groups," according 
to press accounts, including a number of "prominent Colorado Democrats" and several 
"1,atinos." Romer received his seven endorsements throughout September and October from 
prominent Democratic-affiliated groups such as Colorado Clean Water Action, Colorado 
NARAL, and Hispanics of Colorado. 
Table 3-3: Count of Endorsements in Colorado Democratic Primaries by Year and by Type 
Party Prominent 
Interest Group Miscellaneous Officeholder Individual or Individual Total 
Group 
1994 1 2 
1998 4 3 
2002 5 
Total 10 5 
1998 
In 1998, both parties held contested primaries. Each party ran two candidates, and in both 
Table 3-4 Count of Endorsements in Colorado Republican Primaries by Year and by Type 
cases the victor won by more than a ten-percentage points. 
On the Republican side, state treasurer and former legislator, Bill Owens, the eventual 
Total 
2 
16 
4 
22 
1994 
1998 
2002 
Total 
winner, received three major endorsements at least eight months prior to the election (and five 
Officeholder Prominent Interest Group Miscellaneous Individual 
2 
5 2 9 
3 1 
8 3 9 2 
months before the endorsing convention). One of these was from House Speaker Chuck Bell-y 
and the other two were from key conservative groups, the Christian Coalition and Focus on the 
Faillily. Owens also managed to win the support of moderate, pro-choice Republicans such as 
Bruce Holland, the chair of the Denver County Republican Party. Owens received the lion's 
share of institutional support, collecting endorsements from the entire GOP delegation to the 
U.S. House and from more than half of the members of the Colorado House of Representatives. 
His competitor, Colorado Senate President, Tom Norton, received four endorsements, two froin 
each of two unions (the Colorado Association of Public Employees and the Colorado Education 
Association), one from former Senator Bob Dole, and an additional one from a state 
representative. 
011 the Democratic side, both candidates received support only from major players in 
Colorado, though the majority of endorsements and the breadth of inside support went to the 
current lieutenant governor Gail Schoettler, who was also the eventual winner. Mike Feeley, 
state senator and Senate Minority Leader, lost the primary to Shoettler, in spite of the fact that he 
had the full support of organized labor, the Democratic Leadership Council and a fonner 
attorney general. The AFL-CIO came out for Feeley nearly a year before the primary, in 
September 1997, but the remaining endorsements did not arrive until the endorsing convention 
and later. Gail Schoettler, 011 the other hand, received the endorsement of Governor Roy Romer 
in April 1998, followed by that of the mayor of Denver, Wellington Webb, two weeks later. She 
also received the endorsement of the Democratic State Party Chairman, Howard Gelts, just 
before the primary. She had the support of a broad range of groups, including women's 
organizations, Latino organizations, and real estate groups. 
The 1998 general election was hotly contested between Schoettler and Owens, with 
Owens winning by just 6,297 votes, or 0.6 percent. Both candidates had roughly the same 
number of endorsements (see Table 3-5). Owens received support from a number of promillent 
Republicans, from two of the major newspapers in Colorado - the Denver Post and the Roclg) 
Mou~ztain News, but he also drew support from black leaders and from a handful of Democrats 
such as former Democratic state senator, Larry Trujillo. Owens managed to bring together 
inoderate and more conservative factions of the Republican party, according to press accounts, as 
he crafted his 1998 campaign: 
Owens, a C:atholic who opposes abortion and has enjoyed the blessings of the 
Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family, has strong support in the Republican 
religious-right wing, which controls much of the party machinery, including the 
state chairmanship. At the same time, though, he has convinced key moderate, 
pro-choice Republicans to come along for the ride - perhaps because the latter 
group is so eager to reclaim the Governor's Mansion. (Denver Westword 
(Colorado), April 9, 1998 Life of the Party: Winning the Governor's Mansion 
could be a religious experience for the GOP. Ward Harkavy) 
Schoettler drew support from a variety of traditional Democratically-aligned groups, 
including the Sierra Club, NARAL, the AFL-CIO, the teachers' unions, the National Association 
of Social Workers and several out-of-state supporters, such as First Lady Hillary Rodhain 
Clinton, former Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and movie actor Robert Redford. 
Table 3-5: Count of Endorsements in Colorado General Election, 1998 
I 
Activisi 
crroup lndivldual , Total 1 
or Grour, 
The 2002 Colorado primaries were also.uncontested and the general election, though 
1998 
21002 
Total 
contested, was hardly competitive. Incumbent governor Bill Owens sailed to victory in the 
November electioil with 65 percent of the vote. The Democrats ran businessman and CEO, 
1 8 2 9 6 6 
11 1 1 5 
1 24 4 3 14 7 8 
R.ollie Heath, a candidate who had never before held elected office. 
32 
18 
6 1 
A.pplying the Tests 
T,able 3-6: Summary of Test Results Applied to Colorado 
--- 
Party I Election I % Repeat I % I United Front I Candidate 
--- 
Dlemocrats 
After examining the endorsement activity of groups and individuals in Colorado, a 
pattern emerges in which parties, major party-aligned groups and officeholder leaders become 
Endorsers 
8% 
--- 
Rfyublicans 
- -  
--- 
involved. This group is small indeed, though not "stable" in the sense that the same names do not 
NA is noted when tlze election was uncontested. 
1998 
2002 
1994 
1998 
2002 
appear again and again. 
Endorsements 
go to Nominee 
100% 
23% 
50% 
0 
13% 
0 
Smlall World: Repeat Endorsers 
No 
NA 
No 
Yes 
NA 
62% 
84% 
100% 
75% 
100% 
Table 3-7: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers, Colorado Democratic Candidates 
Year Non-Repeater Repeater 
92% 8% 
1998 n=13 77% 23% 
NA 
2 
0 
0 
2 
4 
Ta.ble 3-8: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers, Colorado Republican Candidates 
Quality 
4 
Election Year 
1994 11=2 100% 
1998 n=16 88% 13% 
2002 11=4 100% 
91% 4% 
The average number of repeat endorsers is paltry - 27 percent for the Democrats and 4 
percent for the Republicans. The number of repeat endorsers within the Coloradoan Republican 
party is clearly lower than it is for the Democratic party - but the absolute number of endorsers is 
low too. Who are the endorsers? Table 3-9 below, displays a listing of the repeat endorsers for 
both the Republican and the Democratic candidates. The number of repeat endorsers is extremely 
low; moreover two of the repeaters endorsed both a Republican and Democrat. If an endorser 
supports both parties, can they be called part of the party at all? Are they part of the extended 
party? No. Groups endorse both parties when it is in their interest to be acceptable to both teams. 
It is a way to hedge their bets. The behavior of double-dipping on endorsements can be called all 
sorts of things (smart, a good use of political capital or otherwise), but one thing it is not is party 
behavior. If the very definition of party is to unite behind a team, then a group that roots for both 
teams is not behaving in the partisan mold. 
Table 3-9: Colorado Repeat Endorsers by Year and by Candidate (both parties) 
Endorser 
AFL-CIO 
Feeley (D) 
Heath (D) 
Candidate 
Romer (D) 
Colorado Association of Public Employees 
X 
Colorado Education Association 
1994 
X 
X 
Feeley (D) 
Norton (R) 
Denver Mayor Wellington Webb 
X 
X 
Heath (D) 
Norton (R) 
Heath (D) 
1998 
Schoettler (D) 
Heath (D) 
2002 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Labor is clearly the dominant endorser, appearing again and again through each election 
cycle. Labor, however, is not always supporting the ultimate nominee. The non-repeat endorsers, 
for both Republicans and Democratic candidates were a hodgepodge of supporters -generally 
iildividuals - who appeared for one election and then disappeared. Table 3-1 0, below, presents a 
lists of the non-repeat endorsers . The majority of individuals and groups are strongly party- 
aligned. They are "big" names. On the Democratic side, in the 1994 election, the 11011-repeat 
endorsers were "friends" of incumbent and unopposed Governor Roy Romer - fonner state 
senators, former cabinet members, and a series of prominent individuals such as philanthropist 
Mcrle Chambers. The 1998 primary election brought other individuals into the fray - a forner 
attorney general, 66 Latino leaders, the Democratic state party chair, fonner governor Roy 
Romer, and fonner Senate Majority leader Ray Kogovsek. The Democratic Leadership Council 
endorsed Mike Feeley. The one non-party affiliated interest group that was not a repeat endorser 
was Coloradoans for Western Values - a short lived nonprofit designed exclusively for the re- 
election of Gail schoettler.12 The 2002 primary election had three interest group endorsements - 
fro:ln the Colorado Building and Construction Trades, Colorado NARAL, and the Colorado 
Professional Fire Fighters - each group endorsed challenger Rollie Heath in an uncontested 
primary. No individuals endorsed Heath, according to my search criteria. 
On the Republican side, the non-repeat endorsers were also largely individuals - either 
officeholders or wealthy donors. The five interest groups involved in the 1998 and 2002 primary 
elections were two major conservative religious groups - the Christian Coalition and Focus 011 
the Family, Small Business for Responsive Government and the Farmers and Ranchers 
" Coloradoans for Western Values was later found in violation of the Fair Campaign Practices Act because 
it served an inherently political purpose. 
Coalition, and finally a set of "community and advocacy organizations" which were not 
identified in the press. 
Table 3-10: Colorado Non-Repeat Endorsers who Endorsed Democrats 
/ Endorser 1 1994 1998 2002 
66 Latino leaders 
airport contractors Robert and Linda Alvarado 
Coloradoans for Western Values 
Colorado Building and Construction Trades 
Colorado NARAL 
Colorado Professional Fire Fighters 
Colorado Rockies ownership group 
Democratic Leaderslup Council 
Denlocratic state party chairman Howard Gelt 
former Romer cabinet members Cole Finegan 
former Roiner cabinet members Ken Salazar 
former Romer cabinet members Penfield Tate I11 
foriller state Sen Regis Groff 
foriller state Sens. Tom Glass 
Garts of sporting goods 
J.D. MacFarlane, former Colorado Attorney General 
Jeriy McMoi-ris 
Merle Chambers 
Micky Miller 
Millers of real estate development 
Oren Benton 
organized labor 
Ray Kogovsek 
Roy R. Romer 
Warren Toltz 
1 20 members of the Colorado Legislature 
200 doctors and medical professionals 
2 5 House Republicans 
4 1J.S. House Republicans from Colorado 
Bob ]Dole, 1996 Republican candidate for president 
Charles Steinbrueck 
Cllristian Coalition I Colmunity organizations and advocacy groups across Colorado 
Doug Dean 
ex-senator and religious-right leader Bill Armstrong 
Focus on the Family 
Hous~s Speaker, Republican Chuck Bei-ry 
Jack I'Cenlp 
Joe Rogers 
Limy Trujillo, director of the state Department of Personnel and General Support Services 
Rlobinson Dairy Inc. Cllairman Dick Robinson 
Sillall Business for Responsible Gove~llnlent 
State Sen. Jim Congrove 
The Fai-mers & Ranchers Coalition 
U.S. Senator Wayne Allard 
The Colorado case suggests that the "small world" test needs to be amended - that to 
measure simply the recurrence of endorsers, or even the recurrence of major endorsemei~ts (see 
Cohen et al.) - does not describe the real situation in a state in which the parties are so strong 
that endorsements do not act as a cue but as a stamp of approval. 
Uriited Front, Decisive Influence and Candidate Quality 
Due to the small number of endorsers and candidates in the elections under scrutiny, it is 
hard to fin down the united front. Neither party had a united front in 1998 when both parties ran 
candidates for an open seat. What was the decisive influence? The winning candidate in 
Desllocratic primaries received an average of 84 percent of endorsements granted, while the 
winning candidate in Republican primaries received an average of 92 percent. 
What of candidate quality? The results produced by Jewe117s (1984) four-point scale are 
mixed, though predictable and understandable. In 1994 and again in 2002, the opposition party 
was up against an incumbent - an incumbent who, in both general elections, won by a sizable 
margin. It is difficult in such circumstances to find a high quality candidate - an ambitious 
politician - who is willing to run in an election with such high odds of failure. In both 1994 and 
2002, the Republican and Democratic parties respectively, found a self-financed individual who 
could run a credible campaign, but who would also most surely lose. 
In Colorado, the consequence of strong parties is a primary that is not divisive and, when 
an incumbent is not running, a highly competitive general election campaign as was the case in 
the 1998 general election contest between Schoettler and Owens, two high-quality candidates 
holding state-wide office. 
OHIO 
Overview of Ohio Politics 
"Since their founding, the Ohio Republican and Democratic Parties have closely 
approximated the textbook description of traditional party organizations: autonomous, 
hierarchical institutions maintained largely by material incentives, dedicated to nominating 
candidates for most public offices and securing their election" (Appleton and Ward 1997). 
Both parties engaged in major party renewal in late 1970s, which resulted in the 
development of a strong service orientation for existing and potential candidates. Aggressive 
Delnocratic fundraising efforts were dramatically fostered by the absence of any limits on 
campaign contributions. The OH chapter of the AFL-CIO, as well as other major organizations 
and the powerful OH House Speaker of the time, Vernal Riffe, made substantial contributions. 
With the help of augmented resources, the Democratic Party assisted candidates with inassive 
get-out-the-vote drives, advertising campaigns, and voter registration. For its part, the state 
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Republican Party strengthened its ties to local committees, gave candidates campaign 
contributions, and built sophisticated headquarters full of the latest technology and capable, 
experienced staff. 
In 1987, both parties benefited from a legal change that allowed for public financing of 
parties, an arrangement by which tax filers were able to direct one dollar of their state income tax 
to a state party fund that is divided among state and county party committees. The two state 
committees each receive one-quarter of the funds. The rest is spread among the counties in 
proportion to the fund donations that come from each county. 
The Ohio Republican and Democratic parties have the informal power to endorse 
candidates during primary elections and to fill legislative, county, and municipal offices when 
vacancies occur between elections. Some counties use this power aggressively to endorse, to use 
slate mailers, to provide financing, and to offer use of the party's bulk-mail permit and access to 
poll books. Patronage is not yet dead in Ohio, according to Appleton. County party chairs can 
still1 provide jobs: "Even governors routinely defer to county chairs when dispensing state jobs 
and favors" (Appleton and Ward 1997). 
Party endorsements in Ohio are made by state party committees which meet without a 
convention - the party leadership holds a slate-making session. The number and type of 
participants at these sessions is limited to a small body - far fewer people than would attend an 
e~idorsing convention. Moreover, access to these sessions is limited as well - they are closed to 
the press, and the ballot counts and details of the process are normally not released. 
The main control that the parties exerted in the 1990s was the uncontested primary. "The 
traditional power of O h o  parties at the county and state level rests on their ability to build slates 
and to endorse in order to minimize primary conflicts and craft the strong possible ticket," 
(Morehouse, 40). Whereas this lack of contestation is a sign of strength for Republicans, it is a 
sign of weakness for Democrats, at least during the decade under investigation. The Republican 
Party's strength lay in its ability to locate high-quality candidates and to keep the competition at 
bay. The Democratic Party's weakness lay in its inability to cultivate, let alone to field any high- 
quality candidates for statewide races. The Republican Party's potency lay in its ability to 
develop a stable of potential candidates through its success in legislative and statewide races. 
According to one press account, "state party Chairman Robert Bennett . . . orchestrated his 
ballots" by, for example, tapping George Voinovich to run in 1990, and persuading Taft to wait 
until 1998. "Party insiders privately maintain that Bennett promised Taft a clear path to the 
nomination for govemor in 1998 and was able to deliver. There was plenty of jockeying by 
Republican candidates this year, but by the Feb, 21 '' filing deadline, Bennett had his ticket lined 
up" (McCarthy 2002). Moreover, as Lee Fisher, the 1998 Democratic gubernatorial nominee, 
said about running for statewide office, "You're not just running against [the Republican 
nominee], you're running against the Ohio Republican Party." (McCarthy 2002) 
Overview of Ohio Elections 
The only contested primary in my entire dataset is the 1994 Democratic primary. The 
Democrats ran two low-quality candidates to face an extremely popular Republican govemor, 
George Voinovich, in the general election. The candidates were a little-known state senator, 
Robert Burch, and a Miami University philosophy professor, Lyndon LaRouche ally and recently 
released prisoner, Peter shuller.13 The fact that Shuller managed to win 41.2 percent of the vote 
in the primary election speaks not of his potential or of his popularity, but rather of the failure of 
13 The Ohio Democratic party endorsed Robert Burch, but Shuller still managed to achieve ballot access. 
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the Ilemocratic Party to inform voters about the candidates' backgrounds. Even primary voters 
paid little attention to the contest. 
Shuller received no endorsements that were reported in the press. Burch, on the other 
hand, did receive endorsements from party organizations and interest groups, and he received 
the111 early. Ohio holds its primaries in May. In October, 1993, 59 of Ohio's 88 Democratic 
coui~ty chairmen (the individuals themselves, not the executive committees that run the county 
Denlocratic organizations) endorsed Burch, with the AFL-CIO doing the same in December and 
the party's executive committee in February. Several additional party-affiliated groups and 
individuals also endorsed Burch in that time frame as well. Burch won the nomination in the 
May primary, but only collected two endorsements in the general election campaign and went 011 
to lose colossally in November, with only 25.8 percent of the vote. 
In 1 998, both parties ran high-quality candidates in uncontested primaries. The 
Democrats tapped former Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher, who had lost his re-election bid in 
1 994. Fisher wrapped up Democratic support early, winning the support of the Democratic Party 
Cou~lty Chairmen's Association in September of 1997, followed by the endorsement of a 21 - 
n~elnber Democratic Party screening committee in November 1997. The official party 
endorsement came in December, followed by endorsements from unions (the AFL-CIO and the 
teachers' union) and from prominent Democrats throughout the spring. 
The Republicans ran Secretary of State, Robert A. Taft, and they threw the fill1 weight of 
the Republican Party behind him early, starting with Governor Voinovich ' s fornal endorsemei~t 
one full year prior to the May primary (though Voinovich had announced as far back as 1995 
that he backed Taft). Four days after Voinovich's May announcement, sixty percent of Ohio 
Republican county chairs formally endorsed Tafi, as did former governor James A. Rhodes in 
June. By November, Taft had the endorsements of ten of the eleven Republican members of 
Congress, nineteen of the twenty-one state senate Republicans, and fifty-eight of the sixty state 
representatives. 
The 1998 general election was a relatively easy win for Taft, with Fisher earning 47.2 
percent of the vote to Taft7s 52.8 percent. Taft won the support of all of the major Ohio 
newspapers, of many police organizations, and of several mayors (including Democratic 
mayors). Though Fisher received numerically more endorsements (see Table 6), Taft won many 
party crossover endorsements fiom Democrats, such as Ron Mottl a former Democratic 
congressman, and Democratic fund-raiser businessman Thomas T. George. Fisher's support 
came from traditional Democrat-aligned groups - the Ohio AFL-CIO, NARAL and the Sierra 
Club - as well as from groups that often endorse Republicans, such as the Teamsters' and 
various police associations. 
Table 3-12: Count of Endorsements, 1998 Ohio General Election, Fisher (D) v. Taft (R) 
Candidate I Interest Group Media Officeholder Party Ii~dividual or Group TOTAL 
Taft ran for re-election in 2002 against Democratic nominee Timothy Hagan, former 
Fisher 
Taft 
Total 
Cuyahoga County Commissioner and former chair of the County Democratic Party. According 
to one press account, the Democrats had considerable difficulty finding a nominee, because "the 
16 2 8 
6 4 5 1 
22 6 13 1 
GOP7s dominance of statewide executive offices over the last eight years has contributed to the 
26 
11 
37 
Democrats7 problem of finding enough candidates to fill out the ticket, let alone challenge each 
other in the primary" (McCarthy 2002). According to John Sauter, the Central Ohio Field 
Coordiilator for the Democratic Party, the Democratic party had to "pay candidates to for 
office because of recruitment difficulties. Hagan received only three endorsements in the 
uncontested priinary election campaign - endorsements from Ohio Democratic Party, froin the 
A-FL-CIO, and froin the Civil Service Employees' Association. In Taft's uncontested primary 
election, he received five endorsements, the majority from unions, including the Teamsters', the 
Carpenters', and the Operating Engineers'. He also received an endorsement fiom the Ohio 
Right to Life Society. In the general election, Tafi walked away with the election, as Voinovich 
had done in 1998, with 60.1 percent of the vote. 
--- 
l 4  Phone interview with John Sauter, January 12, 2005. 
Applying the Tests 
Table 3-13: Summary of Test Results Applied to Ohio 
Party I Election / % Repeat I % I United Front I Candidate 
Democrats 
United Front and Decisive Influence 
Using Jewel1 and Morehouse's criteria to evaluate the strength of parties in Ohio - the 
Republicans 
average primary vote for all of a state's governors for the last twenty years averaging 80-1 00 
percent - we might conclude that both parties are strong. Indeed, after examining endorsement 
Year 
1994 
1998 
2002 
activity and noting that only major party-aligned groups and officeholder leaders make public 
1994 
1998 
endorsements and do so early, we might draw the same conclusion. A united fiont appears to 
exist. Ohio's lack of contested primaries means no divisive primaries. It also means that, for both 
Endorsers 
20% 
36% 
67% 
parties, 100 percent of the endorsements go to the eventual nominee, and hence, they ace the 
decisive influence test. However, other indicators point exactly the opposite way, at least for the 
Democratic Party - the massive dominance of the Republican Party in the legislature and in 
0 
0 
statewide offices meails that the Democrats do not have a ready pool of potential candidates. The 
lack of contested primaries indicates that either ambitious quality candidates have decided not to 
run when sure to lose or that there were no quality candidates to begin with. The latter insight 
Endorsements 
go to Nominee 
100% 
100% 
100% 
explains why the average candidate quality score for Democratic candidates is a dismal .5 out of 
4, compared with the Republicans' solid 3.3. 
100% 
100% 
Yes 
NA 
NA 
Quality 
.5 
1 
0 
NA 
NA 
4 
2 
Small World: Repeat Endorsers 
Tablt: 3-15: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers Ohio Republican Candidates 
b?Gtion Year I Non-Repeater I Repeater 
Table 3-14: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers Ohio Democratic Candidates 
Ohio's Democrats fail the "small world" test, managing only an average 41 % percent 
 on year 
11= 1 0 
repeat rate, yet it is far higher than Ohio's Republicans zero. The repeat endorsers in the Ohio 
Democratic party are the Democrats themselves (see Table 3-16), and the AFL-CIO. Not exactly 
Non-Repeater 
80% 
a coalition of any sort. Absent are the major labor unions in the state, the individual county 
Repeater 
20% 
chairs, or any other party-aligned group. If the Democrats7 failure is that they lack any coalition, 
why are the Republicans so successful, yet have no repeat endorsers? The answer lies in the 
na~ture of the elections themselves - the kind of politics that occurs when popular incumbents 
run. As we shall see in the next chapter, campaign managers and strategists argue that 
illcumbents are better-off not collecting endorsements because amassing a war chest of 
endorsements can be viewed as a sign of weakness (see especially the section on the 1986 
gubernatorial election in the chapter on Massachusetts). 
Table 3-16: Repeat Endorsers by year, Ohio Democrats 
PEndor ser / 1994 1998 2002 1 
/ Democratic party county chairmen's association / X X I  I Delnocratic Party's executive committee I X I 
L~hio -- Democratic Party X X 
The non-repeat endorsers involved in the Democratic elections are listed in table 3- 17. 
None of the non-repeat endorsers endorsed Republican gubernatorial candidates in other 
elections, as occurred in Colorado. The individuals listed in Table 3-1 7 had good reason to not 
endorse in additional elections: they were probably not asked. Any candidate has his or her own 
personal following of friends and neighbors. Candidates can call on those individuals to secure 
an endorsement quickly and easily. It is harder to secure the endorsement of an interest group for 
it requires far greater effort than a quick phone-call. Often interest groups require lengthy 
"applications" for endorsements - position papers, a required discussion with the members, and 
general agreement with the group on its goals and mission. Groups have incentives to withhold 
endorsements, for they too wish to preserve political capital and stay in the good graces of the 
states' power structure. 
Table 3-17: Democratic Non-Repeat Endorsers 
Eilidorsers 1994 1998 2002 
18 of'the 25 women on the executive committee of the Federated Democratic Women of X 
Ohio 
50 of Ohio's 88 Democratic county chairmen--from the county chairmen as individuals, X 
rather than from the executive committees that run the county Democratic organizations. 
Coalition of Concerned Black Citizens X 
Enos Singer, Wasl~iagton County Democratic Chair & Pres OH Dem Chair Assoc X 
F:ra.nk:lin County Chairwoman Fran Ryan X 
P'lain Dealer X 
United Auto Workers X 
OH AFSCME 
Bla.ck: Elected Democrats of Cleveland 
David Milenthal former media consultant to Celeste 
Formler Gov. Celeste's former chief of staff Ray Sawyer 
Former Gov. Celeste's secretary Dora Globe X 
Nineteen of Clevelantl's 2 1 council members >: 
Ohiio Education Associatioil X 
Vel-nal G. "Skip" Riffe 111, a Scioto County commissioner, and Verna Kay h f f e  children of late X 
Speaker of OH House 
0:hio Civil Service Enlployees Association 
NE:W MEXICO 
Overview of New Mexico Politics 
New Mexico has a long history of two-party competitions. Party politics are fought over 
three of the vital sub-regions: the Hispanic North, Little Texas, and Bernalillo County, home of 
state"s largest city, Albuquerque. The Hispanic North is comprised of ten counties which depend 
on patronage and government jobs, which are Democratic strongholds and which have given 
nlajority votes to every Democratic gubernatorial candidate since 1960. Little Texas is 
comprised of six counties situated in the southeastern comer of the state. This region is 
dominated by Republicans and has given majority votes to every Republican gubernatorial 
candidate since 1974. In recent years, the Hispanic North and Little Texas have declined in 
impo~-tance both demographically and politically, while Bernalillo County, now 110111e to over 30 
percent of the state's voters, is strongly Republican. 
Until 1994, the Democrats dominated the governorship, holding it for all but sixteen 
years between 1949 and 1994. Republican Gary Johnson won in 1994 and again in 1998, but 
Democrat Bill Richardson won the governorship back in 2002. While Democrats continue to 
don~inate the legislature and county government, as they have since 1933, Republicans have 
made considerable inroads. This growth in the Republican Party and the continued survival of 
the Democratic Party is due to the efficacy (or lack thereof) of their organization at the county 
level: the stronger the county organization, the stronger the party's showing in electoral 
competition (Appleton and Ward 1997). 
Overview of New Mexican Elections 
Because of the lack of data availability on LexisNexis for 1994, I am only able to 
compare the 1998 and 2002 election cycles in New Mexico. 
New Mexico is the only state in my study to hold completely closed primaries, meaning 
that anyone wanting to vote in a party primary must register well in advance of the primary. 
Many argue that such strict rules indicate strong parties who keep party business limited to 
partisans. Like Colorado, New Mexican parties have a legal preprimary endorsement system, 
although New Mexicans wavered on the subject of endorsing conventions. According to 
Morehouse, they have been "thrice legalized and then repealed" (Morehouse 1998,22), but were 
reinstated in 1994 in an effort to achieve balanced slates between Hispanic and Anglo candidates 
(Morehouse 22, citing Jewel1 1984,48-9). 
Morehouse (1998) refers to New Mexico as a weak party state because neither party has 
success~lly prevented a major primary conflict with multiple candidates appearing on the ballot. 
Indeed, in the 1998 Democratic primary, five candidates appeared on the ballot, though 78.5 
percent of the vote went to the top two candidates; in the 2002 Republican primary, four 
candidates appeared on the ballot, though 94 percent of the vote went to the top two candidates. 
Moreover, major endorsements do indeed go to the winning nominee, but only after the March 
nominating convention, in April or May. 
Endorsement activity in New Mexico gubernatorial elections is relatively low, both in 
prj-maries and generals. The situation is like Colorado's in that it consists largely of a few major 
interest groups, a handful of officeholders, and a few prominent individuals. In contrast to 
Colorado, however, the majority of endorsements come after the convention. In the 1998 
eicction, former Albuquerque mayor Martin Chavez received endorsements from the two 
teachers7 ~ulions in April and May, as well as from AFSCME and other smaller unions. Chavez 
ran against four other candidates, but only one of his opponents won a double-digit percentage of 
the primary vote, Gary King. King won 30.4 percent of the primary vote; Chavez earned 48 
percent. King garnered endorsements from environmental groups and from three state senators. 
The winner of the primary went up against incumbent governor Gary Johnson, who eained 54 
percent of the popular vote. 
Table 3-18: Count of Endorsements in New Mexico Democratic Primary Elections by Year 
E1ec;tion Year Interest Group Miscellaneous Officeholder Party I Prominent Individual Total Individual 
1998 
Table 3-19: Count of Endorsements in New Mexico Republican Primary Elections by Year 
El12c:tion Year Interest Group Officeholder Media Miscellaneous Prominent Party Individual or Group I Individual 
or Group 
11 5 2 1 1 19 
2002 
Total 
4 1 1 
15 1 5 3 
6 
24 
The Republican field of primary candidates in 2002 was crowded, with the ultimate 
nominee, State Representative John Sanchez (58.1 percent of the primary vote) running against 
Lieutenant Governor Bradley (35.3 percent of the primary vote). The remaining two low-quality 
candidates scored less than five percent of the primary vote each and received few endorsements. 
While the lieutenant governor received four endorsements, including one fiom the sitting 
govemor, the remaining endorsements came from a talk show host, a retired general, and the 
Albuquerque Tribune. Bradley's main opponent, though a freshman state representative, had won 
his legislative seat by beating the longtime Democratic House Speaker in his home district - but 
his win was after several recounts and by only 206 votes. John Sanchez also had the fonnal 
backing of President Bush's New Mexico organization, who set their sights on winning New 
Mexico in 2004 and on courting the nation's fastest-growing minority group, as well as the GOP 
chair and several major Republican donors. Yet, even after the primary, the govemor did not 
support Sanchez because he "left the party bitterly split . . . [relying] heavily on a lavish media 
campaign that turned the campaign brutally negative in the end" (Russakoff 2002). 
The 2002 Democratic primary was virtually uncontested. Bill Richardson had name 
recognition, inside support and the money to win. He received six endorsements - four from 
nlajor groups, including AFSCME, NOW, the AFL-CIO, and the Navajo Nation Council, as well 
as two more from Democratic and Republican donors. 
Richardson trounced Sanchez in the general election by nearly 20 points. In the general 
campaign, Richardson also received endorsements from several high profile Republicans, 
including the lieutenant governor, the senate majority leader, and fiom the usual Democrat- 
aligned groups - labor, teachers, and environmental groups. 
Aqplying the Tests 
Table 3-20: Summary of Test Results Applied to New Mexico 
It is difficult, based on the short time period and the small number of endorsements I 
--- 
Party 
--- 
Democrats 
y e l "  blicans 
col.lected, to draw a conclusion about the state of the two parties in New Mexico, yet some 
qualified findings can be offered. Clearly, though they retained the goven~orship, the 
1998 
2002 
Republicans had no high-quality candidate for the 2002 race, choosing a freshman state 
Election 
Year 
1998 
2002 
representative who was the darling of the national party but not as popular with the state party. 
% 
Endorsements 
go to Nonlinee 
68% 
100% 
% Repeat 
Endorsers 
16% 
17% 
0 
21% 
Sanchez managed to win four endorsements from Republican-aligned groups in the general 
election (Right to Life of New Mexico, Associated Builders and Contractors, New Mexico Farm 
United Front 
No 
NA 
100% 
50% 
and Livestock Bureau and the New Mexico Federation of Independent Businesses), but these 
Candidate 
Quality 
1.25 
.5 
endo:rsements meant little when compared with the overwhelming support that his opponent 
NA 
No 
received, not only from traditionally Democrat-aligned groups, but also from high-profile 
- 
4 
1.3 
Repu.blica~~s. While the Democrats had an exceedingly strong candidate in 2002, they could not 
find a group of strong candidates to run in 1998 against the popular incumbent governor. 
United Front and Decisive Influence 
For all of the strength that is supposed to flow to parties fkom a primary system and from 
pre-primary party endorsements, New Mexican political parties could not coordinate themselves 
in several key ways. For example, in Ohio we saw that the strong Republican Party chose its 
nominees early and poured support into those candidates. In contrast, in New Mexico, support 
from external groups was not expressed until after the party convention, usually only two montl~s 
prior to the primary. Early support does not necessarily indicate party strength, especially wl~eil 
the support is spread thin, though when early support is united, it is a sign of a cohesive, forceful 
party that has aligned its groups and its troops behind the "chosen one." We cannot say 
definitively that gubernatorial candidates in New Mexico run candidate-centered campaigns, for 
fiont-runner candidates received support from major state-wide groups in both primary and 
general elections, while other candidates received hardly any support in the form of 
endorsements (and in the form of votes). 
The figures for the decisive-influence test are low, where applicable. The united-front test 
produces inixed results. Overall, it is hard draw a general conclusion. Major groups lined up for 
both candidates in the 1998 Democratic primary, but most of the support did not come early and 
it was not vast - i.e. only a few groups exhibited involvement. 
Small World 
Table 3-21: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers New Mexico Democratic Candidates 
Election Year 
1994 NA 
2002 n=6 
Average 
Using Cohen et al.'s test concerning the candidate's support from a "small world", New 
Mexican candidates score low. The average percentage of repeat endorsements for Democrats 
was a meager 16 percent, while, for Republicans, it was even lower at 11 percent. Table 3-23 
Table 3-22: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers New Mexico Republican Candidates 
Non-Repeater 
NA 
83% 
84% 
Election Year 
1994 NA 
1998 n=3 
Repeater 
NA 
17% 
16% 
Non-Repeater 
NA 
100% 
Repeater 
NA 
0% 
shows who the repeat endorsers were (Table 3-24 presents the non-repeaters). A very small 
group indeed. The Albuquerque Tribune's editorial policy was not to endorse in non-contested 
races, so it did not endorse in the 1998 Republican primary. It did, however, choose not to 
endorse in the 2002 Democratic primary, but did endorse Bradley in the Republican primary. 
Table 3-23: Re eat Endorsers by year, New Mexico (both parties) 
h q l r t ~ d  1 1998 2002 1 I 13 / AFSCME 
Albuquerque Tribune 
New Mexico Conservation Voters 
Alliailce 
Albuquerque Tribune 
New Mexico Conservation Voters 
The results of the small world test in New Mexico are inconclusive. If groups hold back 
when an incumbent is running, then many groups could have withheld their endorsements in 
1998, but come forward in 2002. In the Republican primaries, this was the case. There was less 
endorsement activity in 1998; more in 2002. In the Democratic primaries, the opposite occurred. 
Move groups were involved in the 1998 Democratic primary than in the 2002 Democratic 
primary. The field of candidates, however, was wide open in 1998 and was tightly shut in 2002 
with the only viable candidate being Bill Richardson. Perhaps groups were, once again, reserving 
political capital for a later time. 
Concerned Citizens of Albuquerque 
Fraternal Order of Police in Santa Fe 
National Education Association of New Mexico 
New Mexico Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO 
New Mexico Federation of Teachers 
NOW Equality PAC 
sheet metal workers union 
The Gay & Lesbian Voter Alliance 
The Navajo Nation Council 
Table 3-24: Non-Repeat Endorsers in 1998 and 2002 Democratic Primaries 
I 1 Democratic state Sen Pauline Eisenstadt of Corrales 
1998 2002 
X 
Endorsement Type 
Interest Group 
Interest Group Leader 
Miscellaneous 
Officeholder 
I I Former Lt. Gov. Casey Luna 
Endorser 
Communications Workers of America, Local 7037 
State Police Deputy Chief John A. Cordova 
Larry Willard 
Democratic state Rep. James G. Taylor of the South Valley 
Democratic state Sen Linda Lopez of the South Valley 
1 Group I Democrats Party Individual or 
I I Rio Arriba County Democratic Party 
Harry Bigbee, a retired Santa Fe lawyer and district judge 
Billy McKibben, a conservative Republican 
I Pro~ninent Individual I Deborah Dozier Potter Santa Fe real estate manager I x I 
TEXAS 
Overview of Texas Politics 
Like other Southern states, Texas was a one-party, Democratic-dominated, state for the 
first half of the twentieth century. And, like other Southern states, Texas became more 
competitive. By the 1990s, it had become fully competitive. 
Throughout the 1960s, Republicans progressively developed their organization. The 
initial impetus came from GOP-man John Tower's victory to the U.S. Senate in 1961. Tower 
was the first Republican senator elected in Texas since 1870, and he served four terms until 
1984. The Republicans moved to develop their organization financially and professionally over 
this time period. By the late 1970s, Cotter et al. (1 984) ranked the Texas Republican Party's 
organizational strength as moderately strong, in the third highest category of four.15 
Democrats, on the other hand, moved more slowly toward innovation. They did not 
professionalize or move to increase their financial base until well into the 1980s. Their slowness 
allowed the Republicans to make headway. By the 1990s, the Republicans were gaining wins up 
aild down the ballot to the point that, since 2000, the Republicans control both houses of  the 
legislature, the governorship and all other state-wide offices. Despite the Republican ascendance, 
however, the Democratic Party has not been completely usurped, and many elections remain 
competitive. When Senator Phil Gramm annouilced his retirement prior to the 2000 election, 
both Republicans and Democrats considered the chance of a Democratic win viable: 
As it turned out, the race was not that close on Election Day. National tides and 
President Bush's popularity may have affected this outcome. Texas Democrats 
suffered losses in almost every key position, and national Democrats didn't fare 
much better. Neither national nor state Democrats could have known this early in 
the year, and both Republicans and Democrats behaved as though the election 
would be close right up until the last few weeks (Susswein, 2002). 
Texas has no form of official (or unofficial) party endorsement in either party, and it has 
an open primary system, with the primary held in March. This leaves seven months for the 
general election campaign, a long time. However, Texas, like many other Southern states, allows 
for a runoff following the first primary if no candidate receives more than fifty percent of the 
vote. This was not an issue in any election under investigation, for a primary winner emerged 
with more than fifty percent in each case. The absence of party endorsement in the primary 
15 The Texas Republican party scored a .65 1. The scale used was "weak" (0-.249), "nloderately weak" 
(.2:50-. 499), "moderately strong" (.500-.750), and "strong" (.750- 1.00). 
leaves little room for party leaders to exercise much influence in the primary, according to 
Morehouse (1 998). Candidates therefore must develop personality-driven primary campaigns. 
Overview of Texas Elections 
In the nine elections I investigated in Texas, only two elections were even remotely 
competitive. In 1994, incumbent Democratic governor Ann Richards had a primary opponent, 
Gary Espinosa, a retired sandblaster from Palestine who had never held elected office. Her 
opponent in the general election, George W. Bush, had also had a primary opponent who attained 
a mere 6.7 percent of the vote and who also had never held elected office. Following Bush's 
upset over Richards, Bush handily won the next election in 1998 by almost forty points, while 
his successor, Rick Perry, won the 2002 gubernatorial election by almost twenty points. 
Land Commissioner and former Democratic Party Executive Director Gany Mauro ran 
unopposed in the Democratic primary in 1998, and then ran in the general against incumbent 
Bush. His campaign was more notable for the endorsements he did not receive rather than for 
those he did. Several top Democrats in Texas, including retiring Democratic Lieutenant 
Govemor Bob Bullock and Democratic State Comptroller and Lieutenant Govemor candidate 
Jolu~ Sharp, endorsed Bush, as did "dozens of other Democratic officeholders" even before the 
primaries were over (Ratcliffe and Bemstein 1998). The Democratic Party divided over Mauro. 
Sharp commented, "Gany obviously is from the liberal wing of the party. I'm from the more 
conservative wing of the party . . ." (Ratcliffe and Bemstein 1998). In the general race between 
Bush and Mauro, Bush collected eighteen endorsements to Mauro's ten. Bush drew his support 
froin officeholders from all over Texas, including 500 mayors and at least 100 Democratic 
county officials. Democratic officeholders went with the incumbent in droves and abandoned 
party loyalty nearly altogether. The only prominent individual within the party that Mauro could 
count on was First Lady Hillary Rodharn Clinton. 
The 2002 Democratic primary was a four-way race among wealthy Laredo businessman 
To8ny Sanchez, fo~mer two-term attorney general and forrner three-term house member Dan 
Morales, Houston lawyer John Worldpeace and Waxahachie businessman Bill Lyon. Sanchez 
won the primary easily, despite the fact that he had never held elected office. He racked up the 
endorsements of several major Democrat-aligned groups, including the AFL-CIO, the Texas 
State Teachers Association and Democratic Party establishment leaders. These endorsements 
came in tluoughout January and February. The NRA also endorsed Sanchez just before the 
The explanation most often cited for Sanchez's win was his money and his etlmicity: 
For many Democrats, electability seems to be the major issue. East Texas political 
scientist Charles Elliott, a former State Democratic Executive Committee 
member, counts himself among the new breed of Democrats practicing passionate 
pragmatism. He is backing Sanchez. "I think the best explanation for that is he is 
simply a man of considerable experience in a number of areas, and he is 
Hispanic," he said. "How does that sound? I want to win the election" (Herman 
2002). 
Sanchez went up against incumbent governor Rick Perry in the general election. Perry 
had become governor following Bush's election to the presidency in 2000. Perry won easily by 
rou,gl~ly 18 percentage points. Of the 38 endorseinents I collected for this election, more than half 
came from interest groups. The candidates roughly split the total number of interest group 
endorsements. Seven of the nine interest group endorseinents received by Sanchez came froin 
orgi311ized labor - from the AFSCME, the fire fighters, two teachers' unions, and several law 
enforcement unions. Perry also picked up labor endorsements from the Teamsters' and from 
thee  law enforcement unions. And Perry, as incumbent, also had the backing of nearly all the 
illajor newspapers in Texas, save the Austin-American Statesman and the Corpus Christi Caller 
Times, plus the backing of 250 mayors, President Bush, and Sanchez's Democratic opponent in 
the primary - Dan Morales. 
Applying the Tests 
Table 3-25: Summarv of Test Results A ~ ~ l i e d  to Texas 
Candidate Quality, United Front, and Decisive Influence 
Republicans now dominate Texas politics, controlling every statewide office and the 
Party 
Denlocrats 
Republicans 
legislature, though not by as huge margins as in Ohio. Like Democrats in Ohio, Democrats in 
Texas had a tough time finding a high-quality challenger. Sanchez, while wealthy and therefore 
Election 
Year 
1994 
1998 
2002 
1994 
1998 
2002 
self-financing as well as Hispanic, lacked experience in elected office, yet the Democrats 
selected him over a candidate who not only had elected office experience but had held a state- 
% Repeat 
Endorsers 
25% 
.15% 
13% 
0% 
0% 
33% 
wide office. The reason was that former Attorney General, Dan Morales, faced a indictment over 
charges that he had given a cut of a tobacco case settlement attorney's fees to a friend. Overall, 
the average candidate quality score for Democrats was .57 (on the Jewel1 4-point scale), 
coinpared to the Republican's 4. 
Both parties score very highly on the decisive-influence test, because so many of the 
primary elections were virtually uncontested, and because, when the Democrats disagreed, many 
of them chose to go with the Republicans rather than find a more suitable nominee. 
% 
Endorsements 
go to Nominee 
100% 
100% 
88% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
United Front 
Yes 
NA 
Yes 
Yes 
NA 
NA 
Candidate 
Quality 
2 
0 
0 
0 
4 
4 
That being said, the general elections are, at the moment, highly skewed in the 
R.epublicans' favor. Given the level of bi-partisan report enjoyed by Republican nominees, it 
would be hard for one of them to lose to a Democrat. A united front has been easy enough for 
R.epublican nominees to attain, perhaps because most powerful Democrats see the writing on the 
wall and know they have to play along to get along. 
S~llall World: Repeat Endorsers 
Table 3-26: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers Texas Democratic Candidates 
)Election Year I Non-Repeater I Repeater I 
I Average / 71%) 129% 1 
Table 3-27: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers Texas Republican Candidates 
r?%;tion Year I Non-Repeater I Repeater 1 
*See table 3-29. The Texas Hospital Association endorsed a Democrat in 1994 and a Republican in 2002. 
The endorsements candidates receive, on either hand, are mostly from interest groups and 
officeholders. Almost all interest groups appear only once in the data set - in other words, their 
endorsements are episodic rather than constant, and the parties fail the "small world" test, 
especially the Republicans who scored an average of 9 percent. Who were the repeat endorsers? 
Tiihle 3-28 outlines thein below: 
Ta.ble -- 3-28: Texas Repeat Endorsers by Party 
-- 
Endorser 
AFL-CIO 
Texas Hospital Association 
Texas State Teachers Association 
Texas Hospital Association 
1994 1998 2002 
X X X 
X 
X X X 
X 
Candidates draw their support not from a regular pool of repeat players, but from a set of 
interests that services the particular candidate at the precise point in time. In many ways, the 
Texas Republicans are similar to Ohio Republicans when examining the repeat endorsers. The 
difference, however, is that interest groups participate at a higher rate in Texas than in many of 
the other states outlined thus far. Their participation is episodic not stable, but their participation 
is there nonetheless. Table 3-29 displays the interest group activity in Texas elections. 
Table 3-29: Interest Group Endorsements in Texas General Elections, 1994-2002 
Baptist Ministers Association 
Byt is t  Ministers Alliance 
Cl~ristian Coalition t -  
~ & t ~  Sheriffs Association of 
Bexal- Countv 
Bush (1994 & 
1998) 
X 
X 
DPS Officers Association 
Ha~ri!; County AFL-CIO 
--- 
Hispanic Clianiber of Conunerce 
--- 
Illdependent Bankers Association of 
Texas; 
Independent Texas Voters 
M exican-American Sheriffs 
X 
X 
Texas Farm Bureau X X 
x 
Assoc:iation 
Sari. A i ~ t o ~ ~ i o  Police Officers 
Association 
I Texas Federation of Teachers I I I X 1 
Perry (2002) 
X 
X 
> 
X 
X 
A 
X 
Sanchez (2002) 
X 
- 
X 
X 
v 
Texas Hospital Association 
Medical Association 
T& Municipal Police League 
X 
X 
Association 
Association of Fire 
IL,I,INOIS 
Overview of Illinois Politics 
The major issue dividing Illinois is regionalism. The Democratic base is squarely in 
X 
v 
I Texas State Teachers Association 
Chicago, which makes up 23 percent of the state population, although its proportion is in decline. 
X 
A 
X 
Republican support comes from suburban Cook County and from the five "collar counties" 
X 
surrounding it. These six populous counties make up 62 - 63 percent of the state's population. 
Hence, the deciding "swing vote" in Illinois resides in the political leanings of downstate Illiilois 
(the other 96 counties). 
Whereas once upon a time such geographic divisiveness was sometlung the parties could 
"work with" - today, this is no longer the case. The Democratic machine of Daley and even 
before has a storied place in Illinois and national history. Illinois housed one of the largest 
political machines of all time, with patronage politics the name of the game. However, various 
court decisions, beginning in the 1970s and continuing up to the 1990s, significantly and 
dramatically undercut the power and reach of the machines, and rendered them obsolete. Today, 
an endorsement from either the Democratic or the Republican Party is no guarantee of victory. 
Elected office in Illinois is candidate-centered, not party-centered, according to (Appleton and 
Ward 1997). Candidates for statewide office develop their own elaborate fundraising apparatuses 
and need not rely on their respective parties for critical support. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, Illinois politics bear a strong resemblance to 
Massachusetts politics in terns of endorsement activity. All nine Illinois elections I exanlined 
were contested. Moreover, every primary where there was no incumbent (the 1998 and 2002 
Democratic and Republican races) was divisive, and the vote was split at least three ways (if not 
more), with the top three candidates earning at least double-digit percentages. 
The Illinois primary is held in March, giving the parties sufficient time to pull together, 
unite, and mount an effective campaign in the general election. Illinois has relatively weak party 
endorsement rules: parties make informal endorsements, and the primary itself is an open one in 
which anyone can vote as long as they publicly declare their party preference. 
Overview of Illinois Elections 
In 1994, incumbent Republican governor Jim Edgar ran for re-election and won easily 
with sixty-five percent of the vote. He ran against State Comptroller Dawn Clarke Netsch, the 
first woman in Illinois to win statewide office. Netsch faced four contenders in the Democratic 
primary, though her main opponent was Attorney General Roland Burris. The endorsements 
received by the candidates were somewhat scattered. Of the interest group endorsements, Netsch 
received five, compared with Burris' two. Netsch's endorsements came exclusively from 
women's organizations - EMILY'S list, the National Women's Political Caucus, the Illinois 
chapter of the National Organization for Women, and the Women's Campaign Fund. All but one 
of these organizations was fi-on1 out of state. Burris on the other hand, received an endorsement 
from the Chicago Housing Authority Residents' Council and one from Operation PUSH (which 
later merged with Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition). The remainder of the endorsements came 
largely from officeholders and f?-om local party organizations. Richard Phelan, the Cook County 
Board president, who came in a distant third in the primary, won the largest number of 
endorsements. However, his came entirely from local individuals, mostly Chicago - Democratic 
Pii~ty ward leaders and state representatives. Phelan's one major officeholder endorsement came 
from the powerful House Speaker, Mike Madigan. 
The 1998 gubernatorial election presented both parties with an open seat. The Republican 
primary, however, was a cake-walk for Secretary of State George Ryan, who won the 
nomination with eighty-six percent of the vote. He had the support of the sitting governor, Jiin 
Edgar, which he formally received in August of 1997. Although receiving only four 
endo]-sements in the primary, Ryan had the backing of nearly all of the Republican leadership in 
the state - the "overwhelming support among Republican legislators, county chairmen and other 
elected officials.. ." (Neal 1997). The Democratic ticket, on the other hand, was split six ways, 
though three of the six received under seven percent of the vote combined. For the top three 
candidates, John Schmidt (Associate Attorney General), Roland Burris (former Attorney 
General), and Glenn Poshard (downstate U.S. House member), Poshard was a clear favorite, 
with endorsements from major interest groups and party leaders. As early as May 1997, nearly 
one year before the primary, Poshard had the public endorsement of former Senate President 
Philip Rock. His endorsement was followed by four Democratic state central committee 
inembers in June, and by that of the Democratic County Chairmen's Association in July. By 
January, he had the support of the AFL-CIO, AFSCME, the Illinois State Rifle Association and 
the Fraternal Order of Police, as well. In the primary, the party clearly united around Poshard and 
did it early. 
By the general election, the unified support of the Democratic Party had shattered. I 
recorded only 16 endorsements in the general election. While Poshard, the Democratic nominee, 
received the support of the AFL-CIO, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, Vice President A1 Gore, 
and the Pantagraph, endorsements for George Ryan demonstrated his ability to cross party lines. 
Not only did he receive the support of seven Democratic and independent mayors, but also of the 
Illinois Education Association and AFSCME, along with the traditionally Republican Illinois 
Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, as the press reported, he "chose a woman for a running mate, 
courted the gay vote and cast his support for gun control as a key difference from his opponent. 
Along the way, he threatened to turn off his own party's right wing -- though his pro-life 
credentials helped keep many conservatives with him" (Schoenburg 1998). Ryan won, but only 
by 3.6 percent. 
In the 2002 Democratic primary, the top two Democrats received roughly the same 
number of endorsements. U. S . Representative Blagoj evich received 3 1 compared with former 
Chicago public schools' CEO Paul Vallas' 25. Blagojevich started receiving endorsements early 
- by the end of 2001, he already had 15, five of which came from fellow members of Congress 
in May 2001. Several alderman and state representatives added their support in June, and by 
November he had won over the entire Sangainon county Democratic party organization, 
followed by the AFL-CIO. 
Paul Vallas' endorsements did not start rolling in until January 2002 -just two months 
prior to the election. The majority of Vallas' endorsements came from state legislators. Despite 
the sharp difference in timing, Vallas and Blagojevich were separated by just two percentage 
points in the primary. 
011 the Republican side, Attorney General Jim Ryan easily beat his competitors by over 
16 percentage points. He earned 29 endorsements, compared to state Senator Patrick O'Malley's 
two and Lieutenant Governor Corinne Wood's four. The Republican establishment threw its 
support behind Ryan early - by August 2001, Ryan had the full support of the sitting governor 
George Ryan, along with endorsements from former governors Jim Edgar and Jim Thompson, 
the Illinois House minority leader and the Illinois Senate President, and U.S. House Speaker 
Dennis Hastert. 
Blagojevich won the general election by just over seven points. Like the 1998 general 
election, endorsement activity in the general was relatively low. I recorded only 16 endorseinents 
in total - ten of which went to Blagojevich, and all of which were unsurprising. Various 
Democratic Party organizations mobilized behind the nominee, as did the AFL-CIO, the Illinois 
Ed.uci~tion Association, and the Fraternal Order of Police. Ryan had received the endorsemei~ts 
of his rivals in the primary, along with the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Federation of Independent Businesses. 
Applying the Tests 
Table 3-30: Summary of Tests Applied to Illinois 
Party I Election I % Repeat I % / United Front I Candidate 
Year 
1 2002 1 25% I 49% I Moderate I 1 1 
Democrats 
Endorsers 
1994 
1998 
Republicans 
I11 assessing the level of partisan control in Illinois, divisive primaries alone tell us that 
Endorsements 
go to Nominee 
1 2002 
parties have less command of their troops compared to the other states in the data set. 
Quality 
27% 
31% 
1994 
1998 
Nevertheless, we have already seen that Republicans appear more focused than Democrats, given 
11% 
their high decisive-influence scores and high candidate-quality scores. The spread of 
39% 
67% 
0% 
50% 
endorsements for various Democratic candidates split the party enough to give them the lowest 
83% 
decisive-influence score (68 percent) of any state in the data set except Massachusetts. Yet, 
No 
Yes 
100% 
67% 
despite this, the Democrats demonstrated, in every election, that early support from party elites 
1 
.75 
Yes 
made a major difference. A united front composed of powerful members of the party most 
Yes 
Yes 
2 
certainly formed early behind the 1998 Democratic nominee and somewhat behind the 2002 
2 
1 
nominee. We saw, however, that such unity did not always hold through into the general 
election, as in the 1998 election when the GOP nominee, George Ryan, crossed party lines to 
peel away left-wing Democrats. 
Repeat 
Table 3-32: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers, Illinois Republican Candidates 
Table 3-31: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers, Illinois Democratic Candidates 
Repeater 
27% 
31% 
25% 
28% 
Election Year 
1994 n=44 
1998 n=54 
2002 n=63 
Average 
Non-Repeater 
73% 
69% 
75% 
72% 
Like many other elections in the dataset, the Democrats have higher repeat rates than the 
 on year 
n=6 
Republicans. Within the Democratic party the percentage of repeat endorsers is a little higher 
tha.11 other states; moreover, the repeat rate stays in the twenty-five percent arena consistently 
Non-Repeater 
100% 
which does not occur in the other states. The list of repeat endorsers outlined in Table 3-33 
Repeater 
0% 
shows a set of powerful groups and powerful people within the party; however, some groups 
endorsed in one party in one election and in the other party in another election, which, as I have 
sa.id previously, is not partisan behavior per se, but rather self-interested behavior. Overall, we 
can conclude that the Illinois' Democratic party behavior begins to approach the behavior of 
partisan-aligned groups and individuals outlined by Cohen et al., but even there, the three big 
tests receive only a passing grade when taken together. On the Republican side of the equation, 
the repeat endorsement rate is low - and only groups that are counted as repeat endorsers are 
coIu.nted as repeaters because they also endorsed Democrats. The only major officeholder repeat 
endorser is the former governor Jim Edgar. Though the Republicans have a united front and 
score well on the percentage of endorsements going to the nominee, the very small number of 
endorseinents makes these numbers somewhat suspect. 
Table 3-33: Illinois Repeat Endorsers by Year and by Party 
N.IB. Some individuals' titles change (i.e. state senator becomes U.S. Rep), so they are listed twice, but counted once 
per election. 
Chicago Daily Herald 
Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley 
Chicago Sun Times 
Chicago's Fraternal Order of Police 
Democratic County Chairmen's Association 
former Senate President Philip J. Rock 
A-- 
Pairty 
--- 
Derriocratic Candidate Endorsements 
Endorser 
AFL-CIO 
CONCLUSION 
Using the measures noted above, we can conclude that a strong party is one that prevents 
primary fights and builds a strong unified coalition of diverse sets of interests. It is clear from the 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
x x 
X X X 
X 
X 
X 
X X X 
X 
X X 
.X x X 
X X X 
x X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
x 
X 
Republican Candidate Endorsements 
data that strong-party states successfully prevent primary fights, put forth winnable candidates, 
and run campaigns that are most certainly not candidate-centered. However, strong-party states 
also appear to prevent primary fights almost completely, with the result that primary elections, 
with or without an incumbent, are virtually uncontested. The result of this situation is that 
former state Rep. Frank Giglio of Thornton 
House Speaker Michael J. Madigan 
Illinois Personal PAC 
Illinois Planned Parenthood 
Illinois State Rifle Association 
NOW 
Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition 
state Rep. Bobby Rush (D-Ill.) 
state Rep. Jesse L. Jackson Jr. (D-I11 
state Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez (D-Ill.) 
state Rep. William 0. Lipinski 
state sen. Connie Howard (D-Chicago) 
state Sen. Louis S. Viverito of Stickney 
Stickney Townslip Cormnitteenlan Louis Viverito 
Thornton Township Cornnlitteeman Frank Giglio 
U.S. Rep. Bobby Rush (D) 
U.S. Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-Ill.) 
U.S. Rep. Luis Gutierrez 
AFL-CIO 
Chicago Daily Herald 
Chlcago Sun Times 
Gov. Jim Edgar 
Illinois Planned Parenthood 
Illinois State Rifle Association 
primary elections are low on information, low on press coverage and low in participation. 
Candidates are chosen not by the "extended party," but by key institutional party players. By 
contrast, weak to moderate party states have wild and divisive primaries, many more 
endorsements and much more participation by friends, neighbors, key interest groups, and 
partisans. 
My primary purpose in this chapter was to assess and analyze the party politics of the five 
states under examination using several indicators designed by previous scholars. A picture has 
emerged that calls into question the reliability of these indicators and also raises additional 
questions. Does a party need to score highly on all indicators in order to say that it definitively 
co~ztrols the nomination? And what does control even mean when a party is so decimated that it 
has to "pay people" to run under the party banner? The Ohio Democratic Party presents the 
starkest case in the data set. It does not suffer from factionalism nor from weak laws or rules 
preventing it from exerting power. It unites behind a nominee; groups and individuals stay 
involved over time demonstrating cohesion; the amount of endorsement activity is about equal to 
that of the Republicans; and primaries are not divisive. Yet the party has been unable to win a 
single non-judicial statewide office since 1992. The question is, even if party networks are both 
exigent and strong, if they are not influential at all, are they still in control? The word "control" 
connotes power, and for the Ohio Democrats, beggars cannot be choosers. Perhaps Ohio is 
anomalous. The other cases do not present as clear cut failures of the tests, but they still raise 
dolubts. Part of the doubt stems from the very fact that the results are, to some extent, all over the 
place. 
CHAPTER 4: MASSACHUSETTS 
A complete list of Repeat Endorsers in Massachusetts is available in Appendix C 
Political scientist Murray Levin wrote, "Massachusetts is governed not by organized or 
disciplined political parties but by shifting coalitions of prominent individuals for whom personal 
loyalties and commitments mean more than party unity and party platforms (Levin 1962: 17)." 
Levin wrote this about the 1960 gubernatorial election. He argued that both parties in 
Massachusetts politics were dominated, at the time, by personalities - the Democratic party was 
run by ethnic groups distrustful of one another, while the Republican party was governed by 
homogei~ous group of Yankees - and that both parties were run by a small group of activists that 
created inbred, irresponsible parties (Levin 1 962: 3 8). 
Do Levin's observations shed any light on Massachusetts politics of the 1980s and 
1990s? This chapter analyzes endorsement activity in Massachusetts in depth. I was able to 
exainine Massachusetts over a much longer time horizon than the five other states in this study 
due to the availability of newspaper archives at the Boston Globe.. Moreover, I also persoilally 
interviewed several key players in Massachusetts politics to gain a greater understanding about 
the supply and demand of endorsements in election cycles. 
Massachusetts is certainly considered a Democratic state. Democrats have dominated the 
state legislature since 1958 and currently control the entire Massachusetts congressional 
delegation as they have done for the past twenty plus years. The Republicans, however, have 
managed to compete effectively for several major offices, and have won every gubernatorial 
election since 1990. Moreover, Reagan carried the state twice, Republican Edward Brooke 
served two U.S. Senate terms from 1966 to 1978, and most recently, Joseph Malone was elected 
to statewide office as treasurer in 1990. This has led David Mayhew to suggest that 
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Massachusetts has a system of "split-level bipartyism" in which parties are competitive for 
prominent offices: but not for the rest. 
What is most surprising about endorsement activity in Massachusetts is how much of it 
there is. In every other state in my dataset, except Illinois, the average number of endorsemellts 
pel- election cycle was below 15. The average number of endorsements received by Democratic 
candidates was seven times that (1 08). Only Illinois Democratic candidates came close, 
averaging 54 endorsements. Republican candidates in Massachusetts received an average of 21 
e~ldorseinents per election, though there were considerable spikes in Republican activity that 
rivaled the Democrats. So what is going 011 in Massachusetts that accounts for this big 
comparative difference? Who is doing all this endorsing? Did the endorsements make a 
di fference? 
In the next section, I will examine each election in turn, presenting the raw data and tell 
the brief story of each election. After that, I will analyze the results and answer the key questions 
posed in this introduction. 
Ovel-view of the 1978 Election 
1978 Democratic Primary Election 
For all the discussion just noted above regarding the huge number of endorsements 
granted in Massachusetts gubernatorial elections, the 1978 primary and general elections are 
outliers for a number of reasons. First, the number of endorsements for all five primary 
candidates totaled only 27 (most Massachusetts primary elections had well over 100 
endorsements). Second, the incumbent governor, Michael Dukakis, not only faced challengers in 
the primary - he also lost the primary. And third, compared to all other election cycles, oilly a 
sinall percentage (10%) of officeholders endorsed a candidate (most elections had over 35% of 
officeholder endorsements). The driving force behind this anomalous state of affairs was the 
overall level of striking dissatisfaction with the sitting governor, Michael Dukakis. 
In 1978, Edward J. King, the former Executive Director of Massport (the Massachusetts 
port authority), beat the incumbent Governor Dukakis by nearly nine percentage points in the 
primary - a trouncing. According to press accounts in the Boston Globe, many politicians chose 
to sit out the election due to their ire at Dukakis. Carol Surkin, a Boston Globe political 
columnist, wrote in September 1977 that Dukakis had "little support [in the legislature] ," that he 
"lost inost of his small bands of loyalists this year on the redistricting bill" and that he was "less 
effective with the day-to-day bargaining and negotiating required in the chief executive's role" 
(Surkin 1977). An article in October 1977 told of "a once stout supporter of the governor in the 
Legislature said . . . he would have trouble getting five votes for Dukakis for governor in the 
General Court" (Healy 1 977). 
Dukakis' problems extended well beyond his relationship with the legislature. In the 
1978 primary, several unions and organizations who had supported Dukakis in the 1974 election 
refused to endorse him in 1978. The State Labor Council, representing AFL-CIO unions, 
declined to endorse Dukakis as did the Massachusetts Teachers Association, and Citizens for 
Participation in Political Action (CPPAX), a liberal advocacy organization. Dukakis had 
offended unions, especially public employee unions, by his budget cuts and tax cuts resulting in 
massive layoffs. 
Christopher Lydon, a Boston-based journalist, wrote a book review of two Dukakis 
biographies for Washington Monthly in 1988 and summed up the first Dukakis administration 
well: 
In 1975 Dukakis fell heir to the runaway deficits and cooked books of the affable 
Republican Frank Sargent. In the pit of the worst recession since the 1930s, 
Dukakis found himself slashing hospital care for welfare families and, at the same 
time, breaking his no-new-taxes promise to save the state from insolvency. 
Dukakis offended everyone, listened to no one, lost contact with his legislature, 
and drew challenges against his own renomination from both the right and left 
fnnges of his party. The mitigating details of that first term included some 
exemplary judicial appointments and an overhaul of court administration; major 
transit investments around Boston; and the rescue of rotting mill cities like Lowell 
and Pittsfield. But the details did not mitigate much: Lowell and Pittsfield both 
voted for Ed King. Dukakis was the last to learn of what his wife Kitty called his 
"public death." ("Dukakis and the Reform Impulse - Book Reviews", Washington 
Monthly, May, 1988. Christopher Lydon). 
Dukakis received a total of six endorsements in the primary election - three from labor 
groups which he obtained in July and August, including the United Auto Workers, the 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union (a major union at the time, with statewide 
representation in the major industrial cities in Massachusetts), and the vaguely worded 
endorsement of "unions representing 100,000  member^."'^ The sole officeholder endorsement 
came from the mayor of Pittsfield in January. He also received the endorsements of a "number of 
Democratic ward and city committees" and the endorsement of the Boston Globe. What was 
more surprising about Dukakis' endorsements was the number of endorsements that were 
withheld altogether or given to his challengers. Dukakis, for example, was a state board member 
of the Massachusetts chapter of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) - a group that had 
endorsed and championed him in the 1974 election. In 1978, the group could not reach a two- 
thirds vote for any candidate. In addition, many groups including the Massachusetts Teachers 
Association, the liberal Citizens for Participation in Political Action, and a major union 
representing public employees, AFSCME, withheld their endorsements. 
16 The reporting of this endorsement appeared in the Bostorz Globe: "Dukakis, according to his campaign's 
Joseph Jamele, has the endorsements of unions representing 100,000 members. Democrat King has the 
enclorsements of 17 unions that represent 400,000 members, according to Martin A. Burke 3d, the King campaign 
spok.esman." (Boston Globe, Sunday August 27, 1978. No author cited). 
His chief rival, Edward J. KingI7, picked up twelve endorsements, largely from labor 
groups - the building trades, the sheet metal workers, the police, and the Teamsters. Half of his 
endorsements came in May, the rest arrived in August (see Appendix D for timeline). Edward J. 
King was a conservative Democrat who had real ideological differences from his rival Dukakis 
who hailed from the more liberal wing of the party. King was a pro-development Democrat who 
was also proud to join the anti-tax movement of the day. This led to several interesting 
endorsements in the general election, many of which came from staunch Republican-leaning 
groups and individuals, including the conservative anti-tax group, Citizens for Limited Taxation 
and the Republican nominee's rival in the primary election, Edward F. King. Moreover, many 
Democrats could not bring themselves to endorse the Democratic nominee in the general election 
- Dukakis himself, along with Democrats lieutenant gubernatorial candidate Tom O'Neil, 
Representative Philip Johnston, and the mayor of Boston, Kevin White. 
1978 Republican Primary Election 
The Republicans ran two candidates in their primary - businessman and head of Citizens 
for Limited Taxation, Edward F. King and House minority leader Francis Hatch. The five 
endorsements recorded for this election all went to the convention-winning but ultimately 
primary-losing candidate, Edward F. King. He received endorsements from the Sportsmen's 
PAC, the chair of the West Springfield Town Committee and two individuals, including Gordon 
Nelson, the state chair of the Republican party. Save for the Sportsman's PAC and the 
endorsement of a wealthy donor, King received his three party endorsements the day of the 
collvention, suggesting that party insiders had not dedicated enormous energy to fashioning a 
17 Forrner Mayor of Cambridge Barbara Ackernlan also con~peted in the election. 
winning candidate. IOng's opponent, Hatch, won the primary easily, with 56% of the vote, 
presenting himself to voters as a moderate Republican - liberal on social issues and a traditional 
Republican on items such as restricting state spending. 
The results of the Republican primary reflect a view of primaries that would satisfy the 
progressive impulse to establish them in the first place. In this case, an ideological conservative 
candidate was favored by party insiders; a more moderate and liberal candidate was favored by 
voters. Moreover, the more moderate and liberal candidate would appear, on the face of it, to 
have been a candidate that had more potei~tial to win in the general given both the voting 
demographics of Massachusetts at the time and the past history of electing moderate Republican 
governors.18 As it was, however, Hatch lost the general election to a Democrat - a Democrat 
who earned a great deal of his support from conservative Republicans; while Hatch earned n~uch 
of his general election support from liberal Democrats. 
Table 4-1: Summary of Tests Applied to 1978 Primary Elections 
Election Year % Repeat % Endorsements go United Average 
Endorsers to Nominee Front Candidate 
Quality 
Democrats 1978 28% (n=25) 48% No 1.3 
Republicans 1978 40% (n=5) 0 No 0.5 
By Massachusetts standards, the 1978 gubernatorial election was a relatively low- 
eildorsement affair for both Republicans and Democrats (the average number of endorsements 
was 1.03 for Democrats and 2 1 for Republicans for 1978-2002). The percentage of repeat 
endorsers was fairly standard for Massachusetts Democrats, not for the Republicans (the 
Republicans averaged a 2 1 % repeat rate). The absolute number of repeat endorsements, 
18 The most recent Republican governor Francis Sargent (an MIT alum), elected in 1970, raised $100 
1nill:ion in new corporate taxes to pay for social welfare costs, while reducing the state budget by $17.5 millino~l by 
restricting Medicaid eligibility. He was also a champion of environmental protection and served as the keynote 
speaker at the first Earth Day at MIT. 
however, was so low as to make the year somewhat anomalo~s . '~  Clearly the Democrats were 
/ 
divided and angry - the split within the party is clearly evident in the decisive influence test (the 
percentage of endorsements going to the nominee). The Republicans were also divided and 
hence failed the decisive influence test with no endorsements going to the nominee. No united 
front gathered around any candidate in either party. Although the repeat endorsement rate is 
somewhat high, the other tests truly reflect the division within both parties. 
1978 General Election 
I gathered a total of 126 endorsements for the 1978 general election (92 for King, 34 for 
Hatch). The 1978 general election turned Massachusetts politics on its head with liberals 
endorsing the Republican and conservatives endorsing the Democrat. Edward J. King's upset 
victory over a sitting governor in the primary sent many Democrats across the aisle. Republicai~ 
Hatch picked up the endorsements of the Massachusetts chapter of Americans for Democratic 
Action, Citizens for Participation in Political Action, Boston's influential ward 5 Democratic 
City Committee, several Democratic state Representatives, and Dukakis' more liberal rival in the 
primary, Cambridge's Barbara Ackerman. Edward J. King, on the other hand, earned the 
endorse~nents of Hatch's more conservative rival in the Republican primary, Edward J. King, 
along with the endorsement of Edward J. King's group Citizens for Limited Taxation. Whereas 
from an endorsement perspective it appeared that Democrats and liberals flocked to Hatch, 
traditional Democrats also flocked to King, who also picked up endorsements from the AFL- 
CIO, the entire Massachusetts congressional delegation, the Democratic attorney general Francis 
Bellotti, President Carter, and 22 of the state's 39 mayors. Like the 1990 general election 
19 The repeat endorsers for the Democrats were: The Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus, tlze Bosto~? 
Globe, the UAW, the State Police Association, the Sportsmen, the Teamsters, and the National Association of 
Governmental Employees (NAGE). 
between Silber and Weld, many Democrats defected from their party to endorse a Republicail 
because of the selection of a more conservative Democrat in the primary. 
Overview of 1982 Election 
1982 Democratic Primary Election 
The loss to Edward J. King, was, for Dukakis, a major blow but also an opportunity for 
serious soul searching. Richard Neustadt compared Dukakis' exile to Roosevelt's polio for 
character building. Dukakis returned to the political fray in the 1982 gubernatorial election 
detennined to rebuild broken relationships and to form serious coalitions with groups and 
individuals whom he knew he had alienated in the first go-around. He put together a coalition, 
ll~aking a very explicit contract with key constituencies. In the 1982 primary Dukakis set up a 
"shadow government." He essentially hired his cabinet ten months (or more) prior to the 
primary, finding specialists in various policy areas to lead portions of his re-election campaign. 
Philip Johnston, for example, Dukakis' future secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
was a rising member in the House of Representatives. In the spring of 1982, Dukakis tapped 
Johnston to run the health and human services segment of the campaign. Johnston's main 
responsibility was to secure the endorsements of people and groups associated with health and 
human services. In return, these individuals and groups would play a "key role" in the policy in 
the transition period and beyond.20 
The endorsements Johnston secured were not simply a rubber-stamp of approval from 
key groups. "It was a deep involvement at the grass roots," Johnston explained. "An involvement 
of money, field, and policy." Johnston met with the HHS community "constantly" garnering 
their support and their expertise. When an endorsement announcement came, Johnston said, it 
'O Personal interview with Philip Jolmston, July 6,2004. 
came with a photo opportunity, with a policy proposal, and the full weight of the key 
constituency loudly supporting Dukakis. Johnston said the campaign was far less focused on 
securing the endorsements of officeholders - in fact, he said, campaigns should "stay away froin 
officeholders - except Kennedy" largely because officeholders do not necessarily have much to 
offer (money, votes, officespace, etc.) except for their name. Their endorsement is often the 
endorsement of a single individual who only offers that single vote. Cultivating endorsements 
from elected officials is, therefore, an inefficient use of campaign resources. That being said, on 
occasion, certain mayors, governors, or even some non-executives can "deliver" a city, a state, a 
ltey constituency. More often than not, however, according to former state representative, state 
Treasurer, and Democratic nominee for governor, Shannon O'Brien, "elected officials endorse to 
get resources, jobs, prestige, influence, access, rewards, and voicew2' - i.e. elected officials 
endorse to serve their own self-interest - exactly the benefits the Dukakis campaign promised. 
Although the 1982 Dukakis campaign employed and exhibited the "endorsement 
strategy" to a phenomenal degree (see the list of endorsements in Appendix D), the strategy itself 
was not unique to the Dukakis campaign or even to Democrats. Ron Kaufman, former national 
political director for the Republican National Committee, a former senior advisor to 
Massachusetts governor William Weld, and a Republican active in Massachusetts and national 
politics argued that "endorsements are important in how they fit a strategic goal. If you are 
running as an outsider you need outsider endorsements, not the Speaker of the House," whereas 
if two already elected officials are squaring off against one another, it can and should become a 
"war of endorsements - you need to get inside end~rsernents."~~ Kaufman also noted that 
successful campaigns have a "flow - a rationale for every day - a message for every day." Put 
2 1  Personal interview with Shannon O'Brien, July, 2004. 
" Personal interview with Ron Kaufman, July 2004. 
illto practice, that means that when a candidate goes to a school to discuss education, the 
campaign should also have some education groups announcing their endorsements in support of 
both the candidate and the candidate's plan. "Endorsements not only give you free media - they 
give you smart media," Kaufinan said. 
The 1982 campaign was indeed a "war of endorsements" between Dukakis and Edward J. 
King (hereafter referred to as King). I recorded a total of 206 endorsements granted to Dukakis 
and King - 94 went to Dukakis, 112 went to King. 59 endorsements came before the convention, 
held at the end of May. Dukakis received 23 of those to King's 37 (see Table 4-2 below for a 
surnmary of the timeline; see Appendix D for a complete listing). In November, 1981, Dukakis 
lined up the endorsements of the two liberal groups who had withheld their endorsements in 
1978 - the ADA and CPPAX. Philip Johnston joined the campaign in November. In January, the 
Wellesley Democratic town committee sent him their endorsement. By April, many unions 
granted their endorsements, including the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the International 
Union of Operating Engineers Local 877, the United Steelworkers of America, District 1, New 
England and the international's president, William b i n ,  and the United Transportation Union. 
King also received early endorsements. By October 198 1, he had pocketed 12, mostly 
fro~n individuals including the governor of Alabama. He had lined up a number of business 
leaders - the presidents of Northeast Petroleum Corporation, Dart Containerline and a 
representative of direct-mail advertising agency headed by a conservative political fundraiser. He 
also had the support of members of the International Longshoremen's Association, the Teamsters 
and fi-orn U.S. Representative Nicholas Mavroules. 
King maintained his endorsement lead over Dukakis throughout the spring, prior to the 
convention. By Ma.y, King had racked up 32 endorsements, almost exclusively from individuals. 
Only two interest groups endorsed King before the convention - the AFL-CIO Labor Council 
(which also endorsed Dukakis) and the conservative group, Citizens for Limited Taxation. 
Dukakis, by contrast, had endorsements from 8 interest groups before the convention - the ADA, 
CPPAX, the AFL-CIO Labor Council (like King), and five additional labor groups, plus labor 
leaders (the teachers, the operating engineers, the steelworkers, the United Transportation Union, 
and "65 labor leaders"). 
Primary 
Article Year Month Dukakis Kin 
October 
November 
1982 January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
Total 
Dukakis won the first endorsing convention since 1979 in May, 1982. He won by a 
margin of 2- 1 over the sitting governor. According to one article about conventions that appeared 
in the Boston Globe magazine in 1990, "Dukakis saw the convention as a mechanism that could 
help him recapture the office. He organized the delegates like a man possessed . . . though out of 
office, [he] was the insider to the delegates" (May 27, 1990, Sunday, MAGAZINE; Pg. 16 p 
"Conventional wisdom; In their current form, Massachusetts state political conventions are not 
serving the voters" by Robert L. Turner). Following the convention, King and Dukakis received 
about equal numbers of endorsements. 
In terms of the type of endorsements received by both candidates, the results are fairly 
evenly matched. Dukakis received 10 media endorsements to King's 11 (see Table 4-3). King 
received far more officeholder endorsements than Dukakis (5 1 to 32). 22 of King's endorsements 
came from local officeholders - mostly mayors - 18 mayors to be exact. It is difficult to know 
now, in 2005, exactly how powerful any one of these mayors were or if they could "deliver" 
their cities. On the interest group front, Dukakis received endorsements from 25 interest groups 
to King's 29. The. type of interest group endorsements both candidates received is revealing (see 
Table 4-5). Dukakis' endorsements clearly came from the more liberal wing of the party - fro111 
olne environmental group, from one housing group, from two liberal groups, from a women's 
group, and from a group representing minorities. King, by contrast, received four industry 
endorsements, a pro-gun endorsement, a pro-life endorsement, and a taxpayer's association 
Now, I turn to the thee  tests to assess to what degree King and Dukakis relied on a small, 
Table -- 4-3: Count of Endorsements, 1982 Massachusetts Democratic Primary by Type 
relatively stable pool of endorsers or whether they developed personal followings; the degree to 
Activist 
Interest Group 
1atel:est Group Leader 
Media 
l\/iiscellaneous 
Officeholder 
I1a.rty Individual or Group 
I'olitical Person 
which a united front formed, and the degree to which these endorsements had a decisive 
influence. The Democratic primary was between two high quality candidates, so candidate 
Dukakis King 
2 
25 29 
7 5 
10 11 
6 3 
32 50 
2 2 
1 1 
9 11 
94 112 
quality is irrelevant to the discussion. Both candidates could expect to receive high quality 
Total 
2 
5 4 
12 
2 1 
9 
8 2 
4 
2 
20 
206 
endorsements and to have relationships with key groups. 
Table 4-4: Summary of Tests Applied to the 1982 Primary Elections 
Party Election % Repeat % United Front Average 
Year Endorsers Endorsements Candidate 
go to Nominee Quality 
Dei~locrats 1982 17% 46% No 4 
Republicans 1982 32% 45% No 0 
Table 4-5: 1982 Repeat Endorsements by Candidate and Endorsement Type 
Candidate Endorsement Endorser 
Type 
Dukakis Interest Group Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
Black Political Task Force 
Citizens for Participation in Political Action 
IBEW Local 2222 
MA Federation of Teachers 
MA Teachers Assn. 
MA UAW 
MA Women's Political Caucus 
National Association of Social Workers (8000) 
SEIU Local 509 
Boston Globe 
Boston Phoenix 
Springfield Daily News 
WEE1 radio 
Officeholder state Rep. Lawrence Alexander (D-Marblehead) 
U.S. Rep. James M. Shannon 
U.S. Rep. Joseph Early 
Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human Services, state Rep.) 
Media 
Party Individual Convention Endorsement 
or Group 
King Interest Group AFSCME 
Boston Building Trades Council 
Citizens for Limited Taxation 
International Brotherhood of Police Officers 
MA Building Trades Council 
MA Citizens for Life 
MA State Police Association 
NAGE 
Teamsters Joint Council No. 10 
Media Lowell Sun 
Middlesex News 
Officeholder Peabody Mayor Peter Torigan 
State Sen. William Bulger (D- South Boston) 
U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland, a Springfield Democrat 
U.S. Rep. Nicholas Mavroules 
The "small world test" measures the number of repeat endorsers. In the 1982 Democl-atic 
primary election, there were a total of 34 repeat endorsers - i.e. 34 (16%) of the 206 
endorsements collected for the 1982 primary election appeared at least once in other primary 
elections in ~assachuset ts .~)  1 6% is not a tembly impressive number, especially when compared 
with every other Democratic primary election in the dataset except the 2002, when the repeater 
rate was only 10% It is worth noting, that the Democratic primary elections of 1982 and 2002 
both had over 200 endorsements - an enormous rate of activity compared to all other elections 
analyzed in this dissertation. Table 4-5 lays out the repeat endorsements received by King and 
Dukakis. The dominant repeat endorsers are labor groups. No groups "switched" between 1978 
and 1982 fiom Dukakis to King or vice-versa. The only repeat endorsements retained by King 
were fiom the National Association of Governmental Employees (NAGE), the Teamsters and the 
Police. Dukakis retained the autoworkers and the Boston Globe. AFSCME, CPPAX, and the 
tea.chers withheld their endorsements out of anger at Dukakis, but an unwillingness to support 
King. 
The inajorlty of endorsements received by King and Dukakis came from individuals - 
mostly officeholders, but also from political people, prominent individuals, and representatives 
of the party. The majority of these individuals were not repeat endorsers, but rather constituted 
one-time endorsements for the particular candidate. Can we conclude, therefore, that King and 
Dukakis had personal followings that described candidate-centered campaigns? Is it the case that 
they were not competing for endorsements from a relatively small, stable pool of campaign 
backers, but rather casting for personal followings from a "sea" of occasional political players? 
The answer is yes and no. Several points need to be made. 
First, Dukakis and King appealed to far different ideological wings (factions) of the 
Democratic party. In no other election under investigation was the split between two candidates 
of the same party as stark, as glaring, and as easily identifiable. King was a staunchly 
--- 
23 The number of repeat endorsers drops down to 14% if media endorsements are excluded, as I point out 
later in tlie section on t'he Republican primary. 
conservative Democrat - a socially and fiscally conservative Democrat who appeared to making 
his way toward the Republican party and who, in fact, did endorse two Republican candidates in 
the 1986 gubernatorial election. Dukakis, by contrast was staunchly liberal, both socially and 
fiscally. In many ways, therefore, they were not competing for the same endorsements. Dukakis 
hardly wanted the endorsement of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, just as King hardly wanted to 
be endorsed by the ADA. Dukakis and King were drawing fi-om different pools, though both 
candidates, were, at the time, certainly still drawing the majority of their support from 
Democrats. Though King was edging in the Republican direction, the vast majority of his 
endorsements (though not all) came from clear-cut members of the Democratic party who would 
not consider endorsing a Republican - at least not in 1982. We shall see, in future elections, 
whether this ideological divide holds. 
Second, the "sea" of non-repeat endorsers - the supposed candidate-oriented, occasional 
political players - was a sea filled with political strategists as opposed to celebrities, business 
leaders, and other non-political entities who entered the race. This is an obvious point. Both King 
and Dukakis were governors - they were political people with political fiends in high places. 
Hence, the list of non-repeat endorsements is not a list of political novices. It is a list composed 
of several union locals - SEW local 254, AFSCME Council 93, the Local 877 of the operating 
engineers - a list composed of interest group leaders, of political leaders - senate presidents, 
house speakers, and mayors - and of many other frequent political players. Yes, the list also has 
a small amount of miscellaneous people - of people who could certainly be called political 
neophytes - Red Sox players, for example. But overall, the non-repeat endorsers are inherently 
political people and groups. As mentioned previously, the vast majority of officeholder 
endorsements are not terribly important overall. Officeholders, in general, do not bring with their 
endorsement vast (or even small) amounts of resources the way interest group or party 
c:ommittees do. Both King and Dukakis had a high number of officeholder endorsements. But 
they also had high-quality endorsements from groups and party players. 
What about the timing of the endorsements? Did a united front form around Dukakis 
early? We employ this test by examining the pacing of the endorsements throughout the primary 
campaign. We assess whether Dukakis and King received endorsements from groups and 
iactional interests who, ideologically, would have preferred the other candidate, but who went 
with the other because they believed he could do a better job uniting the party and winning in 
November. If we first examine how party members behaved, we see that the state-wide "official" 
party did not endorse. Both Dukakis and King received two endorsements each from groups or 
individuals classified as "party individuals or groups." Dukakis received the endorsement of the 
Wellesley Democratic town committee in January and the convention endorsement in May. King 
was endorsed by two out-of-state national Democratic leaders - a representative of the 
Democratic National Committee, and a member of the Democratic Governors' Conference. If we 
exanline the behavior of interest groups we see no effort was made at forming a united front. 
The more conservative groups lined up for King; the more liberal groups lined up for Dukakis. 
There was nary a cross-over made. Dukakis received the endorsements of human service-type 
organizations and groups - the day-care alliance and the Legislative Council for Older 
A~nel-icans. King received the endorsements of industry groups and the NRA. The united front 
test fails. 
One final note about timing. Many people I interviewed, while acknowledging the 
relative uniinporta~~ce of officeholder endorsements overall, claimed that early endorsements 
from officeholders were critical to demonstrating momentum. Officeholder endorsements, they 
said, were a relatively low-cost mechanism - usually a simple telephone call - that could 
establish a campaign's energy. In the 1982 Democratic primary, there is 110 evidence of early 
endorsen~ents from officeholders that appears to be important. Of the 32 endorsements King 
received prior to the May convention, 15 came from officeholders. Dukakis, who, ostensibly had 
more to prove, only had 5 endorsements from officeholders of the 19 endorsements he had lined 
up by the May convention - though one of his endorsements canie from the influential mayor of 
Boston, Kevin White. King's officeholder endorsen~ents came from an out-of-state governor, 
two of his own appointees and three local officeholders - a fonner school committee member 
and two mayors (of Somerville and New Bedford). 
1982 Republican Primary Election 
The 1982 Republican primary began as a three-way race between state representative and 
assistant whip, Andrew Card, former Boston city councilor John Sears, and investment co~~ncilor 
John Lakian. 
Appendix D outlines the endorsements earned by every candidate by the moi~th in which 
they received the endorsement. Card finished last in the primary election with only 3.4% of the 
vote. He picked up a total of six endorsements - three media outlets (the Middlesex News, the 
Springfield Daily News, and WEE1 talk radio) which all came less than twenty days before the 
election, the town chairman in Stoneham, J o b  Anderson, and two interest groups - the 
Associated Builders and Contractors (which came in June) and the Massacl~usetts Conservative 
Political Action Committee which came in late August. 
The Republicans endorsed Westwood investment counselor and first-time candidate John 
Laltian for elective office at their endorsing convention in March 1982. He won the support of 
party insiders - 200 Republican city and town chairmen, Gordon Nelson, fonner state GOP chair 
and many members of the GOP state committee. Yet Lakian's candidacy fell through after an 
August 18, 1982 story ran in the Boston Globe detailing an "apparent pattern of discrepancies 
between the record and Lakian's statements on his upbringing, education, military service and 
professional career.. ." (Robinson 1 9 8 2 ) . ~ ~  By the time of the September primary, Lakian had 
only 34% of the primary vote. 
Sears, the eventual nominee, had ten endorsements. He picked up at least one early 
endorsement fiom former ambassador and U.S. Senator Henry Cabot in October of 198 1. Three 
of his endorsements came fiom unsuccessful former Republican candidates for state-wide office 
- Josiah Spaulding, a former Republican candidate for the US Senate, governor and attorney 
general; William I. Cowin, 1978 GOP nominee for lieutenant governor; and Charles Cabot, 
fonner candidate for attorney general. Sears also earned the endorsement of the Boston Globe, 
the Moderate Action Committee, and Neil Chayet, a lawyer and radio commentator. 
None of the GOP candidates were high-quality which, in part, explains why the 
Republican machinery lined up behind the disastrous candidacy of Lakian. Another explanation 
was that Lakian was a multimillionaire, and, according to later press accounts, someone who 
appeared to be a "bright, dynamic newcomer'' who many Republicans really believed had the 
ability to beat out a Democrat in November (Connolly 1994). 
How do Republicans fare using the small world test in the 1982 primary? Clearly, despite 
the s~llall repeat rate, the "official" party apparatus united behind Lakian. The remaining 
endorsements received by Card and Sears, save Card's endorsement by the Builders and 
Contractors, were from political hends. Using the method of counting repeat endorsements, 
seven of the 22 endorsements earned by the GOP candidates were from repeat endorsers - four 
24 According to the Boston Globe article, Lakian had made false claims that he had attended Harvard 
University, that he had received a battlefield promotion, and that his father had died of war wounds. Lakien sued the 
Globe for libel, but a j~uy found the "gist of the article" to be true. 
of those were from media outlets. Of the remaining three, two came from interest groups 
(Associated Builders and Contractors), and one came from a partisan - Gordon Nelson, the 
former chair of the state GOP. The repeat endorsement rate, excluding media endorsements, is a 
meager 13%, but also almost the exact rate as the Democrats (1 4%) when media endorsements 
are excluded. The repeat endorsers are also spread out over the three candidates - Card picked up 
four; Lakian picked up two (two official, party-esque GOP endorsements); and Sears picked up 
one (Boston Globe). The world, in this case, is small indeed - so small as to be inconclusive. The 
decisive influence test falls in the same category; 45% of the endorsements granted in the 1982 
Republican primary went to the eventual nominee - hardly a ringing endorsement. Half (5) of 
Sears' ten endorsements arrived in July, before the Globe article ran which called into question 
Lakian' s credentials. 
1982 General Election 
The 1982 general election was not even close. Dukakis won handily with almost 62% of 
the vote. I recorded only 25 endorsements for the general election, 20 of which went to Dukakis. 
Half of the endorsements Dukakis picked up came from unions - and most of the unions were 
police unions. He also won the endorsement of Edward King, the governor, 3 1 mayors, and the 
Boston Globe. The only mention Sears received of Republican support was a Globe article 
indicating that "leading Massachusetts Republicans" endorsed him as did "prominent" 
Republican fundraiser, Lloyd B. Waring. Other than that, Sears' endorsements were from 
obscure individuals and groups (a division of the Polish American Congress, the Suffolk County 
commander of the American Legion, and a retired chief justice of the Superior Court). Not 
exactly "opinion leaders." 
Overview of the 1986 Election 
1986 Primary Elections 
The 1986 Democratic primary election was uncontested. The Republican primary 
e:lectioil could just as well have been - the loser became the nominee. After the Lakian fiasco, 
things got worse: 
"Gregory Hyatt [a state representative], poised to win the gubernatorial nomination, was 
undercut by bizarre reports that he had been seen sitting undressed in his office. Despite the 
ridicule,, Hyatt nearly won the convention endorsement on the first ballot, only to lose to Royal1 
Switzler [a fromer state representative] on a second ballot. Then Switzler was found to have 
inflated his military record regarding service in Vietnam, and he dropped out of the race before 
the primary. Hyatt's name was still on the primary ballot, and he prevailed over an eleventh-hour 
entry, George Kariotis [a businessman]. Hyatt finally yielded to the state committee and stood 
aside for Kariotis to run and lose badly to Dukakis in the general election." (Wilkie 1990). 
Dukakis received three endorsements fiom repeat endorsers in the uncontested primary: 
the Massachusetts Teachers Association (January), CPPAX (April), and the AFL-CIO 
(September). The Republican party rallied around Kariotis in the summer. In July, Kariotis 
picked up the endorsements of three former governors, Edward J. King (the conservative 
Deinocrat), John A. Volpe, and Frank Sargent. Former U.S. attorney Elliot Richardson endorsed 
him, as did fbture GOP chair Ray Shamie and the Republican State Committee. 
Not one endorsement could be found in the general election. Why? Two reasons. First, it 
seerns evident from the data itself and also from interviews that endorsements are more 
important in primaries than they are in general elections. Because voters must distinguish 
between two or more candidates of the same party and because candidates must carve out a 
significant segment of the pasty that they can lay claim to. The primary election stands as a 
critical time in which candidates within a party must distinguish themselves for voters and appeal 
to the party activists who dominate primary election environments. General elections, by  
contrast, are contests between two candidates from different parties. The party identification 
alone takes care of much of the information voters need. Endorsements from classically party- 
aligned groups simply do not have as much cache because they are obvious and therefore not 
informative. Incumbents, running in general elections, usually have an easier time coasting to re- 
election, though not always as Peverill Squire has pointed out (Squire 1992). According to Ron 
Kaufman, former chair of the Republican National Committee, incumbents do well not to work 
for endorsements in their re-election bids because it makes them look as if they are "running 
scared."25 That's the demand side view. On the supply side, interest groups and individuals 
granting endorsements also need to play their political cards carefully. When an incumbent is 
running, particularly an uncontested one, groups tend to hold back on endorsements. This is no 
major surprise. With nothing to contest, why waste time, energy, and political capital on a race 
that is essentially a fait accompli. 
Table 4-6: Summary of Tests Applied to the 1986 Primary Elections 
Party Election % Repeat % United Front Average 
Year Endorsers Endorsements Candidate 
go to Nominee Quality 
Democrats 1986 100% 100% Yes 4 
Republicans 1986 9% 9% No 0 
Overview of the 1990 Election 
1990 Democratic Primary Election 
For the first time in thirty years Republicans and Democrats competed for an open seat in 
the gubernatorial race of 1990 and things finally turned around for the Republicans. Democratic 
" Personal interview with Ron Kaufnlan, July, 2004. 
control of the executive came to a halt; the Republicans have held the office ever since. The 
Republican turnaround had more to do with a Democratic implosion than with a renaissance 
within the Republican party. At the time, fewer than one in seven of Massachusetts registered 
voters were Republicans. The party had not successfully elected a candidate to statewide office 
since 1972, had only one of the state's 11 congressional seats, had no officer in a statewide 
office, and were at a 4-1 disadvantage in the legislature. Despite this, Democratic and 
R.epublican pollsters and strategists alike felt a Republican win in 1990 was likely (Kenney 
1989). 
1990 was not an easy year for a Democrat to run on the "record." Massachusetts was 
deep into a fiscal crisis. According to one press account, "Massachusetts voters were assured by 
Dukakis and other Democratic leaders throughout much of the past year and a half that all was 
well with the state, that the Massachusetts Miracle was intact. When they learned the truth, 
voters felt lied to, betrayed, and abused. And they are very, very angry - angrier, perhaps, than 
they have every been." (Kenney 1989). 
Ambitious Democrats might have chosen to stay clear. U.S. Representative Joseph 
Kennedy did. So did Boston Mayor Ray Flynn. Two statewide officers and Dukakis supporters 
did enter the fray: Attorney General Francis Bellotti and Lieutenant Governor Evelyn Murphy. 
And outsider candidate John Silber, the president of Boston University, ran too. 
The early support went to Murphy. In November and December of 1989, Murphy was 
endorsed by the Massachusetts chapter of the National Organization for Women, by several 
human service leaders and also by Alan Solomont, a nursing-home entrepreneur and major donor 
to the Democratic party who would later become the finance chair for the Democratic National 
Committee. Solomont and NOW were both repeat endorsers. By the end of January, Murphy had 
lined up the support of several legislators and EMILY'S List. And by the May convention, 
Murphy had the support of CPPAX, the ADA, the teachers, the nurses, and Phil Johnston. Much 
of her support was from repeat endorsers. By the May convention, Murphy had 28 endorsements 
(out of a total of 39 by the primary), and 9 of those 28 were from repeat players. The 
endorsements, in general, were the same endorsements Dukakis had picked up - groups like the 
ADA and CPPAX, the women's groups, and the human services. 
Attorney General Bellotti did not receive any endorsements until April of 1990. These 
endorsements were from the mayors of Gardner, Fitchburg, and Worcester. Not quite a 
groui~dswell of support. By May he had picked up the Massachusetts United Autoworkers and 
the state police association. Despite this, by the end of the season, Bellotti had endorsements 
from 16 repeat endorsers; Murphy had endorsements fiom 12 repeat endorsers; Silber had 9. 
Murphy did not win the convention endorsement. Bellotti did. Neither won the primary. 
Instead, Boston University President John Silber, an outsider candidate, won. Silber, however, 
managed to get past the 15% convention threshold with the ultimate inside support - the 
assistance of Senate President William Bulger. Despite Bulger's help at the convention, Silber 
had the fewest repeat endorsements - 10. Five of his repeaters were fiom media outlets. His 
earliest endorsement came from an out-of-state newspaper - the conservative New Hampshire 
daily, the Manchester Union Leader. Then, in April, Silber attracted the endorsements of several 
interest group leaders. An SEIU local leader, the general agent and secretary-treasurer of the 
35,000 member Boston Building Trades Union, and the vice president of the Fire Fighters. These 
were groups that had ties to Silber and to Boston University. Edward Sullivan of SEKJ, for 
example, represented 700 Boston University workers. Michael Mullane of the Fire Fighters 
endorsed Silber. In 1983, Silber had implemented a policy at Boston University of providing full 
sciholarships to children of firefighters killed in the line of duty. The endorsements were from the 
leaders themselves, not from the unions. Other labor leaders shied away from Silber. The Boston 
Globe reported that Domenic Bozzotto, president of the hotel workers' Local 26, "one of the 
more socially active unions in the state" said, " 'Silber? I didn't vote for George Wallace, so I 
won't for him . . . For the first time in history, we're considering endorsing Republicans this 
year"' (Mooney 1990). 
Table 4-7: Repeat Endorsements, 1 
-- 
Eildorsement Twe  
Interest Group 
Interest Grow Leader 
Media 
Officeholder 
Part~- Individaul or Group 
- 
Prominent Individual 
Total 
-- 
390 Massachusetts Democratic Primary by Type and Candidate 
B ellotti Murphy Silber Total 
9 7 16 
Table 4-8: Repeat Endorsers, 1990 Massachusetts Democratic Primary by Type and Candidate 
I Bellotti I Interest Group I AFL-CIO 
I 1 I Black Political Task Force ! I 1 I Iron Workers Union Local 7 I I I 1 MA Building Trades Council 1 
MA State Police Association 
MA UAW 
SEIU Local 509 
Media 
I 
Teamsters 
Boston Phoenix 
Middlesex News 
Officeholder 
Springfield Union-News 
Fitchburg Mayor Jeffrey Bean 
U.S. Rep. Nicholas Mavroules 
Party Individual or Group 
I 1 1 MA Nurses Association I 
William Delahunt (U.S. Rep, DA) 
Convention endorsement 
I 
Murphy 1 Interest Group 
I 
I 
MA Teachers Assn. 
MA Womens Political Caucus 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
Citizens for Participation in Political Action 
EMILY'S List 
I I I Secretary of Labor Paul Eustace I 
Officeholder 
! I 1 state Rep. David Cohen (D-Newton) I 
NOW 
former state Rep. Me1 King 
Boston Herald 
Lawrence Eagle-Tribune 
Lowell Sun 
Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human Services, state Rep.) 
Alan Solomont 
Joseph Nigro, Boston Building trades union 
Attleboro Sun Chronicle 
Silber 
1 I I Peabody Mayor Peter Torigan 
Prominent Individual 
Interest Group Leader 
Media 
Officeholder 
1 I I Salem Mayor Neil Harrington 1 
Westfield Evening News 
former U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland of Springfield 
I U.S. Rep. Joseph Early 
Table 4-7 presents the repeat endorsers by type and by candidate. Table 4-8 shows who 
the repeat endorsers were. The repeat rate for the 1990 election was fairly high - 33%. The 
repeat endorsers show the split within the Democratic party. Murphy and Bellotti picked up the 
liberal wing of the party and essentially split it - Murphy received many human service 
endorsements, yet Bellotti received the endorsement of SEUI Local 509, a human service local 
representing 10,000 workers. Murphy received the support of the ADA and CPPAX, but Bellotti 
received the support of the Black Political Task Force. Silber picked up the more conservative 
wing, but only small pieces of it. Murphy withdrew her candidacy just seven days before the 
primary. Silber won the nomination with a ten point lead over Bellotti. The Democratic party 
was splintered. Using the decisive influence test, the party failed miserably. The two "insider" 
candidates received 75 percent of the endorsements - the nominee received only 25%. The two 
"quality candidates" who had vast amounts of elective office experience and statewide 
recognition lost to the candidate with no prior experience and no real statewide name recognition 
Table 4-9: Summary of Tests Applied to the 1990 Primary Elections 
Party Election % Repeat % United Front Average 
Year Endorsers Endorsements Candidate 
go to Nominee Quality 
D~emocrats 1990 33% 25% No 1 
Republicans 1990 31% 60% No 0 
1990 .Republican Primary Election 
The 1990 Republican primary was a two-way race between state representative Steven 
Pierce and fonner U.S. Attorney and former Assistant Attorney General in the Regan 
administration William Weld. Pierce had served twelve years as a state representative from 
western Massachusetts. Neither candidate was a particularly "high-quality" candidate. On the 
quality scale, both earned zeros, for neither held a state-wide office nor held a leadership position 
in the legislature. Like other Republican races in Massachusetts, the endorsement activity was 
quite low comparatively speaking to that of their Democratic counterparts. Only 42 
endorsements were recorded for the Republican primary. Weld picked up 25; Pierce had 17. Like 
their Democratic counterparts, Pierce and Weld's endorsements show some ideological splits 
within the party. Pierce won the endorsements of more conservative-based groups - 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Citizens for Limited Taxation, and the Exodus Movement, a 
conservative church Group; among the endorsements Weld secured were the Massachusetts 
Women's Political Caucus, "moderate party leaders," and "several women's professionals." 
As noted above in the discussion of the 1982 Democratic primary, many of those 
interviewed observed that early endorsements from officeholders are a very easy, low-cost 
method of exhibiting momentum. In the 1990 Republican primary, that is just what Weld did. As 
outlined in Appendix D, in October, November, and December of 1989, Weld obtained the 
public support of three former U.S. attorneys, four state senators, and several party leaders, 
including Gordon Nelson, the former state Republican party chair. Between January and July, 
Pierce only received three public endorsements - one from Citizens for Limited Taxation in 
January, one from the Republican convention in March, and one from Life Insurance Industries 
in July. After the initial spurt of energy for Weld in the fall of 1989, he too did not get many 
eildorsements in the winter, save one from a repeat endorser, Associated Builders and 
Contractors. The party moderates appeared to come out early for Weld, then hang back, allowing 
Pierce to go on to win the convention endorsement. As far as Massachusetts Republicans are 
concerned, it seems, winning the convention endorsement appears to be the best way to predict a 
September primary loss. After the convention, all was quiet on the endorsement front until July, 
and then, only two endorsements, one for each candidate. There was hardly a groundswell of 
support from the interest group community, from officeholders, or from anyone else. A united 
front did not build behind either candidate. 
Weld and Pierce both received about the same number of repeat endorsements. Of the 13 
endorsements that came from repeat players, 6 endorsed Weld, 7 endorsed Pierce. Table 4-10 
indicates who these repeat endorsers were. Many are media endorsements. The remaining repeat 
endorsements, though few in number, do give us a brief snapshot of where the candidates stand. 
As noted above, it is clear, simply from looking at this short list, that Weld's moderation earned 
him the support of women's groups and that, most likely, he was pro-choice; it is equally 
obvious from Pierce's endorsements that he was pro-life and favored the tax-cutting ethos 
supported by Citizens for Limited Taxation. Thus, the Republican party was also split in the 
1990 primary election. According to a press account citing a Republican strategist supporting 
Weld, the Pierce campaign "underestimated the large number of independent voters who would 
participate in the GOP primary" (Wilkie 1990). Because of Pierce's underestimation of the 
Independents and Weld's cultivation of them, Weld won the primary handily by over 20%. 
Table 4-10: 1990 Republican Primary Repeat Endorsers by Candidate and by Type I Candidate I Endorsement Type I Endorser 
/ Pierce / Interest Group I Citizens for Limited Taxation 1 
Media 
Interest Group 
I Media 
Party Individual or Group 
Life Insurance Industries of MA 
MA Citizens for Life 
Attleboro Sun Chronicle 
Boston Herald 
Lawrence Eagle-Tribune 
Westfield Evening News 
Associated Builders and Contractors 
MA Women's Political Caucus 
Boston Phoenix 
Middlesex News 
S~riilefield Union-News I V 
Gordon Nelson. former state GOP chair 1 
1990 General Election 
The 1990 general election face-off between Weld and Silber was, in many ways, similar 
to the election of 1978 in which party aligned groups appeared to cross-over to the "other" side. 
Republican Weld, for example, received the support of Environmental Roundtable, 
Massachusetts Choice, and the Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights. Democrat Silber 
received the support of Citizens for Limited Taxation, former governor Edward J. King, who had 
endorsed a Republican in the previous election, and Nixon administration secretary of state 
Henry Kissenger. A complete listing is shown in Table 4-1 0. Weld's coalition of Democrats and 
Republicans won the day and he captured the governorship for the Republicans with 52% of the 
vote. 
Overview of the 1994 Election 
1994 Democratic Primary 
The 1994 Democratic primary was a three-way race between state Senator Michael 
Barrett, former state Senator George Bachrach, and state Representative Mark Roosevelt. All 
were, according to the criteria employed, fairly low-quality candidates, scoring 1 ,0  and 1, 
respectively. The winner would be up against incumbent Weld who did, eventually, trounce the 
Democrat. Bachrach captured the more liberal wing of the party; Barrett ran as a business- 
oriented Democrat but failed to capture many endorsements from business-minded groups or 
individuals; Roosevelt, the eventual nominee, captured the "inside" support - the bulk of labor, 
officeholders (including both the House Speaker and the Senate President), and various members 
of the Democratic party. 
No one candidate appeared to come out early with a sizable ground swell of support, 
Il~ougl~ the first endorsement granted in the Democratic primary period came fiom the 
Democratic state committee chair Steve Grossman for Barrett. As if engaging in a tit for tat, in 
February, Roosevelt garnered the endorsements of the former Democratic National Committee 
chairman Paul Kirk, as well as the endorsements of "several dozen other prominent Democrats." 
Olver the spring and early summer, all candidates collected endorsements fiom individuals only, 
save the convention endorsement, which went to Roosevelt. No groups made public 
endorsements until late June. In July, Baclvach collected endorsements fiom a liberal group - 
CPPAX - a slightly leaning conservative group - the Fire Fighters, the UAW and the social 
workers. All but one of Bachrach's interest group endorsements came fiom repeat endorsers. 
Roosevelt received endorsements fiom the AFL-CIO and from several labor locals which were 
never mentioned by name (see table 4- 1 1 for a complete list of repeat endorsements). 
MIA State Fire Figliters Union 
M A  lJAW 
N,atioual Association of Social Workers (8000) 
NlO W 
Table 4-1 1 : Repeat Endorsers 1994 Democratic Primary 
Compared to other years, a fairly small number of endorsements were granted (75), and 
Citizens for Participation in Political Action 
IBEW Local 2222 
ma~ny of these came from individuals - activists - who appeared to control much more than their 
123 
Bachrach Roosevelt 
X 
X 
X 
own individual vote. The number of repeat endorsers was 20 - or 27 percent, about average for 
Massachusetts Democratic elections. Roosevelt, who won the primary by 23 percentage points, 
only received 41 percent of the endorsements offered that year; scarcely decisive. 
Table 4-12: Summary of Tests Applied to the 1994 Primary Elections 
Party Election % Repeat % United Front Average 
Year Endorsers Endorsements Candidate 
go to Noninee Quality 
Democrats 1994 27% 41% No 1 
Republicans 1994 0% 100% Yes 4 
1994 Republican Primary and General Election 
The Republican primary was uncontested. Weld had only one reported endorsement - 
that of California Governor Pete Wilson. 
In the general election, Weld defeated Roosevelt by 43 points - a higher margin than 
incumbent Dukakis had over the GOP's last minute pick of James Kariotis. Weld received 24 
endorsements; Roosevelt received 16. The only three interest groups endorsing Roosevelt in the 
general election were labor groups: the teachers, fire fighters, and the auto workers. Weld, by 
contrast, picked up 6 labor endorsements (mostly from police unions), but also had the support of 
two gay rights groups and the Black Political Task Force. Not only that, he had the endorsements 
of "800 Democratic and Independent" city officials. The re-election of Weld appeared to be 
irreversable and Democratic groups and officeholders decided to stay in the good graces of the 
governor rather than side with their party. 
The 1994 election highlights some key points made in Chapter 3 regarding incumbency 
and party behavior. Most Democrats knew that it would be fairly difficult to defeat the 
incumbent. Ambitious politicians save their entry into a race for an election fight that is 
winnable. The Democratic candidates who ran had a difficult time drumming up support for their 
candidacies early in the process. Most interest groups stayed out of the race altogether, for 
interest groups can also be thought of as "ambitious" in the sense that they save their political 
capital for events that pay dividends, either in the forrn of political favors later on or 
noteworthiness for having fought the good fight, or some variant of the two. Moreover, on the 
"d.emand" side of the equation, incumbent candidates may be advised not to collect 
endorsements publicly. Ron Kaufman, who consulted to the Cellucci campaign and was a close 
Cellucci advisor, commented that incumbents are best-of developing a strategy of "non- 
endorsements." Getting too many endorsements, he said, "makes them look like they are 
worried."26 Finally, if endorsements function as a mechanism by which imperfectly informed 
voters receive information, then incumbents, being a known entity that is easily observable, need 
not work to heavily on garnering endorsements. 
Overview of the 1998 Election 
1998 Republican Primary 
Weld ran for U.S. Senate in 1996 and lost. He resigned as governor in 1997 to press his 
case to become Ambassador to Mexico. He was ultimately unsuccessful. In 1997, however, 
Lieutenant Governor Paul Cellucci became acting governor and hence became the incumbent to 
beat in the 1998 primary and beyond. State treasurer Joe Malone challenged Cellucci in the 
primary. Malone received nearly twice as many endorsements as Cellucci in the primary, all told, 
including 8 of the 15 "top" Republican town or city committees. One endorser, Ray Shamie, 
fonner GOP state chair and mentor to Malone (Malone had managed Shamie's 1984 
unsuccessful bid for U.S. Senate) endorsed both candidates in June of 1997, then in February just 
before the convention announced his neutrality saying he was nervous about the fractious tone of 
the primary battle (Phillips et al. 1998). Cellucci not only had the incumbency advantage, he had 
--- 
'6 personal interview with Ron Kaufman, July 2004. 
the support of the former governor Bill Weld, the rising star in the Republican party, Suffolk 
County District Attorney Ralph Martin, and the convention endorsement. 
Both Cellucci and Malone had nearly the same number of repeat endorsers - 4 (or 5, if 
you count Ray Shamie) a-piece. Three of Cellucci's five repeat endorsers were newspaper 
endorsers. Ray Shamie and Weld were the other two. Malone's repeat endorsers included 
Citizens for Limited Taxation, the mayor of Leominster, a small town with any army base, Life 
Insurance Industries of Massachusetts, and Ray Shamie. The majority of endorsements went to 
the primary loser and there was no clear united front of endorsements that developed around 
Cellucci. The incumbent Cellucci, however, sailed through the primary with a 17.4 margin of 
victory. 
1998 Democratic Primary 
In 1998, the Democrats nominated the state attorney General Scott Harshbarger. 
Harshbarger ran against former state Senator and chair of the Ways and Means Committee, 
Patricia McGovem and against former U.S. House Representative Brian Donnelly. Harshbarger 
received the most endorsements - 5 1. Donnelly received 2 1 ; McGovem received 24. 
Harshbarger had the support of 22 interest groups; Donnelly had 3; McGovern had 1. All three 
candidates had substantial support from officeholders, though again Harshbarger had the most, 
with 26 officeholder endorsements to McGovem7s 20 and Donnelly's 18. See Table 4-13. 
Harshbarger also had the most number of repeat endorsements (13 of the 23 repeaters) from 
groups including the AFL-CIO, the Black Political Task Force, the Boston Building Trades 
Council and SEW Local 509. The only interest group repeat endorser for McGovem came from 
out-of-state Democratic women's fundraising group, EMILY'S List. And Donnelly's only repeat 
interest group endorser was the Fire Fighters. 
The ideological splits that were evident in past Democratic primaries were not apparent 
Table -- 4-13: Count of Endorsements, Massachusetts 1998 Democratic Primary by Candidate and by Type 
in 1998. Many of the more liberal leaning groups stayed out of the 1998 primary - CPPAX, the 
Endorsement Type 
-- 
Interest Group 
Media 
C)fficeholder 
Party Individual or Group 
Pronlinent Individual 
--- 
Total 
ADA, and the human service organizations that had been active in past primaries. Moreover, it 
Donnelly Harshbarger McGovern 
3 22 1 
1 2 
18 26 20 
2 
1 
21 51 24 
was fairly clear to most observers that neither McGovern nor Donnelly had much of a chance at 
wi~vling the nomination. That being said, when examining Appendix D's timelines, it is worth 
noting that unlike past primaries in Massachusetts, although the eventual nominee Harshbarger 
had amassed a great deal of early support from individual officeholders, the interest group 
support did not really start arriving until the summer before the primary, later than in most other 
~a~mpaigns. Like the 1994 election prior, the Democrats did not rally around a Democratic 
candidate. Many of them saved their endorsements for the general election and endorsed the 
Republican incumbent instead. 
Table 4-14: Summary of Tests Applied to 1998 Primary Elections 
Pasty Election % Repeat YO United Front Average 
Year Endorsers Endorsements Candidate 
go to Nominee Quality 
Democrats 1998 24% 53% No 1 
Republicans 19518 24% 35% No 3 
1998 General Election 
The Cellucci v. Harshbarger general election was fairly close with a roughly 4 point 
spread. Cellucci won. Cellucci picked up a great deal of support from Democrats, including 
''m~ore than a dozen high profile Democrats," at least four members of the Worcester Democratic 
City Committee and others. He also received endorsements fiom some heavily-leaning 
Democratic unions - SEW, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees, and the Fire Fighters - but he 
also received the endorsement of Citizens for Limited Taxation and Massachusetts Hunters. The 
Fire Fighters said it was among the first times the union had decided to endorse a Republican and 
they did so because their membership was beginning to lean ~ e ~ u b l i c a n . * ~  Cellucci's running 
mate for Lieutenant Governor Jane Swift, said that the first thing their campaign tried to do, 
following the primary, was to "grab endorsements from the losing Democratic coalition.. ." to 
demonstrate " e l e ~ t a b i l i t ~ . " ~ ~  Moreover, Swift said, the surprising thing. about Cellucci's 
e~ldorsements in 1998 was that he received any of the labor support that he received. 
The count of endorsements in the 1998 general election was fairly high, signifying a 
close election. Cellucci received 74 endorsements; Harshbarger received 68. Although there 
were a number of defections among Democrats to Cellucci, and no defections running the other 
way, Harshbarger did retain several key endorsements in his fold, including the teachers, the 
nurses, the AFL-CIO, and environmental groups. 
Overview of the 2002 Election 
2002 Democratic Primary 
The 2002 election was for an open seat and on the Democratic side, the candidates lined 
up. The Democratic primary was unruly. Five candidates ran for the nomination. Senate 
President Thomas Birmingham and state Treasurer Shannon O'Brien were the two "inside" 
candidates with the highest candidate quality scores. They competed against former Secretary of 
Labor Robert Reich, Steven Grossman, former chair of both the Democratic National Committee 
and the Massachusetts Democratic party Steven Grossman, and state senator Warren Tolman. 
27 Personal interview with Robert McCarthy, May, 2004. 
Personal interview with Jane Swift, August, 2004. 
Of the 202 endorsements granted in the 2002 Democratic primary, 147 of them went to 
O'Brien and Birmingham. The remaining 55 endorsements were spread out quite evenly across 
the additional three candidates. Table 4-15 shows the spread of the endorsements across the 
different types. In the interest group category, the number for Birmingham is artificially low. 
Bim~ingham, a former labor lawyer, called in his chits for the 2002 gubernatorial election and 
won the endorsements of labor groups across the state. Two of his endorsements were 
e~~dorsements from "30 labor unions" and "43 labor groups." Of the specific unions mentioned, 
Birn~ingham had the support of the AFL-CIO, the two teachers unions and the nurses (all repeat 
endorsers). Birmingham, however, did not receive any other "type" of interest group support - 
no1 from any environmental groups or liberal groups or human service groups. Moreover, 
Birmingham's endorsements from labor came relatively late in the process. The AFL-CIO and 
the "30 union" endorsements did not arrive until June, followed by the Nurses and the 
Massachusetts Teachers Association in August. O'Brien's support was also fairly narrowly cast 
and fairly late as well. Of the 6 interest group endorsements she earned, four were won~en's 
groups (EMILY'S List (March), Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus (May), NOW 
(August), and "prominent Women's Groups" (September)). The only other endorsements came 
from the Black Political Task Force and a Worcester union. Tolman, the liberal of the field 
running on money from Clean Elections, garnered the CPPAX endorsement (in August) and two 
environmental groups (in September). Reich received one from OutSomerville and Grossmail 
had zero interest group endorsements. 
Table 4-15: Count of Endorsements, 2002 Democratic Primary by Type 
Birmingham Grossrnan O'Brien Reich Tolrnan 
10 6 1 4 
1 1 1 
1 2 2 
Total 
21 
3 
5 
What is striking about table 4-1 5 is how few interest group endorsements there are, 
overall, and how many officeholder endorsements there are. As noted earlier, officeholder 
endorsements are rarely worth much except a single vote. A primary, Joe Malone said, is a time 
"when you need foot soldiers - a strong volunteer base - the ability to hold signs." Officeholders 
rarely deliver such tangible goods. Moreover, the vast majority of officeholder endorsements 
were fioin alderman and school committee members - only a handful of mayors and other 
leaders. Finally, if endorsements are supposed to provide informational cues to voters, the 
endorsements of low-level officeholders from small cities and towns fail to deliver on the 
informational value. How does anyone outside of Newburyport know the political leanings of its 
school committee members? Why would members of the general public even know the positions 
of state senators and representatives beyond their own? So why did O'Brien and Biminghain 
expend so much energy soliciting their support? As O'Brien pointed out in her interview, 
officeholder endorsements are generally fairly easy to obtain - often it is a single phone call, 
hence they are low-cost. Second, both O'Brien and Birmingham were officeholders and they felt 
they needed to demonstrate a wide range of support that emanated fiom within their own ranks to 
prove their viability. If one of them collected all the officeholder endorsements while the other 
decided not to expend the energy, then the public perception would be one of failure to attain the 
support even from "friends." 
Miscellaneous 
Officeholder 
Party Individual or Group 
Political People 
Prominent Individual 
Total 
1 3 1 
62 5 41 7 12 
4 3 13 1 
2 
1 4 2 10 1 
80 16 6 7 2 1 18 
5 
127 
21 
2 
18 
202 
Despite Birmingham's strong labor support, he lost both the convention endorsement and 
the primary election. And despite O'Brien's winning of the nomination, she did not have the 
decisive influence of endorsements nor the united front of support from the party. For all of the 
"endorsement activity" that occurred in the 2002 Democratic primary, the vast majority of it was 
"noise." 
Table 4-16 Summary of Tests Applied to 2002 Primary Elections 
Party Election % Repeat % United Front Average 
Year Endorsers Endorsements Candidate 
go to Nominee Quality 
Democrats 2002 10% 33% No 1 
Republicans 2002 13% 100% Yes 0 
2002 Republican Primary 
In 2001, Paul Cellucci left Massachusetts to become Ambassador to Canada, leaving 
Lieutenant Govemor Jane Swift the Acting Govemor. The Republicans displayed a high-degree 
of party unity in 2002 when they ensured that incumbent Govemor Jane Swift would not seek 
reelection. With poll numbers showing that any one of her Democratic rivals could beat Swift 
ea~sil y, the Republi cans tapped Mitt Romney, a fonner Senate nominee in 1 994, wealthy venture 
capitalist, and chair of the Salt Lake Olympic Committee in 2000 to seek the Republican 
nomination. The Republican party did their "tapping" behind-the-scenes, according to strategist 
Ron Kaufman. " Romney did not want public endorsements" when Swift was still planning to 
ru:n in the primary. Instead, Rornney and his Republican supporters sought private endorsements 
that were "used to help Jane make a decision."29 Those "private" endorsements became public at 
least twenty days before Swift publicly declared she would not seek re-election on March 19. By 
the end of February, five Republican town committee chairs announced their intention to endorse 
Romney, along with one Representative and one newspaper. Following Swift's announcement, 
29 Personal interview wit11 Ron Kaumfan, July 2004. 
131 
more endorsements rolled in, largely fiom officeholders. Romney ran unopposed in the primary 
and therefore did not need to collect a high number of endorsements to differentiate himself. 
2002 General Election 
Romney faced state treasurer Shannon O'Brien in the general election. Like many other 
past general elections, O'Brien, the Democrat, collected nearly twice as many endorsements (57) 
as the Republican Romney (34). Both candidates received the "usual suspects" of endorsements 
from traditionally party-aligned groups. With the exception of a few Democratic activists and 
local officeholders who endorsed Romney, there was not a high degree of "cross-over" endorsing 
as had occurred in previous Massachusetts elections. O'Brien had the backing of the entire 
Democratic establishment - from every major elected Democrat to the AFL-CIO, to the teachers' 
union with no success in the end. Many Democratic strongholds defected and many independents 
tilted Republican. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
By going through each election in turn, this chapter has highlighted several important 
points about endorsements in gubernatorial elections - the behavior of candidates, the behavior 
of endorsers, and the behavior of parties. We can draw several conclusions: 
Incumbents generally avoid gathering endorsements; when incumbents run in a psimav, 
endorsers tend to hold back. Most of the time, incumbents are relatively safe. Even when 
incumbent Cellucci faced a challenger in Malone in 1998, it was Malone who had to collect the 
endorsements to prove his viability not Cellucci. In 1978, Dukakis was not a safe incumbent and 
endorsers wielded punitive power through withholding endorsements. When Dukakis fought 
back against incumbent governor Edward J. King in 1982, King faced a serious challenge; hence 
both candidates needed to carve out their own piece of the ideological spectrum which they did 
through securing endorsements. 
Endorsements from of$ceholders are low-cost, low-yield mechanisms; endorsements 
f r . 0 ~ 2  interest groups are high-cost but potentially higher-yield mechanisms. An endorsement 
from a mayor, fiom a school-committee member, or fiom a sheriff is usually the direct result of 
the candidate asking for the endorsement. Typically, the officeholder need not do much more 
thiin lend his or her name to the candidate's list of endorsements. Occasionally, a mayor can 
"deliver" a city, but, more often than not, officeholder endorsements are little more than stamps 
of approval. Interest-group endorsements, by contrast, are offered more formally. Many interest 
groups have endorsement procedures and guidelines they must follow - they grant their 
e~ldorsements at certain times of year, they have candidates fill out a detailed questionnaires, 
they ask candidates to speak to their members and so on. If they ultimately grant an endorsement, 
groups will not only donate money to the campaign, they will donate people, office-space, and 
membership lists. 
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that Massachusetts gubernatorial candidates, both 
Republican and Democrat, collect far more endorsements than do their counterparts in other 
states under investigation. Why? I shall discuss the Democratic party first, then the Republican 
pafiy. 
First, it is important to understand where the endorsements come fiom. 47% of the 
endorsements received by Democratic candidates are from officeholders. Only Illinois 
Democratic candidates rival Massachusetts Democratic candidates - 50% of their endorsements 
come from officeholders. Moreover, the officeholders who endorse are either local politicians 
(42%) - mayors, school committee members, and other low-level public officials - or they are 
state legislators (25%). This is very different from other states in which the number of 
officeholder endorsements to Democratic candidates hovers in the 20-30% range. Massachusetts 
has a lot of Democratic officeholders to choose from. But what prompts these candidates to seek 
such low-level endorsements in such vast quantities? The weakness of the Democratic party 
provides some insight. Because there is no cohesive party unit - nor a set of party leaders that 
can do the heavy-lifting - individual candidates must start from scratch at the beginning of every 
electoral season to patch together a winning coalition of elected officials. They must scramble to 
secure the endorsement of the local mayor before any other candidate beats them to the punch - 
without the local mayor's endorsement, they may lose a pivotal machine or they might not look 
viable. Massachusetts Democratic candidates fend for themselves. The party cannot control who 
enters the race and it cannot stave off divisive primary fights. 
In this void where the Democratic party is supposed to be, interest groups also participate 
far more heavily than in other states. In Massachusetts the absolute number of endorsements 
from interest groups far exceeds that of other states.30 Between 1994 and 2002, the total number 
of interest group endorsements to Democratic gubernatorial candidates in Massachusetts was 57. 
In Illinois, that number dropped to 30. And in Texas, the number was 19. In that same time 
range, most of the interest group involvement was from labor organizations. Again, in 
Massachusetts, many more local unions made endorsements compared to other states. Just like 
with officeholder endorsements, the local level was where the action was. The organizational 
structure of unions and the relative autonomy of locals, enables labor to make multiple 
endorsements to Democratic candidates within a state at a variety of levels. This not only 
30 The one exception is 1994. In that year, Texas gubernatorial candidate Ann Richards received 
endorsements from 12 interest groups. That same year only 10 interest groups endorsed Democratic gubernatorial 
candidates in Massachusetts. 
enhances the pure number of endorsements, but it also provides organizational strength at all 
levels of a campaign for Democrats. In addition, the close relationship enjoyed by Democrats 
with labor bumps them up to equal footing with Republicans at least in terms of resources, given 
the relative edge Republican state central committees enjoy. Bibby and Holbrook (1 999) point 
olut that while Republican state party organizations serve as a relatively more important source of 
campaign funds for candidates, Democrats makeup for their relative weakness by relying on such 
allied nonparty groups. 
Republican gubematorial candidates in Massachusetts look a lot like their counterparts in 
other states, gaining endorsements from a mix of interest groups, officeholders, and party- 
ali,g~ed individuals and groups. Across the states, Republicans gain a plurality of their 
endorsements from officeholders (35% in Massachusetts, about 42% in New Mexico and Illinois, 
and Ohio and 24% in New Mexico, 18% in Texas). Still, like their Democratic counterparts in 
Massachusetts, Republican candidates collect a high number of endorsements from local 
individuals which gives them a higher absolute number of endorsements overall compared to 
other states (between 1994 and 2002, Massachusetts GOP candidates collected a total of 67 
endorsements compared to a total of 47 in Illinois, and 22 in Ohio). 
Although the Massachusetts Republican party began the 1980s with a weak party that 
could barely cobble together a nominee for governor, with the election of Weld, the party 
developed itself, at least at the gubematorial level. Since that time, the party has dedicated itself 
to a.voiding divisive primaries by selecting a nominee through the traditional party route, not by 
taking cues from interest groups or any other party-aligned group. "Official" party people - 
Republicans - selected Rornney, not outside interest groups or prominent individuals. 
CHAPTER 5: REPEAT ENDORSERS AND THE SMALL WORLD TEST 
In this small chapter I zero in on one test in particular: the small world test. Recall that 
the small world test assesses the number of repeat endorsers - the group of endorsers who appear 
in multiple elections. These people and groups are important to the theory of the "expanded 
party" because if there is, indeed, a small supply of "competent political personnel" and if 
candidates must draw upon the same limited pool of party leaders and activists to secure the 
resources and the funding necessary to successfUlly become the nominee then we can consider 
them part of the party. If, by contrast, candidates find their own sets of supporters who differ 
from election to election, then we can say that campaigns are indeed more candidate-centered 
than party-centered. The degree of repetition within the complete list of endorsements through 
consecutive elections is an "indication of the size of the pool from which candidates must be 
recruiting supporters" (Cohen et al. 2001: 3 1 
One question we might ask is: do you need the repeat endorsers on your side to win the 
nomination? Do repeaters endorse winners or do they endorse losers? I pooled all of the 
endorsements for all of the years together to determine how many endorsements from repeat 
players went to the successful nominee. The number is small indeed. Of the 1267 endorsements I 
collected for primary endorsements, 996 (79 percent) came from non-repeat players. 27 1 (21 
percent) came from repeat players; not a very high percentage at all. When repeat players 
endorsed, they endorsed winners 49 percent of the time. By state, there is, of course, more 
variation, but, overall, in four of the six states, repeat players endorsed winning candidates 
between 43 and 55 percent of the time. Only in Texas and Ohio did repeat players endorse 
winners 100 percent of the time, but nearly all of the elections in Ohio and Texas were 
uncontested, so this is not surprising. 
What do these results tell us? First, they tell us that the size of the pool from which 
candidates recruit, support from is big. Nearly 80 percent of a candidate's endorsement support is 
drawn from groups or individuals who only appear in one single election. One could argue that 
even if the pool is big, perhaps the 20 percent of repeat endorsements is critical to nomination. If 
wi~u~ers received the support of the repeat endorsements all the time, then we could say yes, the 
pool is big, but a core group of endorsements exists that are must-haves. This is not the case. The 
repeat endorsers have nearly a fifty-fifty chance of choosing the winner. Any particular candidate 
might feel it is absolutely necessary to attain the support of the teacher's union, for example, but 
a1 least in the aggregate, such support does not guarantee a win by far. 
Let us, for a moment, only examine contested elections. We know fi-om previous chapters 
that political groups and individuals have their own calculus of whether to expend political 
capital or not. These political players tend not to endorse when there is an incumbent running 
(usually uncontested elections) both because incumbents do not ask for them and because the 
groups and individuals themselves determine it is a waste of political energy. We also know that 
they tend not to endorse as much in uncontested elections with or without an incumbent for much 
the same reason - the preservation of political capital. Finally, if we subscribe to the theory that 
these political players - and here I am referring specifically to the repeat players - should behave 
as jf they were members of the party, then we should see them consistently backing winners and 
we should see this even when we eliminate uncontested elections from the mix. 
According to my data, however, in contested elections, repeat players endorse winners 
only 43 percent of the time. This is hardly consistent and it indicates that interest groups and 
political individuals are not necessarily backing a winner as much as they are backing a 
ca~~didate whose views align with their own. I expand on this point more in a moment. 
Who are these repeat endorsers? And, is there a difference between the repeaters who 
endorse winners fiom the repeaters who endorse losers? In answer to the first question, the repeat 
endorsers are largely interest groups (45 percent) and officeholders (28 percent). Media 
endorsements make up 17 percent of the repeat endorsements. Only 7 percent of the repeaters 
came from official party individuals or groups. Within these broad categories the split of groups 
or individuals who endorse winners and losers is often close to 50-50, though the slight 
variations are revealing. Interest groups and officeholders endorsed the loser slightly more often 
than they endorsed the winner; the media endorsed the winner slightly more often than the loser. 
Official party people or groups, however, chose the winner 72 percent of the time. By contrast, 
the five repeat prominent individuals and miscellaneous individuals - celebrities, business 
leaders, and academics etc. - chose the loser 100 percent of the time. 
These results are consistent with many of the insights fiom interviews I conducted. Let us 
isolate individual officeholders, celebrities and business leaders, excluding individual members 
of the party. How are endorsements from individuals attained and why are they granted? Most of 
the time, endorsements from individuals are, plain and simple, political favors. A candidate 
needs to show momentum, viability, or perhaps even needs to write a press release. The 
candidate calls his or her officeholder fkiend, business leader or fiiend of a friend and asks for an 
endorsement. The transaction is quick, it requires little more than a thank you note, and it can 
translate into a few notices in the press. This transaction yields few resources. The endorser 
endorses as a favor to a friend, as publicity for him or herself, or as a way to show involvement. I 
asked everyone I interviewed about their decision to endorse other candidates and all of the 
officeholders said they endorsed for the "you scratched my back I'll scratch yours" reasons. 
There is little variation in the individual's calculus to endorse regardless of whether the 
individual is the Speaker of the House, a state-wide officer, or a member of Congress. The odds 
of endorsing a winner remained nearly 50-50. Hence, it is not just school-committee members 
and other low-level officeholders who do favors for friends. It is legislative leaders and 
ambitious politicians alike. The only officeholders who are calculating about whom to endorse 
tend to stay out of the endorsement game altogether, at least publicly. Many press accounts, for 
example, discussed the "behind-the-scenes" work of certain high-profile political leaders 
If we unpack the list even more, the random nature of the list does not change much. 
Labor endorsements - the vast majority of interest group endorsements - are evenly split 
between winners and losers. The remainder of the repeat interest group endorsements are fairly 
evenly divided. Of the five pro-gun endorsements, for example, three went to losers and two 
went to winners. In two of those elections, 1978 and 1998, the pro-gun groups endorsed both a 
Republican and a ~ernocra t .~ '  The only environmental group that granted repeat endorsements 
occurred in Colorado. In 1998, the New Mexico Conservation Alliance endorsed Gary King, a 
Democrat. In 2002, the group endorsed Baca, a Republican. This suggests that groups are 
behaving like groups not like a party. They are endorsing the candidate(s) who is/are most 
ideologically aligned with their interests not picking a winner. 
3 1 In Massachusetts in 1978, the Sportsmen's Political Action Committee endorsed both Edward F. King (a 
Republican) and Edward J. King (a Democrat). They endorsed John Lakian in the 1982 Republican primary. In 
1998, the Illinois State h f l e  Association endorsed both Republican primary candidate Chad Koppie and Democratic 
primary candidate Glen Poshard. 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
The title of this dissertation is, Do Parties Still Matter? This suggests that parties did 
matter once. In what ways did they matter? Until the late 1950s, parties served as significant 
vehicles of voter mobilization largely because they remained labor-intensive organizations that 
focused on face-to-face contact with voters (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993). Voter mobilization, 
in turn, contributed to higher levels of participation overall in electoral politics. Until the 
Progressive reforms in the 1920s at the state level and the McGovem Fraser Commission at the 
national level in the 1970s, parties also solely controlled nominations. In controlling 
nominations, parties had the power to weed out candidates before the election, to choose a 
nominee who was broadly acceptable within the party then build substantial support and unite 
the party for the general election. In controlling nominations, parties had strength. When we 
imagine, therefore, what a weakened party is, we generally begin with the idea that a weakened 
party is one that does not have such power over nominations and that a weakened party is 
fractured. 
The advent of primaries, the demise of machines and the attendant decline in patronage, 
and the introduction of mass media all contributed to the decline of parties as vital sources of 
mobilization and as the principal organization responsible for choosing candidates. For many 
scholars, party decline became the dominant story that could explain much of the major trends in 
American politics, from the decline in turnout to the growth of divided government and gridlock. 
Some scholars, however, noting an up tick in general partisan identification among voters and 
the growth of party unity in Congress and the attendant strengthening of party leaders, began to 
argue that parties were resurgent - not only resurgent, but approaching the model of Respoilsible 
Party Government advanced by the American Political Science Association in 1950. Yet, even if 
parties had gained power in Congress and even if voters appeared to be more partisan once 
again, the loss of control over nominations remained. 
Primaries have had a number of harmful effects on parties: they have increased campaign 
costs, diminished the capacity of party organizations to reward supporters through nomination, 
lessened the influence of party leaders on nominees, and increased intraparty factionalism. With 
all these as givens, Cohen et al. argued that, at least in presidential nominations contests, parties 
fought back even against the challenges posed by primaries and maintained their control of 
nominations; they just found work-arounds. The main "work-around" was an expansion of the 
conception of party. Parties, they argued, became less hierarchical and more like a loose network 
of interests. They adapted organizationally to the changed political environment. Thus, instead of 
having a small band of party leaders caucusing to choose the most suitable nominee at a given 
point in time, today a large swath of partisan-aligned interests send signals to each other via 
endorsements during the invisible primary to settle on a candidate who is broadly acceptable. To 
prove that such interests are acting more like parties and less like narrow interests, Cohen et al. 
show that interest groups often endorse candidates who may not necessarily toe their absolutist 
agenda - rather they endorse candidates who can win - candidates who are broadly acceptable to 
the median primary voter. Cohen et al. argue that parties beat back reforms and now control 
no~minations as much as they ever did. Parties, therefore, remain strong, vital organizations that 
are very much in control of presidential nominations politics. 
My dissertation tests this assertion - this idea that parties have become less hierarchical 
and instead now behave as a loose network of interests. I studied 32 nominations contests in six 
sta.tes over time. I examined closed and open primaries. I collected nearly 2000 endorsements for 
76 c:andidates. I did not find evidence of a loose network of interests at the state level. Instead, I 
found when parties are strong they remain hierarchical organizations that indeed do "control" the 
nominations mainly through limiting the amount of primary competition. Contrary to the Cohen 
et al. thesis, I found that where parties are weak, a loose network of interests does develop 
around a particular candidate - yet these interests are factionalized just as the candidates are 
factionalized. The interests, therefore, do not represent the "extended party" so much as they 
represent their own perhaps narrow ideological interests. 
In addition, my dissertation uncovered some new findings about endorsement activity 
generally. I found, not surprisingly, that in primary elections, incumbents typically do not collect 
many (if any) endorsements, unless they are "running scared." When incumbents do not face any 
high-quality challengers they tend not to ask for endorsements and groups tend to reserve their 
endorsements for the general election. This often means, therefore, that when incumbents are 
running, elections are low-information events; opposition-party high-quality or low-quality 
challengers in primary or general elections simply do not generate as many endorsements and 
therefore the informational value of endorsements diminishes significantly. 
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14.P.PENDIX A: ENDORSEMENT 
CATEGORIES 
Officeholders 
Local (Alderman, city council, mayor) 
State Legislative (state Rep., state Senate) 
State Legislative leaders 
t3.S. House 
tJ.S. Senate 
C:ongressional leadership 
Sheriffs (county) 
State-wide officers (AG, Treasurer) 
Out of state: senators, house members, Attorneys 
General 
Cabinet secretaries (statelnational) 
PLUS: fornler ones of all of these 
District Attorneys 
Former US attorney 
Political People (non-officeholders) 
Aidelformer aide 
Nornineelformer nominee 
Candidate (previously never held elective 
office:, mentioned) 
Media 
Newspapers (state-wide; local; conglomerate (i.e. 
Co~nrnunity Newspapers)) 
Colunmists 
Industry-specific magazine/newsletter (i.e. Pool & 
Billiards Magazine; the Polish American) 
Activists 
1nldi.viduals the newspapers call "activists" 
Issue-oriented activists (environmental activists; 
child-care activists) 
P ~ r t y  People/Groups 
WardICity Committees 
Ward/City Committee individuals 
County chairs 
State Committee members 
State Committee leaders 
Nominating Convention 
"Activists" (i.e. Democratic Party Activists") 
College Dems/Republicans 
Prominent Individuals 
Celebrities 
Business leaders (CEOs) 
Interest Groups 
Unions 
Police, Teachers, Social Workers, Truckers 
National; regional (i.e. New England); state; locals 
Industry PACs 
Environmental 
Public InterestlGood Gov't 
Pro-Choice 
Pro-Life 
women's 
Civil hghts  
Realtors 
Taxpayers 
Seniors 
National org (EMILY'S List) 
Lawyers Groups 
Sportsmens/people 
Interest Group Leadershndividuals from 
the above-mentioned categories 
Miscellaneous 
Ad-hoc committee of physicians; auto-dealers; 
bankers 
Election-specific groups (Black Coalition to elect 
Mike Dukakis of 100 blacks) 
Professors (Lester Thurow; Gary Onen) 
Former college-president 
APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
Bachrach, George. Former state senator; political commentator. July 2004. 
Braude, James. Former executive director, Tax Equity Alliance; former city councilor; televsion 
and radio talk-show host. May 2004. 
Dukakis, Michael. Fonner Democratic govemor; former Democratic nominee for president. July 
2004. 
Grossman, Steven. Former chair, Massachusetts Democratic Party; former chair of Democratic 
National Committee. August, 2003. 
Holloway, David. President, National Association of Governmental Employees. May 2004. 
Johnston, Philip. Former secretary health and human services in Dukakis administration; forn~er 
state representative. Chair, Massachusetts Democratic Party. July 2004. 
Kaufinan, Ron. Former chair, Republican National Committee. July 2004. 
Malone, Joseph. Former Massachusetts state Treasurer; former Republican nominee for 
govemor. June 2004. 
McCarthy, Robert. President, Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts. June 2004. 
Nelson, Avi. Political commentator. June 2004. 
O'Brien, Shannon. Former Massachusetts State Treasurer; former Democratic nominee for 
governor. August, 2004. 
Swift, Jane. Forrner state representative; former lieutenant governor; former Republican acting 
governor. August, 2004. 
Tolrnan, Warren. Former state senator; former Democratic candidate for governor. July, 2004. 
Buckley, Joseph. Service Employees International Union. April 2003. 
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APPENDIX D: TIMELINES OF ENDORSEMENTS 
States are listed in the order in which they appear in the text. 
COLORADO 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, Colorado Primary, 1994,1998, and 2002 
1994 March Romer Colorado Rockies ownership group 
May Romer airport contractors Robert and Linda Alvarado 
former Romer cabinet members Cole Finegan 
former Romer cabinet members Ken Salazar 
former Romer cabinet members Penfield Tate I11 
former state Sen Regis Groff 
former state Sens. Tom Glass 
Jerry McMorris 
Merle Chambers 
Micky Miller 
Oren Benton 
Warren Toltz 
July Romer AFL-CIO 
1997 September Feeley AFL-CIO 
1998 April Schoettler Roy R. Romer 
May Feeley Democratic Leadership Council 
Organized labor 
Schoettler 66 Latino leaders 
Denver Mayor Wellington Webb 
Ray Kogovsek 
June Schoettler Garts of sporting goods 
Millers of real estate development 
July Feeley Colorado Association of Public Employees 
J.D. MacFarlane, a former Colorado Attorney General 
Schoettler Coloradans for Western Values 
August Schoettler Democratic state party chairman Howard Gelt's 
2002 February Heath Denver Mayor Wellington Webb 
July Heath AFL-CIO 
Colorado Building and Construction Trades 
Colorado Education Association 
Colorado NARAL 
Colorado Professional Fire Fighters 
COLORADO 
Tinleline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Colorado Primaries, 1994,1998, and 2002 
I 994 March Benson Charles Steinbrueck 
Robinson Dairy Inc. Chairman Dick Robinson 
1 997 December Norton Colorado Education Association 
1 998 February Norton Doug Dean 
Owens House Speaker, Republican Chuck Berry 
April Owens Christian Coalition 
Focus on the Family 
U.S. Senator Wayne Allard 
May Owens 25 House Republicans 
June Owens Joe Rogers 
State Sen. Jim Congrove 
July Norton Colorado Association of Public Employees 
Owens 4 U.S. House Republicans from Colorado 
Small Business for Responsible Government 
August Norton Bob Dole, 1996 Republican candidate for president 
Owens 20 members of the Colorado Legislature 
ex-senator and religious-right leader Bill Armstrong 
Jack Kemp 
2001 August Owens Larry Trujillo, director of the state Department of Personnel and General Support Services 
2002 July Owens 200 doctors and medical professionals 
Community organizations and advocacy groups across Colorado 
The Farmers & Ranchers Coalition 
NEW MEXICO 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, New Mexico Primary, 1994,1998, and 2002 
1997 October King Democratic state Sen Pauline Eisenstadt of Corrales 
November King Democratic state Sen Linda Lopez of the South Valley 
Martin Chavez State Police Deputy Chief John A. Cordova 
December King Democratic state Rep. Janles G. Taylor of the South Valley 
1998 April Martin Chavez AFSCME 
Democrats 
National Education Association of New Mexico 
Rio Arriba County Democratic Party 
sheet metal workers union 
King Communications Workers of America, Local 7037 
Concerned Citizens of Albuquerque 
New Mexico Conservation Voters Alliance 
Martin Chavez Deborah Dozier Potter Santa Fe real estate manager 
New Mexico Federation of Teachers 
The Gay & Lesbian Voter Alliance 
June Martin Chavez Fraternal Order of Police in Santa Fe 
July Martin Chavez Harry Bigbee, a retired Santa Fe lawyer and district judge 
August Martin Chavez Former Lt. Gov. Casey Luna 
2002 January Richardson AFSCME 
March Richardson New Mexico Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO 
April Richardson The Navajo Nation Council 
May Martin Chavez Albuquerque Tribune 
Richardson Billy McKibben, a conservative Republican 
Larry Willard 
June Richardson NOW Equality PAC 
Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, New Mexico Primary, 1994,1998, and 2002 
1998 March Johnson Linda Kay Jones 
May Johnson All-Indian Pueblo Council 
Republican Party 
2001 September Baca Albuquerque Public Schools Superintendent Brad Allison 
Albuquerque Tribune 
New Mexico Conservation Voters Alliance 
Sanchez Albuquerque police officers union 
2002 March Sanchez Republican Party Chairman John Dendahl 
April Sanchez Col. Allen Weh, held fund-raisers for Bush and U.S. Rep. Heather Wilson 
Colin McMillan, fonner co-chairman of President Bush's New Mexico campaign 
Dona Ana District Attorney Susana Martinez 
George Yates, a Roswell oilman 
state Rep. Larry Larranaga 
May Bradley Albuquerque Tribune 
Gov. Johnson 
retired Gen. Gilbert Baca 
talk show host Larry Ahrens 
OHIO 
rl"in~eli~~e of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, Ohio Primary, 1994,1998, and 2002 
I1 993 October Burch 59 of Ohio's 88 Democratic county chairmen--from the 
county chairmen as individuals, rather than from the 
executive committees that run the county Democratic 
organizations. 
Enos Singer, Washington County Democratic Chair & Pres 
OH Dem Chair Assoc 
Franklin County Chairwoman Fran Ryan 
December Burch 18 of the 25 women on the executive committee of the 
Federated Democratic Women of Ohio 
AFL-CIO 
1994 January Burch United Auto Workers 
February Burch Democratic Party's 87-member executive committee 
OH AFSCME 
April Burch Coalition of Concerned Black Citizens 
Plain Dealer 
1997 September Fisher Democratic party county chairnlen's associatioi~ 
November Fisher Democratic Party's executive committee 
December Fisher Ohio Democratic Party 
1 998 February Fisher AFL-CIO 
March Fisher Ohio Education Association 
April Fisher Black Elected Democrats of Cleveland 
David Milenthal former media consultant to Celeste 
Former Gov. Celeste's former chief of staff Ray Sawyer 
Former Gov. Celeste's secretary Dora Globe 
Nineteen of Cleveland's 2 1 council members 
Vernal G. "Skip" Riffe 111, a Scioto County commissioner, 
and Verna Kay Riffe children of late Speaker of OH House 
2002 January Hagan Ohio Democratic Pai-ty 
March Hag an AFL-CIO 
April Hagan Ohio Civil Service Elllployees Association 
OHIO 
Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Ohio Primary, 1994,1998, and 2002 
1994 February Voinovich OH Republican Party 
April Voinovich Local 13 17 of the International Longshoremen's Association in Cleveland 
Pipe Fitters Local 120 of Cleveland 
1997 May Taft 60 percent county GOP chairman 
Voinovic h 
June Taft foriller GOP Gov. James A. Rhodes 
July Taft board of directors for the Associated General Contractors of Ohio 
October Taft 77 of the 81 GOP legislators 
Auditor Jim Petro 
Rep. Michael Wise, R-Chagrin Falls 
November Taft 10 of the 11 GOP members of Congress from Ohio 
19 of 2 1 state Senate Republicans 
400 elected GOP officials and party officials 
58 of 60 Ohio House Republicans 
7 1 of 8 1 Republican General Assembly members and all GOP members 
of Ohio's congressional delegation. 
81 of 88 county GOP chairmen 
Ohio Medical Political Action Committee, the political arm of the Ohio 
State Medical Association 
Ohio Right to Life Society 
Ohio State Building and Construction Trades Council 
OH Conference of Teamsters 
Ohio Vicinity Regional Council of Carpenters 
1998 March Taft 
2002 February Taft 
March Taft 
April Taft 
Operating Engineers' Union 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, Texas Primary, 1994,1998, and 2002 
1994 February Richards AFL-CIO 
Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas 
El Paso Municipal Police Officers' Association 
Houston Police Patrolmen's Union 
McAllen Police Officer's Union 
National Association of Social Workers 
Sierra Club 
Texas Conference of Police and Sheriffs 
Texas Hospital Association 
Texas PACE 
Texas State Teachers Association 
Trial lawyers 
1998 January Mauro State Democratic Executive Committee's 
AFL-CIO 
Texas State Teachers Association 
February Mauro First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton 
1200 1 August Sanchez Former Democratic gubernatorial nominee Garry Mauro 
200% January Sanchez AFL-CIO 
Democrat State Rep. Ruth Jones McClendon 
Democratic establishment leaders 
former San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros 
Four of five trial lawyers Morales hired 
February Sanchez Austin GayILesbian Political Caucus 
Grocery store owner Joe Santos 
Houston Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus 
Texas State Teachers Association 
March Morales Houston Chronicle 
San Antonio Express-News 
Sanchez Austin American-Statesman 
Fort Worth Star-Telegram 
NRA 
The Dallas Morning News 
Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Texas Primary, 1994,1998, and 2002 
1994 February Bush Southwest & Texas Cattle Raisers 
Texas Farm Bureau Friends of Agriculture Fund 
Young Conservatives of Texas 
1997 September Bush New Hampshire Republicans 
republicans in the northern United States 
November Bush Top Democrat Bob Bullock 
1139 8 January Bush HISD Superintendent Rod Paige 
Houston Federation of Teachers Gayle Fallon 
200 1 June Perry Texas Hospital Association 
November Perry Sen. Todd Staples, R-Palestine 
2002 February Perry Texas Association of Business and Chambers of Commerce 
ILLINOIS 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1994 Illinois Primary 
1993 May Netsch former Senate President Philip J. Rock 
Phelan Jacoby Dickens, chairman of Seaway National Bank 
September Phelan 13th Ward Committeeman Madigan 
14th Ward Committeeman Edward M. Burke 
23rd Ward Committeeman 
33rd Ward Committeeman Richard F. Me11 
state Rep. William 0 .  Lipinski 
Stickney Township Cornmitteenlan Louis Viverito 
Thornton Township Committeeman Frank Giglio 
October Burris CHA Residents' Central Advisory Council 
November Netsch Ben Heineman, retired chairman of Northwest Industries Inc. 
EMILY'S List 
National Womens Political Caucus 
Womens Campaign Fund 
Phelan Crate & Barrel1 President Gordon Segal 
Sam Zell, the corporate turnaround artist 
January Netsch Independent Voters of Illinois-Independent Precinct Organization 
1994 NOW 
Phelan Ald. Ambrosio Medrano (25th) 
Ald. Billy Ocasio (26th) 
Ald. Ray Suarez (3 1 st) 
Board of (Tax) Appeals Commissioner Joseph Berrios 
state Rep. Ben A. Martinez 
state Rep. Edgar Lopez 
state Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez (D-Ill.) 
state Rep. Miguel Santiago 
state Rep. Ray Frias 
Febniary Netsch Ald. Pat O'Connor 
Cook County Democratic Chairman Thomas G. Lyons 
New Trier Democratic Organization (Phelan country) 
Pool & Billiards Magazine 
State Sen. Howard Carroll 
Phelan fol-ty-six suburban mayors and village presidents 
Hillside Mayor Joseph Tamburino 
March Burris Chicago Sun Times 
Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition 
state Rep. Bobby Rush (D-Ill.) 
Netsch 1 1 th Ward Democratic Organization 
Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley 
Chicago Sun Times 
County Commissioner John Daley 
state Sen. Carroll's 50th ward org. 
Phelan House Speaker Michael J. Madigan 
state Sen. Penny Severns (Decatur) (running-mate to Phelan) 
'Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1998 Illinois Primary 
11997 May Poshard 79 of 102 county chairmen; none from Cook County 
former Senate President Philip J. Rock 
June Poshard 
July Poshard 
August Burns 
September Poshard 
October Burris 
Poshard 
Schmidt 
November Poshard 
state central committee member Barb Brown 
state central committee member Mary Ellen Considine 
state central committee member Miki Pavelonis 
state central committee member Shirly McCombs 
Democratic County Chairmen's Association 
former Illinois Sen. Alan Dixon 
Gene Callahan, Sen. Dixon's chief aide 
88 of state's 102 Dem. County chairs 
Edmund Kelly, influential member, Chicago Democratic Organization 
most black ward committeemen 
former Senate President Philip J. Rock 
IBEW Local 134 
City Clerk James J. Laski, unified support 23rd Ward Regular Democratic Org. 
December Poshard Illinois State Association of Letter Carriers 
1998 January Bunis Aid. Robert Shaw (9th) (South Side official) 
Cook County Commissioner Bobbie Steele 
Harold Murphy (D-Markham) 
state Rep. Lovana Lou Jones (D-Chcago) 
state sen. Connie Howard (D-Chicago) 
state Sen. William Shaw (D-Dolton) 
U.S. Rep. Bobby Rush (D) 
Poshard AFL-CEO 
AFSCME 
Berwyn Committeeman Thomas G. Shaughness y 
Bremen Cornnitteeman Terry Steczo 
Chicago's Fraternal Order of Police 
Cicero Committeeman Richard S. Caravetta 
Democratic County Chairmen's Association 
former state Rep. Frank Giglio of Thornton 
House Speaker Michael J. Madigan 
Illinois State Rifle Association 
James Sheehan of Proviso 
John McNamera of Worth 
Lyons Committeeman Jack E. Mikso 
Maine Committeeman Andrew Prsybylo 
Oak Park's Rock 
state Sen. Louis S. Viverito of Stickney 
Schmidt Kevin Conlon of Rich 
NOW 
suburban Committeemen Patrick Botterrnan of Wheeling 
William Gaynor of Orland 
February Poshard George Dunne, head 42nd Ward Organization & foi-mer Cook County Board Pres. 
Pro-life Republicans 
U.S. Rep. Luis Gutierrez 
March Burris Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition 
U.S. Rep. Danny K. Davis 
U.S. Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-Ill.) 
Poshard Dem Vickie Moseley, Springfield, former legislator & candidate 99th House seat 
Illinois Democratic Hispanic Council 
state Sen. Minority Leader Ernil Jones Jr., D-Chicago 
U.S. Senator Dick Durbin 
ILLINOIS 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 2002 Illinois Primary 
2001 May Blagojevich U.S. Rep BILL LIPINSKI 
U.S. Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-Ill.) 
U.S. Rep. Luis Gutierrez 
US REP JAN SCHAKOWSKY 
US REP LANE EVANS 
Vallas Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley 
Juan Range1 of the United Neighborhood Organization 
Jul Blagojevich DOUG SCOTT, mayor of Rockford 
Oct Blagojevich Ald. Edward M. Burke 
Ald. Richard F. Me11 
Ald. William J.P. Banks 
John Gianulis, Rock Island, cahir Democratic County Chairmen's Assoc. 
state Rep. William 0 .  Lipinski 
state Sen. Carol Ronen 
Burr is Carol Moseley-Braun's 
state Rep. Danny K. Davis 
U.S. Rep. Bobby Rush (D) 
Nov Blagojevich gay and lesbian community 
Sangamon County Democratic Party 
Bui-ris Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition 
Dec Blagojevich AFL-CIO 
2002 Jan Blagojevich cago and Northeast Illinois District Council of Carpenters 
Illinois Federation of Teachers 
Illinois Personal PAC 
state Rep. David Phelps 
state Rep. Jerry Costello 
Vallas Chicago's Fraternal Order of Police 
Cook County Commissioner Calvin R. Sutker 
former Cook County Assessor Thomas C. Hynes 
former Sen. Jerome Joyce (D-Reddick). 
Glenn Poshard, the 1998 Democratic candidate for Illinois governor 
Lawrence M. Walsh (D-Elwood 
state Rep. George E. Sangmeister (D-Mokena 
state Rep. Julie Hamos (D-Evanston 
state Rep. Lou Lang, D-Skokie 
State Rep. Mary K. O'Brien (D-Coal City 
state Sen. Debbie Halverson (D-Crete 
state Sen. Patrick D. Welch (D-Peru 
Feb Blagojevich Alan J. Dixon 
Citizen Action 
Burris 15 black ministers 
Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition 
state Rep. Jesse L. Jackson Jr. (D-I11 
Vallas black leaders 
Former U.S. Sen. Adlai Stevenson 111 
Illinois Personal PAC 
Illinois Planned Parenthood 
Rev. Willie Barrow, co-chair of Rainbow/PUSH 
The Tribune 
Mar Blagojevich Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley 
Chicago Sun Times 
HDO activist Ald. Danny Solis (25th 
Latino political establishment 
state Rep. Edward Acevedo (D-Chicago 
state Sen. Tony Munoz (D-Chicago 
The Pantagraph 
The Sierra Club Woods 
Wetlands Group 
Vallas Chicago Daily Herald 
Chicago radio personality Steve Dahl 
five newspapers statewide 
The IHA 
The Pantagraph 
ILLINOIS 
Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Illinois Primary, 1994,1998, and 2002 
1993 November Edgar Ameritech Corp. Chairman and CEO William L. Weiss 
East St. Louis Mayor Gordon Bush 
Joe Morris, a 42-year-old conservative lawyer 
Mike Dikta 
Richard Duchossois, chairman of Arlington International Racecourse Ltd. 
December Edgar Cook County State's Attorney Jack O'Malley 
1997 August Ryan Gov. Jim Edgar 
overwhelming support among Republican legislators, county chaii-nlen and 
other elected officials 
November Ryan International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150 
December Koppie group led by anti-tax extremist Jim Tobin 
1998 January Koppie Illinois State Rifle Association 
Ryan AFL-CIO 
200 1 May Ryan Schaumburg Township Alliance of Republicans 
August Ryan Former Gov. Jim Thompson 
Gov. Jim Edgar 
Illinois House Minority Leader Lee Daniels 
Illinois Senate President James "Pate" Philip 
JOHN SHIMKUS, R-Collinsville 
Sangamon County GOP Chairman IRV SMITH 
three-fourths of the 32 Republican state senators 
Treasurer JUDY BAAR TOPINKA 
U.S. House Speaker Dennis Hastert 
U.S. Reps. RAY LAHOOD, R-Peoria 
September Ryan Congressman Johnson 
state Rep. Ray LaHood, R-Peoria 
Woods McHenry County Republican Chairman Bill LeFew 
October Ryan State Sen. Carl Hawkinson 
November Ryan McHenry County Republican Chairman Bill LeFew 
December Ryan Sangamon County Republicans 
2002 January Ryan Edward Southwell 
Maine Republicans 
Woods Illinois Planned Parenthood 
Febi-uary O'Malle Illinois Citizens for Life PAC 
March 
Y 
The Illinois Federation for Right to Life 
Ryan Cuba Township GOP 
Illinois Citizens for Life PAC 
The Associated Fire Fighters of Illinois 
The Illinois Federation for Right to Life 
Woods 50 mayors 
Ryan Chicago Daily Herald 
Chicago Sun Times 
George Ryan 
One of the largest downstate Teamster union locals 
state Rep. Donald Moffitt (R-Galesburg) 
The IHA 
The Pantagraph 
Woods Bloomington Mayor Judy Markowitz 
Irimeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, Massachusetts Primary, 1978 
19'78 January Dukakis Pittsfield, Mayor Paul Brindle I11 
April Withheld Citizens for Participation in Political Action 
May Dukakis International Ladies Garment Workers Union 
J. King Howard Phillips, national director Conservative Caucus 
Joseph F. Fitzpatrick VP New England Council 
several building trade union locals 
Teamsters Joint Council No. 10 
June Ackermann MA Caucus for Gay Legislation 
state Rep. Barney Frank 
July Dukakis MA UAW 
J. King MA State Police Association 
September Dukakis Boston Globe 
J. King U.S. Rep. Michael J. Harrington of Beverly 
NA King NAGE 
Withheld MA Teachers Assn. 
Tirneline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Massachusetts Primary, 1978 
1978 May F. King Convention endorsement 
Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair 
William A. Casey, chairman W. Springfield Republican Town 
Committee 
Timeline of Endorsements to Dukakis, Massachusetts Primary, 1982 
Year Month 
1 9 8 1 November 
1982 January 
February 
March 
April 
June 
Endorser 
Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA) 
Citizens for Participation in 
Political Action 
Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human 
Services, state Rep.) 
Wellesley Democratic Town 
Committee 
Boston Mayor Kevin White 
state Rep. Michael J. Barrett 
(D-Reading) 
State Sen. George Bachrach 
(D-Watertown) 
David and Diana Rockefeller 
economist Otto Eckstein 
former Rep. David J. Mofenson 
Jerome Grossman 
MA AFL-CIO Labor Council 
MA Teachers Assn. 
65 labor leaders 
International Union of 
Operating Engineers Local 877 
MA Federation of Teachers 
United Steelworkers of 
America, District 1, New 
England 
United Transportation Union 
William Irvin, international 
representative of the United 
Steel Workers of America 
Bill Geary, a former aide to 
Dukakis and candidate for Lt. 
Gov 
Convention endorsement 
MA Political Action 
Committee Daycare Alliance 
Voice of Teachers for 
Education (VOTE) 
Amalgamated Clothing and 
Textile Workers Union 
Ann Pastreich, Lexington fire 
fighter 
Black Coalition to Elect Mike 
Dukalus 100 blacks 
Donna Kuha, former president 
of the Massachusetts Womens 
Political Caucus' 
Dorine Levasseur, president 
SEIU Local 925 
July 
Food and Cormnercial Workers 
Local 1445 
Frank Manning, president MA 
Assn. for Older Americans & 
100 elderly orgs 
Gary Orren, Harvard prof. 
Legislative Council for Older 
Americans 
MA UAW 
Margaret Merry, former 
president of Wheelock College 
Marilyn Anderson Chase, 
executive director of the 
Roxbury Multi-Services Center 
Tina Ponte, president UAW's 
community action prograin in 
Southeastern Massachusetts 
Women for Dukakis 
Committee (800) 
198 current city couilcil 
members, selectmen or 
aldermen 
400 local officials 
5 mayors 
6 1 school committee illembers 
7 county commissioners 
80 1 business executives 
Boston City Council member 
Michael McCorinick 
Chicopee Robert Kuinor 
Donald B. Bivck, president of 
the Disc Technology Corp. 
Edward H. Pendergast, 
president of a consulting firm 
Holyoke Mayor Ernest Proulz 
MA Womens Political Caucus 
Mayor Antonio Marino of 
Lynn 
Medford Mayor Paul J. Donato 
several former elected officials 
or who now hold appointive 
office 
Suffolk County Sheriff Dennis 
Kearne y 
Worcester Mayor Sara 
Robertson 
August 3 5 state legislators 
Black Political Task Force 
Chelsea Mayor Joel Pressinan 
Former US Atty. Edward F. 
Harrington 
Louis Pines, It. governor 
candidate, former state rep. 
MA State Conference of 
Bricklayers and Allied 
Craftsmen (5000) 
Metropolitan District 
Commission Police Patrolman's 
Union 
National Association of Social 
Workers (8000) 
Registry Inspectors Assn. 
SEIU Local 509 
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy 
state Rep. Lawrence Alexander 
(D-Marblehead) 
state Rep. Thomas J. Vallely 
(D-Boston) 
state Rep. Walter Bickford (D- 
Berlin) 
state Sen. Allan R. McKinnon 
(D-Weyrnouth) 
U.S. Rep. James M. Shannon 
U.S. Rep. Joseph Early 
Worcester businessman Robert 
Giordano 
Worcester businessman Steven 
Karchrnar 
September AFSCME Local No. 1242 
Boston City Council member 
Bruce Bolling 
Boston City Council member 
Maura Hennigan 
Boston City Council member 
Terrence McDerrnott 
Boston Globe 
Boston Phoenix 
Chelsea Record 
Danvers Herald 
Greenfield Recorder 
IBEW Local 2222 
MA Tenants' Organization 
Malden's This Week 
National and the MA Leagues 
of Conservation Voters 
Revere Republic 
Springfield Daily News 
Ward anticorruption 
commission chair John Ward 
Ward anticorruption 
commission member architect 
Peter Forbes 
Ward anticorruption 
commission member Louis 
Weinstein 
Ward anticorruption 
commission member Suffolk 
University Prof. Frances Burke 
WCVB-TV (Channel 5) 
WEE1 radio 
Tinleline of Endorsements to King, Massachusetts Primary, 1982 
198 1 October Charles Curry, representing the 
Democratic National 
Committee 
Conrad Everhard, president of 
Dart Containerline Inc. 
Democratic governor, Fob 
James of Alabama 
John Buckley Northeast 
Petroleum Corp. 
Margaret M. Heckler (R- 
Wellesley) 
Mark. E.. ~ohnson, representing 
a direct-mail advertising 
agency headed by Richard 
Viguerie, conservative political 
fund-raiser. 
Officials from International 
Longshoremen's Assn. 
Pat Thibeaux, of the 
Democratic Governors' 
Conference 
Paul M. Weyric, executive 
director Committee for the 
Survival of a Free Congress 
Teamsters officials 
Thomas Kuhn, former 
Massport official, vice 
president for government 
affairs of the American Nuclear 
Energy Council, an industry 
group 
U.S. Rep. Nicholas Mavroules 
1982 January Fall River Mayor Carleton 
Viveiros 
former House Speaker and 
recently named Administration 
and Finance Secretary David 
M. Bartley 
John J. McGlynn, King's chief 
secretary, in Medford 
Lowell City Manager B. Joseph 
Tully, former state senator 
Springfield Mayor Theodore 
DeMauro 
state Rep. Michael C. Creedon 
(D-Brockton), chairman of the 
powerful House Ways and 
Means Committee 
Superintendent of State 
Buildings Charles Buffone, 
former state representative 
February Citizens for Limited Taxation 
former school committeeillan 
David I. Finnegan 
New Bedford Mayor Jolm 
Markey 
Somerville Mayor Eugene 
Brune 
state Auditor John J. Finnegan 
state Rep. Daniel F. Pokaski 
April 
June 
July 
March Lowell restaurateur X. L. 
Speronis 
MA AFL-CIO Labor Council 
Marion C. Buffone of 
Worcester 
Park Plaza President Roger A. 
Saunders 
theater magnate Surnner M. 
Redstone 
Boston lawyer Richard 
McCarthy 
John J.C. Herlihy, chairman of 
the Judicial Nominating 
Commission 
Associate Turnpike Conu. 
Raymond Fontana 
Boston Building Trades 
Council 
International Brotherhood of 
Police Officers 
MA Building Trades Council 
Metropolitan Boston District of 
the Building and Construction 
Trades Council 
developers and contractors 
Attleboro Mayor Gerald J. 
Keane 
Daniel Twomey, former 
president Police association 
Home Builders Assn. of MA 
NAGE 
Northampton Mayor 
Peabody Mayor Peter Torigian 
Pittsfield Mayor Charles Smith 
State Senate president William 
Bulger (D- South Boston) 
Taunton Mayor Richard 
Johnson 
Waltham Mayor Arthur Clark 
August 18 of 39 MA mayors 
AFSCME Council 93 
Beverly Mayor Peter FOI-tunato 
Boston Police Superior 
Officers Federation (230) 
Boston Red Sox Carl 
Y astrzemski 
Boston Red Sox Jerry Remy 
Brockton Mayor Paul V. 
Studenski 
Disabled fights Union of MA 
Everett Mayor Edward G. 
Connolly 
Joseph Reilly, former pres. MA 
Citizens for Life 
Gloucester Mayor Leo Alper 
L. Joyce Hampers Revenue 
Commissioner 
Lowell Mayor M. Brendan 
Flenling 
MA Citizens for Life 
MA Coalition of Police 
MA Crime Prevention Officers 
Association 
MA State Police Association 
Malden Mayor Thomas Fallon 
Marlborough Mayor Joseph 
Fel-recchia 
MCAD chairman Leon 
Brathwaite 
Melrose Mayor James E. 
Milano 
Middlesex County Superior 
Court Officers Assn. 
Newburyport Mayor Richard 
Sullivan 
NRA 
'Nursing home industry's PAC 
SEIU Local 254 
state affirmative action 
director, John F. Drewry 
state Rep. Royal L. Bolling Jr. 
(D-Mattapan) 
state Sen. Joseph F. Tirnilty (D- 
Canton) 
state senatorial candidate Louis 
A. Elisa 2d 
'Teamsters Joint Council No. 10 
U.S. Rep. Claude Pepper (D- 
Fla.) 
Western MA Chefs of Police 
Association 
Westfield Mayor Michael 
O'Connell 
September 10 state senators 
65 representatives 
700 past and present elected 
public officials from cities and 
towns 
AFSCME 
Boston Police Patrolmen's 
Association 
Boston Red Sox Dwight Evans 
Boston Red Sox Jim Rice 
Fall River Herald News 
House Assistant Whip Vincent 
J. Piro (D-Somerville) 
House Majority Leader George 
Keverian (D-Everett) 
House Speaker Thomas W. 
McGee 
House Whip John E. Murphy 
(D- Peabody) 
Independent Taxi Owners Assn 
Lowell Sun 
Lynn Item 
MA Chief Probation Officers 
Assn. 
MA Federation of Physicians 
and Dentists 
MA State Automobile Dealers 
Assn 
Malden Evening News 
Medford Daily Mercury 
Melrose Evening News 
Middlesex News 
New Bedford Standard Times 
Salem Evening News 
Senate Majority Leader Daniel 
J. Foley (D-Worcester) 
Senate Whip Mary L. Fonseca 
(D-Fall River) 
Springfield Moining Uilion 
U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland, a 
Springfield Democrat 
Utility Workers Union of 
America Local No. 369 (2000) 
executive board 
WITS radio talk show host Pat 
Whitley 
Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, 1982 
1981 October Sears Henry Cabot Lodge, former ambassador, US senator 
New England Patriots 
1982 March Lakian Convention endorsement 
April Lakian Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair 
May Sears Moderate Action Committee 
June Card Associated Builders and Contractors 
July Sears Charles Cabot, former candidate for attorney general 
Josiah Spaulding, a former Republican candidate for the US Senate, governor 
and attorney general 
Neil Chayet, lawyer and radio commentator 
The Coalition of Concerned Republicans 
Timothy O'Brien, former campaign treasurer for state Rep. William G. Robinson 
September Card Middlesex News 
Springfield Daily News 
WEE1 radio 
Lakian The Polish American, a monthly journal 
Sears Boston Globe 
William I. Cowin, 1978 GOP nominee for lieutenant governor 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1986 
1986 April Dukakis Citizens for Participation in Political Action 
September Dukakis AFL-CIO 
NA Dukakis MA Teachers Assn. 
Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, 1986 
1986 April Hyatt former Gov. Edward J. King 
Switzler Convention endorsement 
July Kariotis Elliot Richardson 
former Gov. Edward J. King 
former Gov. John A. Volpe 
former Rep. Leon Lombardi of Easton 
Frank Sargent 
millionaire businessman Michael Valerio 
Ray Shamie, former GOP chairman 
Roger Wellington, president and chief executive officer of Augat Inc., a high- 
tech firm in Mansfield 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1990 
1989 July Murphy state Rep. Mary Jane Gibson (D- Belmont), 
September Murphy Secretary of Labor Paul Eustace 
November Murphy NOW 
December Murphy Alan Solomont 
dozen other directors of social service agencies 
Kip Ternan, Director of Rosie's Place 
1990 January Murphy 2 1 child care advocates from across the state 
2 1 legislators 
50 leaders of Massachusetts' minority con~rnunity. 
Alex Rodrigues, comrnissioi~er of the Massachusetts Cornnlission Against 
Discrimination 
Deborah Prothrow-Stith, the former commissioner of public health 
EMILY'S List 
group of about 20 state and local elected officials 
state Rep. Augusto Grace (D-Burlington) 
state Rep. David Cohen (D-Newton) 
state Rep. Joan Menard (D-Somerset) 
state Rep. Robert Durand (D-Marlborough) 
state Rep. Shirley Owens-Hicks (D-Boston) 
Silber New Hampshire's conservative Manchester Union-Leader newspaper 
March Murphy about 50 Environmental people 
Environmental Roundtable 
former vice presidential nominee Geraldine Ferraro 
state Rep. Geoggrey Beckwith 
Women's Campaign Fund 
April Bellotti Fitchburg Mayor Jeffiey Bean 
Gardner Mayor Charles J. Manca 
Worcester Mayor Jordan Levy 
Murphy Citizens for Participation in Political Action 
Silber Edward Sullivan, head of SEIU local 
Joseph Nigro, general agent, secretary-treasurer of 35,000 member Bostoil 
Building trades uniion 
Miichale Mullane, regional VP of International Association of Fire 
Fighters 
May Bellotti MA State Police Association 
MA UAW 
state rep. Carmen Buell (D- Greenfield) 
Murphy Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
Hollywood Women's Political Committee 
MA Choice 
MA Nurses Association 
MA Teachers Assn. 
Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human Services, state Rep.) 
Silber Mayor Albert V. DiVirgilio of Lynn 
Mayor, Kai Shang of Attleboro 
Peabody Mayor Peter Torigian 
Salem Mayor Neil Harrington 
state Rep. Marian Walsh (D-West Roxbury 
state Sen. William Q. MacLean (D-Fairhaven) 
U.S. Rep. Joseph Early 
June 
July 
Bellotti 
Silber 
Bellotti 
Murphy 
Silber 
September Bellotti 
Silber 
Brockton Building Trades' Council 
Communications Workers of AmericaICWA 
Convention endorsement 
Iron Workers Union Local 7 
Quincy and South Shore Building Trades' Council 
Somerville Mayor Michael Capuano 
Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Civil kghts  
International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental 
Ironworkers of Springfield Local Union 357 
former U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland of Springfield 
1 1 of 12 Democratic county sheriffs 
DA Anthony J. Ruberto Jr. of Berkshire County 
DA John J. Conte of Worcester County 
DA Judd J. Carhart of Hampshire County 
DA Newrnan A. Flanagan of Suffolk County. 
DA Ronald Pina of Bristol County 
DA William O'Malley of Plymouth County 
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 26 
IBEW 
MA Building Trades Council 
William Delahunt (U.S. Rep, DA) 
Gloria Steinem 
Greater Boston Gay and Lesbian Political Alliance (500-member) 
Frederick A. Hurst, one of three members of the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination 
Worcester Police Officers' Union 
100 liberal activists 
Boston Phoenix 
Brookline hometown paper 
Haverhill Gazette 
Leonard Zakim, executive director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith 
Lt. Gov. Evelyn Murphy 
Mayor Raymond Flynn 
Middlesex News 
Rainbow Coalition 
Springfield Mayor Mary Hurley 
Springfield Union-News 
state Sen. John Houston (D- Worcester) 
Transcript News 
Valley Advocate (Springfield) 
Attleboro Sun Chronicle 
Boston Herald 
Brookline Police Association 
David Nyhan 
Holyoke Police Department 
Lawrence Eagle-Tribume 
Lowell Sun 
Westfield Evening News 
Tinleline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, 1990 
1989 September Weld Carroll Sheehan (challenged 1974 Sargent from Right) 
former state Rep. Paula Lewellen of Bedford 
Young Americans for Freedom 
October Weld Anthony DeInnocentis, a businessman 
fomer assistant US attorney D. Lloyd Macdonald 
fomer assistant US attomey Gary Crossen 
fomer assistant US attorney Janis M. Berry 
Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair 
November Pierce George Kariotis 
Weld 19 key Bush backers (moderate party leaders) 
b 
state Sen. Henri S. Rauschenbach of Brewster 
state Sen. Mary Padula of Lunenburg 
state Sen. Peter Webber of Pittsfield 
1990 February Pierce Citizens for Limited Taxation 
March Pierce Convention endorsement 
Weld Associated Builders and Contractors 
July Pierce Life Insurance Industries of MA 
Weld MA Womens Political Caucus 
September Pierce Attleboro Sun Chronicle 
Boston Herald 
college Republicans 
Exodus Movement 
former Boston Mayor Jolm Collins 
Lawrence Eagle-Tribume 
MA Black Republican Council 
Rev. E.W. Jackson of the New Cornerstone Baptist Church 
Sen. Robert Dole 
Westfield Evening News 
Weld Association of Independent Truckers 
Boston Phoenix 
former Boston US Attorney Jeremiah O'Sullivan 
Middlesex News 
North Shore Weeklies 
Rudolph W. Giuliani, former US attorney, New York 
several top federal prosecutors 
several women professionals 
Springfield Union-News 
TAB Newspapers 
of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1994 
January Barrett Democratic State Committee chairman Steven Grossman 
Roosevelt Mitchell E. Kertzman, chairman of Powersoft Corp. & president of the 
Massachusetts Software Council 
February Roosevelt former Democratic National Committee chairman Paul Kirk 
former state Attorney General James Shannon 
several dozen other prominent Democrats 
March Roosevelt Indiana Gov. Evan Bayh 
April Barrett state Sen. William R. Keating 
Roosevelt state Sen. Marc Pacheco (D- Taunton) 
May. Bachrach activist Jennifer Duryea 
Ald. Michael E. Festa, Melrose 
Ald. Paul Fitzgerald, Melrose 
Felix Arroyo 
former Labor Secretary Paul Eustace 
former Rep. Barbara A. Hildt 
Liz Belkin of Swampscott 
State Committee & School Conunittee member Marcia Sweeney 
state Rep. Nelson Merced 
Bal-rett activist Catherine Gover 
activist Ed Flashenburg 
activist Jack Kennaday of Melrose 
activist James Morin 
activist Larry Kirby 
activist Mark Falzone 
activist Mark Rotondo 
activist Mark Teitelbaum 
activist Paul Brodeur 
activist Susan Tatelman 
activist Theresa Czerapica 
activists William and Mary Wasserman 
former Councilor Kathy Gardner-Gill 
former state Rep. Frances Alexander 
former state Rep. Lawrence R. Alexander 
Roosevelt activist Andrea Watson 
activist Greg Nadeau 
Brian S. Dempsey 
Democratic State Committee member Grace Myette 
Democratic State Committee member Mark DiSalvo 
Democratic State Committee member Sharon Pollard 
Douglas W. Petersen 
Edward (Chip) Clancy 
James V. DiPaola 
Salem Mayor Neil Harrington 
state Rep. Michael P. Cahill 
state Sen. Thomas F. Birmingham 
state Sen. Walter J. Boverini 
William F. Cass 
Bachrach 40 female political figures 
Cambridge Mayor Alice Wolf 
Northampton Mayor Mary Ford 
June 
July 
June Roosevelt Convention endorsement 
House Speaker Charles F. Flaherty 
organized labor 
Senate President William M. Bulger 
Bachrach Citizens for Participation in Political Action 
MA State Fire Fighters Union 
MA UAW 
National Association of Social Workers (8000) 
Roosevelt AFL-CIO 
September Bacluach Boston's Ward 2 1 Democratic Committee 
former state Rep. Me1 King 
Jeff Jacoby 
U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Maiden 
Barrett Telegram & Gazette 
Roosevelt 40 southeastern Massachusetts officials 
Boston Globe 
Lieutenant governor candidate Bob Massie 
Springfield Union-News 
Tinleline of Endorsements to Weld, 1994 
1993 April Weld California Governor Pete Wilson 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1998 
1997 January Harshbarger 100 Democratic State Committee supporters 
June McGovern 
October Harshbarger 
December McGovern 
1998 January Harshbarger 
February Donnelly 
Harshbarger 
Donne11 y 
Harshbarger 
McGovern 
40 state representatives and senators 
House Majority Whip Rep. Barbara Gardner (D-Holliston) 
state Rep. Guy Glodis 
state Rep. Harold M. Lane Jr. D-Holden 
state Rep. John F. Merrigan, D-Greenfield 
state Rep. Patricia A. Walrath, D-Stow 
state Rep. Patrick F. Landers 111, D-Palmer 
state Rep. Stephen Kulik, D-Worthington 
state Rep. Vincent A. Pedone, D-Worcester 
state Sen. Brian A. Joyce (D-Milton) 
state Sen. David Magnani of Framingham 
Gloria Larson, former member of Weld's cabinet 
25 of 160 House members 
state Rep. Janet O'Brien 
Assistant Majority Leader Linda J. Melconian (D-Springfield) 
EMILY'S List 
state Senate Majority Leader Thomas C. Norton (D-Fall River), 
Ways and Means Chairman Stanley C. Rosenberg (D-Arnherst) 
William Delahunt (U. S. Rep, DA) 
Brockton Mayor John T. Yunits Jr. 
former Plymouth County Commissioner John R. Buckley Jr. 
former Weymouth state Senator Brian J. McDonald 
Quincy City councilor Stephen J. Durkin 
Quincy City councilor Timothy P. Cahill 
state Rep. Geraldine Creedon 
state Rep. Thomas P. Kennedy 
state Sen. Michael Morrissey 
state Sen. Robert Creedon 
U.S. Rep. Joseph Moakley of South Boston 
U.S. Rep. Richard Neal (D-Springfield) 
Joseph Nigro, general agent, secretary-treasurer of 35,000 me~llber 
Boston Building trades uniion 
Laborers International Union of North America, Tunnel Workers Local 
88, 
Holyoke Mayor Daniel Szostkiewicz 
Mayor Michael McGlynn of Medford 
Mayor Patrick McManus of Lynn 
Mayor Richard Sullivan of Westfield 
Mayor William Stanley of Waltham 
Salem Mayor Stanley Usovicz 
Taunton Mayor Robert Nunes 
Pittsfield Mayor Gerald Doyle 
behind-the-scenes convention help from a few other mayors, including 
Thomas M. Menino of Boston 
David Osborne, wrote Reinventing Government, form Cellucci supporter 
Northampton Mayor Mary Ford 
July 
June Donnelly Boston Carmens Local 589lATU 
MA State Fire Fighters Union 
Norfolk County Central Labor Council 
Harshbarger AFL-CIO 
Carpenter's Union 
Convention endorsement 
Harshbarger IBEW Local 7 
Iron Workers Union Local 7 
SEIU Local 285 
SEIU Local 509 
September Harshbarger Boston Building Trades Council 
Boston Herald 
Cement Masons Local 534 
Everett Mayor David Ragucci 
Food and Commercial Workers Local 1459NFCW 
Food and Commercial Workers Local 328 
Food and Commercial Workers Local 791 
Laborers Local 223 
MA Organization of State Engineers and Scientists 
National Confrence of Firemen and Oilers Local 3 
Newton Mayor David Cohen 
Operating Engineers Local 4 
Operating Engineers Local 877 
Operating Engineers Local 98 
Salem Mayor Stanley Usovicz 
Springfield Mayor Michael J. Albano 
Teamsters Local 122 
U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Malden 
Worcester-Framingham AFL-CIO Central Labor Council 
McGovern Boston Phoenix 
former Mayor Jeffrey A. Bean of Fitchburg 
former state Sen. Robert D. Wetmore of Barre 
Mary O'Brien, Central Berkshire register of deeds 
state Rep. Daniel E. Bosley of North Adams 
state Rep. Ernile J. Goguen of Fitchburg 
state Rep. Harriette L. Chandler of Worcester 
state Rep. Nancy Flavin of Easthampton 
state Rep. Peter J. Larkin of Pittsfield 
state Sen. hchard T. Moore of Uxbridge 
state Sen. Robert A. Antonioni of Leorninster 
state Sen. Robert A. Bernstein of Worcester 
state Sen. Stephen D. Brewer of Barre 
U.S. Rep. John Olver 
Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, 1998 
1997 June Cellucci Ray Shamie, former GOP chairman 
July Malone Dorothea Vitrac (working with Malone to get term limits) 
Leominster Mayor Dean J. Mazzarella 
October Malone Ray Shamie, former GOP chairman 
December Cellucci Attorney Richard W. Hynes, son of former Democratic Mayor of Boston 
Bristol County DA Paul Walsh 
Malone 8 of 15 top GOP Committees 
Boston GOP City Committee Chair 
Plymouth County GOP Chairs, Betsy Sawyer and Joseph Lovetere 
Springfield GOP City Committee Chair 
1998 January Cellucci state Sen. Bruce Tarr 
Malone Former Worcester state Sen. Arthur E. Chase 
February Cellucci Waltham GOP City Councilor Michael Squillante 
Withheld Ray Shamie RESCINDS endorsement 
March Malone Lyn Nofziger 
April Cellucci Barbara Bush 
Convention endorsemeilt 
Former Gov. Bill Weld 
Malone former Republican U.S. Sen. Alan Simpson of Wyoming 
former state Rep. Robei-t D. Hawke 
Malone Fidelity Investments 
financier Thomas Lee 
Jim Davis, chairman of the New Balance athletic shoe company 
John Connors, CEO of advertising firm Hill Holliday Connors Cosmopulos 
Life Insurance Industries of MA 
Peter Brooke, chairman of venture capital firm Advent International 
Peter Lynch 
Peter Nicholas, chairman of Boston Scientific, a big medical equipment 
company 
Richard Egan, chairman of Hopkinton high-tech company EMC Co~p ,  
Staples chief executive Thomas Stemberg 
Terrence Murray, chairman of Fleet Financial Group 
Thomas May, chief of Boston Edison Co. 
Thomas Shields of Shields Health Care Group, a Democrat, Weld 
Appointee 
September Cellucci Boston Globe 
Boston Herald 
Community Newspapers 
Lowell Sun 
Melrose Mayor Patrick C. Guerriero 
Springfield Sunday Republican 
Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 2002 
200 1 November Birmingham State Sen. Guy W. Glodis 
state Sen. Stephen D. Brewer of Barre 
December Bii~ningham Democratic City Committee chairman Jeff Krumriile of Newburyport 
Essex District Attorney Kevin M. Burke of Beverly 
former state Economic Development director David A. Tibbetts of 
Ne wburyport 
Gloucester city councilor Michelle Galante Mitchell 
Gloucester Councilor-elect Jeffrey T. Worthley 
Gloucester Mayor Bruce H. Tobey 
Jeff Sullivan of Saugus, president of the North Shore Building Trades 
Council 
Lynn City Councilor David D. Ellis 
Lynn City Councilor James M. Cowdell 
Lynn City Councilor Richard J. Ford 
Lynn City Councilor Salvy Migliacci 
Lynn City Councilor William R. Trahant 
Malden Mayor Richard C. Howard 
Mayor-elect John J. Guerin Jr. of Haverhill 
Middlesex Sheriff James V. DiPaola of Malden 
Peabody city councilor David Gamache 
Peabody city councilor Judith A. Selesnick 
Peabody Mayor Peter Torigian 
state Rep.s Eugene L. O'Flaherty 
state Sen. Frederick E. Berry of Peabody 
Swampscott School Committee member Richard Feinberg 
Wakefield Democratic Town Comrnittee chairman Thomas Markha 
Grossrnan Barry Y. Weiner of Gloucester, DNC Finance Committee 
Bill Wasserman of Ipswich 
Democratic State Committee member Victoria Budson of Millis 
former state Rep. Sally Kerans of Danvers 
Fred Rich of Wakefield 
Jonathan Sclarsic, Brandeis Student Body President 
Nancy Kaufman of Swampscott, executive director of the Jewish 
Community Relations Council of Greater Boston 
state committee member Marcia L. Sweeney of Marblehead 
state Rep. Michael E. Festa of Melrose 
O'Brien Ald. Jane L. Lavender of Melrose 
Bruce Callahan of Lynn, secretary of the North Shore Labor Council 
City Councilor Deborah Smith Walsh of Lynn 
City Councilor Joyce A. Spiliotis of Peabody (who is also a state 
committee member) 
City Councilor Martin J. Gately of Malden 
Democratic ward chair Eric Wildman of Melrose 
former Essex County treasurer Kathy O'Leary 
former Salem Democratic city committee chairwoman Mary Lou Tuttle 
former state committee member David J, Shea of Salem 
Groveland Democratic Town Committee chairman John McCai-thy 
Newburyport Democratic ward chair Barry Connell 
Newburyport ~ernocratic ward chair Bonnie Salt of Newburyport 
Newburyport Democratic ward chair Karen Hudner 
To lrnan 
2002 January Birmingham 
Reich 
February Birmingham 
O'Brien 
March Grossman 
O'Brien 
Reich 
April Birmingham 
Grossman 
O'Brien 
Reich 
Tolman 
Birmingham 
Newburyport Democratic ward chair Paul Christopher 
Newburypoi-t Mayor Lisa L. Mead 
Peabody Democratic City Committee chairman Richard Jarvis 
political consultant Helen Corbett of Danvers 
state committee member Kathleen Pasquina of West Newbury 
state Rep. Brian S. Dempsey of Haverhill 
state Reps Harriet L. Stanley of West Newbury 
Melrose Alderman George J. Doyle 
Peabody City Councilor Barry Osborne 
Salem City Councilor Jim Tierney 
state Rep. Edward G. Connolly of Everett 
state Sen. Cheryl Jacques of Needham 
state Sen. David Magnani of Framingham 
state Sen. Pamela Resor of Acton 
State Sen. Steve Panagiotakos 
state Sen. Susan Fargo of Lincoln 
teacher unions 
U.S. Rep. Martin Meehan 
John Landry, former chief technology officer for Lotus 
17 of the state's 42 mayors 
Brockton Mayor John T. Yunits Jr. 
Holyoke Mayor Michael J. Sullivan 
Mayor Rita Mercier in Lowell 
Pittsfield Mayor 
Quincy Mayor William Phelan 
state Sen. Robert Creedon 
Taunton Mayor 
House Majority Whip Lida Harkins of Needham 
former Texas Gov. Ann Richards 
EMILY'S List 
Barbara Streisand 
NY Gov. Mario Cuomo 
Rep. Jim Marzilli, D-Arlington 
Warren Beatty 
Democratic political consultant Jack Corrigan 
Alan Solomont 
Economist John Kenneth Galbraith 
former congressman Rev. Robert F. Drinan 
Principal at AOL-Time Warner Inc. 
Principal at Kessler Financial Services 
state Rep. Robert P. Spellane, D-Worcester 
Weymouth Council President Thomas J. Lacey 
Weymouth Councilor-at-Large Greg Hargadon 
Weymouth Councilor-at-Large Jack Carey 
Weymouth Councilor-at-Large Joseph Connolly 
Weymouth Councilor-at-Large Sue Kay 
Weymouth Mayor David Madden 
former Senator Bill Bradley 
Woody Allen 
law offices of Gallagher and Cavanaugh 
Medford Mayor Michael McGlynn 
O'Brien Councilor-at-Large Joseph M. Petty 
Councilor-at-Large Michael C. Perotto 
Diane Saxe, a Democratic state committee member from Graft011 
District 2 Councilor Philip P. Palmieri 
District 4 Councilor Barbara G. Haller 
MA Womens Political Caucus 
Mayor Timothy P. Murray 
Reich actress and former MTV deejay Tara Deshpande Tennebawn 
feminist author Carol Gilligan 
folk star Katryna and Nerissa Nields 
folk star Loudon Wainwright I11 
group of 400 women 
state Rep. Pat Jehlen 
June Birmingham 30 unions 
AFL-CIO 
Sheriff John "Mike" Flynn 
state Rep. Thomas Golden 
O'Brien Convention endorsement 
House Majority Leader Sal DiMasi 
House Speaker Thomas Finneran 
Saundra Graham, a delegate and former state Rep. 
state Rep. Carol Donovan 
Worcester union 
Birmingham Fall River Mayor Edward Lambert 
Melrose Mayor Rob Dolan 
Newton Mayor David Cohen 
O'Brien Mayor Dorothy Kelly Gay 
Rep. Emile J. Goguen 
Somerville Alderman-at-Large Bruce Desmond 
state Rep. Cory Atkins 
state Rep. Robert P. Spellane, D-Worcester 
Reich Mayor Willie Brown of San Francisco 
OutSomervile 
July 
September Birmingham 15 house lawmakers 
22 mayors 
24 Democratic state senators 
4 sheriffs 
43 labor groups 
5 sheriffs 
Ald. John Stewart, 
Ald. Sydra Schnipper 
former School Committee member Richard Alfred 
former School Committee member Rodney Barke 
former School Committee member Suzie Heyman 
Lowell Sun 
MA Federation of Teachers 
North Shore Labor Council 
School Committee chairwoman Anne Larner 
School Committee vice chairwoman Susan Albright 
State Sen. Harriette L. Chandler 
U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey 
O'Brien Black Political Task Force 
Boston Globe 
chairman of the Board of Selectmen Gerald Wasserman 
Democratic State Committee chairman Steven Grossman 
Democratic Town Committee chairwoman Mary Ellen Herd 
Parks and Recreation commissioner Richie Weitzen 
Prominent Womens groups 
Rep. Charles Murphy 
School Committee member Paul Denver 
Selectwoman Colleen Schaller 
state Rep. Lida Harkins 
State's two largest gay and lesbian weeklies 
U.S. Rep. Richard Neal (D-Springfield) 
Warren Democratic Town Committee 
Reich 6 newspapers 
Boston Herald 
Maria Echaveste, former deputy chief of staff to President Bill Cliilton 
Tolrnan Ald. Carleton Merrill 
Ald. Kenneth Parker 
Ald. Lisle Baker 
Ald. Mitchell Fischrnan 
Ald. Pauline Bryson 
Ald. Scott Lennon 
Ald. Stephen Linsky 
Board of Aldermen President Brooke Lipsitt 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 
Clean Water Action Vote Environmental 
MA Sierra Club 
Saugus Democratic Town Committee member Charles Gill 
1Timeline of Endorsements, Republican Candidate, 2002 
2:002 February Romney Lowell Republican Committee Chair Paul Hoar Jr. 
Tewksbury Republican Committee Chair Doug Sears 
March Rornney chairman of the Republican town committee in Scituate, Conley Ford 
Deseret News 
Former Hingham committee Chairman Carl Harris 
Rep. Paul K. Frost, R-Auburn 
Weyrnouth town committee Chairman Joe Curran 
April Ronmey Convention endorsement 
Former Gov. Bill Weld 
Joe Malone 
June Romney 20 Republican legislators 
state Rep. George N. Perterson 
state Rep. Karyn E. Polito 
state Rep. Paul J.P. Loscocco 
state Rep. Robert S. Hargraves 
July Ronmey Former Gov. Argeo Cellucci 
Mayor Dan H. Mylott 
September Romney Lowell Sun 
MA Chiefs of Police Association 
state Sen. Robert L. Hedlund (R-Weyrnouth) 
APPENDIX E: ELECTION RESULTS 
COLORADO 
Democratic Primary 
Roy Romer 
Republican Prirnarv 
Dick Sargent 
Michael C. Bird 
Bruce Benson 
General 
Bruce Benson (R) 
Roy Romer (D) 
Democratic Primary 
Mike Feeley 
Gail Schoettler 
Republican Primary 
Tom Norton 
William (Bill) Owens 
General 
Gail Schoettler (D) 
William (Bill) Owens 
(R) 
Democratic Primary 
Rollie Heath 
Republican Primary 
William (Bill) Owens 
General 
Rollie Heath (D) 
William (Bill) Owens 
(R) 
Vocation 
100.0 Incumbent 
% 
17.0% Investment Securities 0 
Broker 
2 1.6% State Senator 1 
6 1.4% Former State Party Chair 0 
44.7% State Senate Minority 1 
Leader 
5 5.3% Lieutenant Governor 2 
40.8% State Senator 1 
59.2% State Treasurer 2 
Candidate 
Quality 
Score 
4 
100.0 Businessman 
% 
1 00.0 Incumbent 
% 
ILLINOIS Vocation Candidate 
Quality Score 
1994 Democratic Primary 
Sheila Jones 
James Gierach 
Richard Phelan 
Roland Burris 
Dawn Clark Netsch 
Political Activist 
Lawyer 
County Council President 
Attorney General 
State Comptroller 
Republican Primary 
Jack Roesser 
Jim Edgar 
Enginerring Firm Executive 
Incumbent 
General 
Dawn Clark Netsch 
Jim Edgar 
1998 Democratic Primary 
Jim Bums 
John R. Schmidt 
Roland W. Burris 
Glenn Poshard 
Former US Attorney 
Former Assistant Attorney General 
Former Attorney General 
Member of Congress 
Republican Primary 
Chad Koppie 
George H. Ryan 
Airline Pilot 
Secretary of State 
General 
Glenn Poshard 
George H. Ryan 
Democratic Primary 
Roland Burris 
Paul Vallas 
2002 Rod R. Blagojevich 
Former Attorney General 
Former City Schools Chief 
Member of Congress 
Republican Primary 
Corinne Wood 
Patrick O'Malley 
Jim Ryan 
Lieutenant Governor 
State Senator 
Attorney General 
General 
Jim Ryan 
Rod R. Blagojevich 
MASSACHUSETTS Vocation Candidate 
Quality Score 
1978 Democratic Primary 
Barbara Ackerrnan 
Michael Dukakis 
Edward J. King 
6.7% Former mayor of Cambridge 
42.2% Incumbent 
5 1 .O% Former Commissioner of 
MassPort 
Republican Prirnary 
Edward F. King 
Francis W. Hatch 
44.0% Businessman 
56.0% House Minority Leader 
General 
Francis W. Hatch 
Edward J. King 
1982 Democratic Primary 
Edward J. King 
Michael Dukakis 
44.8% Incumbent 
5 1.8 % Former Governor 
Republican Primary 
Andrew Card 
John Lakian 
Jolm Sears 
3.4% State Representative 
34.1 % Investment Councilor 
65.9% Former City Councilman 
General 
John Sears 
Michael Dukakis 
1986 Democratic Primary 
Michael Dukakis 100.0% Incumbent 
Republican Primary 
James Kariotis 
Royal1 Switzler 
Gregory Hyatt 
1 8.5% Busiilessman 
32.7% Lawyer 
48.8% State Representative 
General 
James Kariotis 
Michael Dukakis 
1990 Democratic Primary 
Evelyn Murphy 
Francis Bellotti 
John Silber 
2.9% Lieutenant Governor 
43.7% Former Attorney General 
53.5% Boston University President 
Re~ublican Prirnary 
Steven Pierce 
William Weld 
39.4% State Representative 
60.6% Former US Attorney 
General 
Jolm Silber 
William Weld 
h4.4SSACHUSETTS Vocation Candidate 
Quality Score 
1994 Democratic Primary 20-Sep-94 
George Bachrach 120,567 27.0% Former state senator 
Michael Rarrett 1 1 1,199 24.9% State Senator 
Mark Roosevelt 2 15,06 1 48.1 % State Representative 
Republican Primary 20-Sev-94 
William Weld 2 1 1,325 100.0% Incumbent 
General 1 -Nov-94 
Mark Roosevelt 61 1,650 28.5% 
William Weld 71.5% 
1,533,387 
1998 Democratic Primary 15-Sep-98 
Brian Donnelly 101,984 17.0% Former US Congress Member 
Patricia McGovern 189,686 3 1.7% Lawyer 
Scott Harshbarger 306,883 5 1.3% Attorney General 
Republican Primary 15-Sep-98 
Joe Malone 95,963 4 1.3% State Treasurer 
Paul Cellucci 136,258 58.7% Incumbent 
General 3-Nov-98 
Scott Harshbarger 90 1,843 47.4% 
Paul Cellucci 967,160 50.9% 
Democratic Primary 17-Sep-02 
2002 Steven Grossman* 5,976 0.8% Former Chair, Dem Nat'l 
Committee, MA Dem Party 
Warren Tolman 132,157 17.7% Former state senator 
Thomas Birmingham 179,703 24.1 % State Senate President 
Robert Reich 185,3 15 24.8% Former Secretary of Labor 
Shannon O'Brien 243,039 32.6% State Treasurer 
Republican Primary 17-Sep-02 
Mitt Romney 227,960 100.0% Businessman 
General 5-Nov-02 
Shannon O'Brien 985,981 47.4% 
Mitt Romney 1,091,988 52.6% 
*Included because I discuss his endorsements in the text. 
NEW MEXICO Vocation Candidate 
Quality Score 
1998 Democratic Primary 
Robert E. Virgil 
Jerry Apodaca 
Gary K. King 
Martin J. Chavez 
Republican Primary 
Gary Johnson 
General 
Martin J. Chavez (D) 
Gary Johnson (R) 
2002 Democratic Primary 
Bill Richardson 
Republican Primary 
Robert M. Burpo 
Walter D. Bradley 
John A. Sanchez 
General 
John A. Sanchez 
Bill Richardson 
2-Jun-98 
10,483 6.5% State Auditor 0 
16,303 10.2% Former Governor 3 
5 1,487 32.1 % State Representative 1 
82,147 5 1.2% Former Mayor, 1 
Albuquerque 
2- Jun-98 
64,669 100.0% Incumbent 
4-Jun-02 
147,524 100% Former Member of 1 
Congress, Former Secretary 
of Energy 
4-Jun-02 
3,864 4.2% State Representative 1 
33,206 36% Lieutenant Governor 2 
55,102 59.8% State Representative 1 
Vocation Candidate 
Quality 
Score 
1994 Democratic Primary 3-May-94 
Peter M. Schuller 286,275 
Robert L. Burch 408,159 
Professor 
State Senator 
Republican Primary 3-May-94 
George Voinovich 750,779 Incumbent 
General 1 -Nov-94 
Robert L. Burch 835,849 
George Voinovich 2,40 1,572 
1998 Democratic Primary 5-May-98 
Lee Fisher 663,832 Former Attorney General 
Secretary of State 
Republican Primary 5-May-98 
Robert A. Taft 69 1,946 
General 3 -Nov-98 
Lee Fisher 1,498,956 
Robert A. Taft 1,678,72 1 
200.2 Democratic Primary 7-May-02 
Timothy Hagan 467,572 Former Cuyahga County 
Commissioner 
Republican Primary 7-May-02 
Robei-t A. Taft 552,49 1 Incumbent 
General 5-Nov-02 
Timothy Hagan 1,263,924 
Robert A. Taft 1,865,007 
TEXAS Vocation Candidate 
Quality 
Score 
1994 Democratic Primary 
Gary Espinosa 
Ann Richards 
22.2% Retired 
77.8% Incumbent 
Republican Primarv 
Ray Hollis 
George W. Bush 
6.7% Retired 
93.3% Baseball team owner 
General 
Ann Richards 
George W. Bush 
1998 Democratic Primary 
Gany Mauro 100.0% Land Commissioner, Dem Pai-ty 
Exec. 
Republican Prirnarv 
George W. Bush 96.6% Incumbent 
General 
Garry Mauro 
George W. Bush 
2002 Democratic Primary 
Dan Morales 
Tony Sanchez 
35.2% Lawyer 
64.8% Businessman 
Republican Primary 
Rick Perry 100.0% Incumbent 
General 
Tony Sanchez 
Rick Perry 
